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Abstract
The objective of the chapters in this thesis is to examine the behavior
of farming households in rural Ethiopia where the assumption of perfect
markets may be violated by the presence of high transactions costs, thin
and isolated markets, and missing markets for insurance among other
goods or factors. Since farming households combine both producer and
consumer aspects of microeconomic analysis, constraints to consump-
tion decisions due to market failures are (or can be) relaxed through
production decisions. This forms the basis of the agricultural household
model formalizing non-separability of household decisions under market
failures. Using this model, the forms of these responses and their ef-
fectiveness have been examined using data on farmers’ choice of crops
such as selection between food and cash crops; and composition of crop
portfolio; and market participation decisions such as allocation of farm
output to market exchange and household consumption; from several
countries especially the developing world. These decisions are analyzed
through the lens of farmers’ efforts to internalize imperfect food mar-
kets through their farming decisions. In addition to production deci-
sions, other responses take the form of informally designed strategies
such as risk-sharing and state-contingent credit arrangements between
households facing missing insurance markets. We consider the use of
these strategies by farmers in rural Ethiopia using rich plot level data
added to information about household characteristics (including social
networks) and market/community infrastructure collected in repeated
rounds of survey starting from 1989 through 2009. We find that non-
separability or jointness in household decisions can be observed through
farmers’ crop choices and use of farm output. The extent to the non-
separability of household decisions appears to be particularly sensitive
to household characteristics such as size of food consumption and risk
attitude; and market characteristics such as distance to market as well
as community and market infrastructure. Informal risk-sharing arrange-
ments through mutual support between households also exist in rural
Ethiopia. It is observed that these informal insurance arrangements are
highly persistent between relatives and neighbors.
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1 Introduction
The thesis focused on examining the behavior of farming households in rural
Ethiopia where the assumption of perfect markets may be violated by the presence
of high transactions costs which constrain market participation decisions; thin and
isolated markets creating price risk; and missing markets for insurance under high
risk exposure thereby affecting farmers’ ability to achieve food security and ensure
consumption smoothing. Given that farming households combine both producer
and consumer aspects of microeconomic analysis, their behavior under various
assumptions about market conditions have been an interesting area of research
culminating into a large body of literature. Combining Chayanov’s concept of
subjective equilibrium, Becker’s allocation of time and other contributions from
studies on farming-households, Singh et al. (1986d) have built the agricultural
household model which combines both production and consumption aspects of a
typical farming-household.
Using this model, various theoretical and empirical studies have emerged. In
general, the theoretical contribution from this literature has shown that under
well-functioning or perfect markets, the producer and consumer sides of the farm-
ing household are only linked through farm profits from production which are
used to finance consumption decisions. This implies that production and con-
sumption decisions can be modeled as though they are sequentially determined
and farmers are price takers of exogenous market prices which equate to house-
hold shadow prices ensuring that household produced goods and owned factors
are perfect substitutes to market goods. This is referred to as the separability
of household decisions or the separable household model. On the other hand,
under market failures such as the presence of transactions costs or other market
features such as market isolation and missing markets, market prices no longer
reflect farmers’ valuation. The presence of a wedge between market and shadow
prices due to market failures breaks the perfect substitutability of goods produced
and/or factors owned by the household and similar market goods. This creates
incentives for farmers to adjust their production decisions with consumption pref-
erences in mind. As a result, household characteristics relating to consumption
decisions such as demographics, size of food demand etc. affect production deci-
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sions. This relationship has been attributed to constraints on household decisions
such as their ability to balance household food demand, to substitute family with
hired labor; to ensure consumption smoothing through borrowing among other
effects. To relax these constraints, farmers have incentives to internalize markets
which are missing or costly to participate. As a result, decisions relating to pro-
duction and/or consumption decisions are determined by household shadow prices
instead of exogenous market prices. This establishes jointness in the production
and consumption decisions (which are no longer linked by farm profits only). This
relationship between production and consumption decisions is the central pillar of
the non-separable household model. This model shows that under market failures,
farmers’ adjust their production decisions such as their choice of crops and com-
position of crop portfolio; and their market participation decisions such as their
allocation of farm harvest between market exchange and household consumption
when the subjective equilibrium of the goods they produce and consume; and the
factors they own and use; falls within the price bands imposed by market failures.
Several studies have empirically tested the implications of the agricultural house-
hold model under varying assumptions about markets. From tests of the (non)separability
of household decisions; the substitutability of family and hired labor; to parametric
approaches to estimate shadow prices, efforts to understand the behavior of farm-
ing households in developing countries continues to attract a lot of interest. As
data quality improves, various forms of market failures are being identified along
with the increased creativity of farmers as they devise mechanisms of operating un-
der market failure. Farmers’ responses to market failures- whether through their
farming activities and/or their interactions with other households has been the
focus of several recent studies. Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) call these responses
“creativity in the context of adversity”. These studies have used data relating to
farmers’ production decisions- such as crop choices, choice of farming technology;
allocation of labor and farm harvest decisions among several others to examine
the extent to which they constitute responses to constraints imposed by market
failures. For instance, constraints on consumption decisions of a given household
can be relaxed through production decisions such as the production of food crops
rather than cash crops; and allocation of farm output for household consumption
rather than market exchange. Across households, constraints imposed by missing
2
insurance markets can in principle be relaxed through repeated interactions be-
tween households resulting in informally designed insurance arrangements such as
mutual support and other risk-sharing agreements.
Despite the developments in the theoretical and empirical literature on agricul-
tural households, several gaps still exist. In a recent review of the literature on
agricultural household models, Janvry and Sadoulet (2006), pointed out the gap in
our understanding of the size of the extent to which the production of food crops
instead of cash crops by subsistence farmers in developing countries is driven by
concerns about food security relative to other factors which influence crop choices.
Several studies have mostly focused on examining the extent to which observed
production decisions reflect (non)separability of household decisions. The factors
which drive the non-separability of production and consumption decisions; and
the differences in the size of their influence have mostly been ignored in the litera-
ture despite its importance for the formulation of agricultural policy such as price
incentives, subsidies among others. Another issue raised by LaFave and Thomas
(2014) relates to limitations in data. Several studies on farmers’ crop choices have
used household level data leaving other factors such as plot characteristics (espe-
cially where farmers use multiple plots to farm different crops) which affect crop
choices largely ignored. In terms of informal risk-sharing arrangements, several
studies have mostly focused on examining the effectiveness of these arrangements
with other issues such as the evolution of these arrangements overtime mostly ig-
nored.
We take up these issues in the chapters of the thesis using plot-level crop choices
and allocation of farm output combined with information on household and mar-
ket characteristics (including household risk-sharing network) from farmers in ru-
ral Ethiopia. We examine the hypothesis that where constraints on household
utility maximization due to market failures are binding, the resulting jointness in
household decisions implies observed farming decisions such as crop choices and al-
location of farm harvest between market exchange and household consumption are
responses to relax the constraints. Other forms of these responses under missing
markets include informal arrangements through social networks. Through farm-
ing decisions, households can internalize food markets through the production of
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crops and allocation of farm harvest for household consumption rather than market
exchange. Similarly, through repeated interactions between households, missing
insurance markets can be internalized through systems of mutual support enforced
by social norms among neighbors and family members.We test the first component
of this hypothesis using data on farmers’ choice of crops and diversity of crop port-
folio into food and cash crops; allocation of farm output between market exchange
and household consumption; and market conditions with indicators of transactions
costs such as distance to markets, road conditions and market infrastructure. We
investigate the extent to which farmers internalize food markets through their crop
choices and use of farm output in the first and second chapters of the thesis re-
spectively.
In the third chapter, we focus on the persistence of risk-sharing arrangements
within household networks. Using data from two rounds of survey of household
networks containing information about individuals on whom a given household
relies on for support and their characteristics, we examine the extent to which the
persistence of these arrangements between households overtime is influenced by
strategic factors to maximize insurance or social factors such as altruism.
In the first chapter, we investigate the extent to which farmers’ crop choices re-
flect non-separability of household decisions due to constraints on consumption
decisions. The presence of market frictions such as transactions costs is likely to
constraint households’ ability to balance food demand through market exchange.
For farming households, these constraints can be relaxed by internalizing food
markets through crop choices- by producing food instead of cash crops. We test
this hypothesis using rich plot-level panel data of farmers in rural Ethiopia to
examine: farmers’ choice of food and cash crops and the extent to which they
diversify their crop portfolio. Under this hypothesis, farmers facing constraints
on food demand have incentives to produce food crops for household consumption
thereby reducing reliance on markets to balance household food demand. Thus,
farmers’ crop diversity (especially food crops) should reflect the extent to which
food markets are internalized to achieve food security. We test this implication of
the hypothesis through the effect of crop diversity on consumption using a panel
data of the same farmers collected over ten years. Previous studies have mostly
used household level data to examine crop choices of subsistence farmers. We
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contribute to this literature by using rich plot-level data to examine the extent
to which crop selection and diversity is influenced by simultaneity of household
decisions. Furthermore, we also complement this analysis by estimating the effect
of crop diversity on household consumption overtime.
In the second chapter, we investigate transactions costs effects on farmers’ market
participation through their use of farm harvest for market exchange and household
consumption. We test the hypothesis that the presence of transactions costs con-
strains farmers’ market participation by lowering returns from market exchange
of farm output thereby increasing gains from alternative uses of farm harvest such
as household consumption. Previous studies have largely focused on the effects of
transactions costs on market exchange. However, for farming households facing
joint determination of production and consumption decisions, transactions costs
are likely to also affect farmers’ use of farm harvest for household consumption.
The second chapter makes a contribution in this regard. We also examine the het-
erogeneity of transactions costs effects across crop choices (categorized into cash
and non-cash crops); and across farmers based on differences in diversity of crop
portfolio. We test this hypothesis using three rounds of the Ethiopia Rural House-
hold Survey (ERHS) data collected between 1999 and 2009.
In the fourth and final empirical chapter, we examine the persistence of links
within risk-sharing networks of households in rural Ethiopia. Using two rounds of
data collected over a five year period, we identify persistent links as individuals
listed in both periods by households as their source of support in times of need.
We investigate the extent to which the persistence of links in these networks are
driven by strategic or social factors. Under strategic considerations, households are
assumed to choose risk-sharing partners to maximize gains from insurance. On the
other hand, risk-sharing arrangements between households (especially with family
members and close neighbors) may persist overtime due to social factors such as
altruism. We consider these explanations in the chapter using attributes of links
in repeatedly observed risk-sharing networks in Ethiopia.
In general we find statistical evidence that indicators of household food demand
such as the share of household expenditure allocated to food consumption; and
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risk attitude have significant effect on farmers’ choice of crops- especially in the
production of food crops. We interpret this effect as concerns about food security
and the likelihood of being constrained by market conditions creating incentives
to internalize food markets. In terms of the allocation of farm harvest between
market exchange and household consumption, it was observed that indicators of
transactions costs such as distance to market lowers the volume of farm output
sold and increases the proportion of household consumption obtained through farm
harvest. On the other hand, improvements in roads and markets are associated
with an increased volume of farm output used for market exchange; and a decrease
in the amount use for household consumption. We interpret these results as the
role of costly exchange of farm output due to transactions costs which create disin-
centives for farmers to participate in markets as sellers of farm output and possibly
in making purchases for household consumption. Due to the relationship between
production and consumption decisions for farming households, the production of
food crops and the use of farm harvest for household consumption under binding
constraints on market participation, is constrained-optimal since it enables house-
holds to internalize food markets.
Our analysis of the persistence of links in risk-sharing networks also shows that link
attributes such as kinship relations, proximity (both in terms of neighborhood and
farming area), connectedness of links and endowments (such as land) significantly
influence the persistence of links in risk-sharing networks. Further examination of
the persistence of specific links indicate that the effects of these factors differ in
magnitude and statistical significance across links with family members and neigh-
bors; as well as based on type of relationship- money-lending and labor sharing
links.
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2 Market Conditions and Farmers’ Crop Choices Under
Possible Constraints on Household Consumption.
Abstract
We investigate the extent to which farmers’ crop choices reflect non-separability
of household decisions due to constraints on consumption decisions. The presence
of market frictions such as transactions costs is likely constraint households’ abil-
ity to balance food demand through market exchange. For farming households, these
constraints can be relaxed by internalizing food markets through crop choices-by pro-
ducing food instead of cash crops. We test this hypothesis using rich plot-level panel
data of farmers in rural Ethiopia to examine: farmers’ choice of food and cash crops
and the extent to which they diversify their crop portfolio. Under this hypothesis,
farmers facing constraints on food demand have incentives to produce food crops for
household consumption thereby reducing reliance on markets to balance household
food demand. Thus, farmers’ crop diversity (especially food crops) should reflect
the extent to which food markets are internalized to achieve food security. We test
this implication of the hypothesis through the effect of crop diversity on consump-
tion using a panel data of the same farmers collected over ten years. Previous studies
have mostly used household level data to examine crop choices of subsistence farmers.
We contribute to this literature by using rich plot-level data to examine the extent
to which crop selection and diversity is influenced by simultaneity of household de-
cisions. Furthermore, we complement this analysis by estimating the effect of crop
diversity on household consumption overtime. We find that the size of household food
consumption significantly increases farmers’ likelihood of specializing in food crops.
A similar effect was also observed in farmers’ selection of food crops at plot-level.
Differences in risk-preferences also affect crop choices- with risk loving farmers being
more likely to diversify their crop portfolio and select cash crops instead of food crops.
Keywords: Crop choice, Ethiopia, farming households, markets, conditional logit ,
Poisson regression.
JEL Classification: D130 O130 Q120
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2.1 Introduction
The focus of the chapter is to investigate the extent to which farmers’ crop
choices are influenced by interdependence of household production and consump-
tion decisions. Since farming households make production and consumption deci-
sions, the nature of the interdependence between these decisions (whether joint or
separate) has a significant implication on household behavior and hence observed
choices. Under separate/sequential decisions, farmers choose optimal production
decisions the returns from which are used to finance household consumption. How-
ever, under joint/simultaneous decisions, household production and consumption
decisions are not only linked through farm profits/income, but also through the ef-
fect of consumption preferences on production decisions. Simultaneity of household
decisions may result from market failures such as the presence of high transactions
costs, thin and isolated markets and incomplete markets such as missing markets
for insurance (especially where farmers are risk averse). The presence of these
frictions in food markets, imposes constraints on household food consumption de-
cisions. For farming households, these constraints can be relaxed by internalizing
food markets through crop choices. Thus farmers facing binding constraints on
household consumption have incentives to produce food crops and diversify their
crop portfolio to reduce reliance on markets to balance household food demand.
We test this hypothesis in two ways. In the first part of the chapter, we use rich
plot-level panel data of farmers in rural Ethiopia to examine the extent to which
farmers’ choice between food and cash crops; and diversification of crop portfolio
reflect efforts to internalize food markets. We investigate the extent to which these
decisions are constrained optimal responses to binding constraints on household
food consumption through the effects of household and market characteristics. For
farming households to internalize food markets through production decisions, ob-
served crop choices are expected to be sensitive to household characteristics such
as size of food consumption and risk-attitude; and market characteristics such as
indicators of transactions costs to market participation. We examine the effects
of these factors on the likelihood of farmers’ specializing in food crops instead of
producing cash crops, and the extent to which they diversify their crop portfolio
(producing food and cash crops).. In addition to household-level crop choices,
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and as a contribution to the existing literature we also consider farmers’ plot-level
choice of food and cash crops under the same hypothesis. With plot-level data,
concerns about the effect of plot characteristics on crop choices and farmers’ mul-
tiple crop choices across several plots can be captured.
Farmers’ ability to relax constraints on household food demand through crop
choices can also be examined through the effect of crop diversity on household
consumption. Where food markets are internalized through crop choices, farmers
with more diversified crop portfolios are expected to be less constrained by frictions
in output markets and hence achieve food security. We test this implication of the
hypothesis in the second part of the chapter through the effect of crop diversity on
household consumption overtime using data collected in different intervals over a
ten-year period to form a balanced panel. Crop diversity is constructed as an index
of the number of food and cash crops produced by farmers in each farming period.
To align the analysis in both parts of the chapter, the same set of households is
considered in both pars of the chapter - except that in the first part, the data is
available at plot-level whereas in the second part, we use household-level data.
Throughout our analysis, we define food crops as crops such as cereals that are pro-
duced predominantly for household consumption; whereas cash crops such as coffee
are mostly produced for market exchange. In rural Ethiopia where a large number
of the farmers are small-scale and rain-dependent, returns from farming represent
a substantial portion of household income from which household consumption is
financed. The Central Statistical Agency (CSA) of Ethiopia reports that there
are 12.8 million small-scale farmers in Ethiopia cultivating 96.3% total land area
yielding 95% of total agricultural production (Chamberlin and Schmidt (2011)).
Furthermore, as in most developing countries, markets are often less integrated and
incomplete with missing insurance markets and poorly developed credit markets.
These conditions impose constraints on household decisions such as their ability
to balance household food demand. For agricultural or semi-commercial house-
holds, the presence of these constraints establishes jointness/non-separability of
production and consumption decisions. See Singh et al. (1986d); De Janvry et al.
(1991a); Kurosaki and Fafchamps (2002); Taylor and Adelman (2003); Caillavet
et al. (1994), among several others.
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The chapter draws from the literature on the non-separability of household de-
cisions in farming communities, and its implications on agricultural decisions.
Several studies have examined the existence of jointness in household decisions
and the extent to which it is driven by market conditions. Sadoulet and De Jan-
vry (1995a) have shown that where market frictions such as transactions costs exist
in output and/or input markets, the equality of shadow and market prices breaks.
The inequality of prices imposes constraints on farmers’ market participation and
their ability to satisfy consumption decisions. This is a result of the breakdown
of perfect substitutability of self-produced and market produced goods which is
assumed in the absence of market frictions. However, through production deci-
sions, farmers can relax these constraints by producing crops needed for household
consumption thereby internalizing food markets. Similarly, the presence of price
or yield risk in an environment with missing insurance markets breaks the equality
of market and shadow prices. This is as a result of farmers’ discount of expected
output and prices due to risk aversion affecting both production and consumption
decisions resulting in non-separability.
This hypothesis has been tested in several studies through factors influencing farm-
ers’ choice between food and cash crops; low-risk low return crops and high-risk
high return crops; traditional and improved or hybrid varieties of crops among
others Fafchamps (1992). Most of the studies on crop choices and its link with
non-separability of household decisions use household level data in which farmers
are classified into either food or cash crop producers. This approach ignores the
effect of plot-specific factors which are likely to influence crop choices and the
possibility of farmers’ producing both food and cash crops on several plots. This
chapter aims to contribute to the literature by using rich plot-level data in addi-
tion to the typical household level categorization of food and cash crop producers.
Drawing from this literature we examine the hypothesis that farmers’ choice be-
tween food and cash crops at plot-level is influenced by binding constraints on
household consumption. We also complement this analysis by examining the ef-
fect of crop diversity at household-level on household consumption overtime using
five rounds of data to form a balanced panel.
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We find statistical evidence that the size of household food demand and risk-
preferences significantly affect their choice of cash crops over food crops. Increase
in food consumption (especially among more risk-averse farmers) significantly de-
creases farmers’ probability of selecting cash crops relative to food crops. We also
find that as farmers become more risk-averse, their likelihood of producing food
crops increases. These results imply that under joint household decisions, farmers
have incentives to produce food crops for household consumption thereby reducing
reliance on markets to meet food demand. These gains are likely to ensure house-
hold food security as indicated by the positive effect of crop diversity on household
consumption estimated using five rounds of household data. For risk-averse farm-
ers with large food demand, gains from internalizing food markets may be larger
than returns from cash crop production or specialization making their observed
crop choices constrained-optimal.
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2.2 Literature Review
Farming households make production, consumption, and labor allocation deci-
sions to maximize profits and utility. Production decisions such as crop choices
and composition of crop portfolio; consumption decisions such as choosing be-
tween consuming farm output or market goods, and labor allocations to agricul-
tural and non-agricultural activities, use of family or hired labor; may be done
jointly or sequentially. Joint household decisions imply that household decisions
are non-separable and thus farmers make production decisions with consumption
preferences in mind. On the other hand, under sequential decisions, farmers make
production decisions to maximize profits followed by consumption and labor al-
location decisions to maximize utility. Differences in household decision making
process have both behavioral and policy implications, especially among subsis-
tence farmers in developing countries. Several studies have examined production
and consumption decisions of farming households with the objective of providing
answers to questions such as:
• Are production and consumption decisions of farming households jointly or
sequentially determined?
• What conditions influence the joint or separate determination of both deci-
sions?
• How does the relationship between farmers’ production and consumption de-
cisions affect their behavior and its implication on agricultural policy?
The contribution of the chapter is linked to the latter aspect of the literature.
We examine farmers’ crop choices and the extent to which they are influenced by
jointness of production and consumption decisions. By these decisions, we imply
crop choices and household food demand respectively.
2.2.1 Production and Consumption Decisions of Agricultural House-
holds:
In studying the behavior of subsistence farmers with regards to their produc-
tion and consumption decisions, two approaches have been considered. The first
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assumes that farmers make production decisions to maximize profits which are
then used to finance consumption decisions to maximize utility. Through this se-
quential nature of household decisions, production and consumption sides of the
household can be examined as being separately determined - hence the separable
household model. On the other hand, the joint determination of household de-
cisions implies farmers make production decisions while considering consumption
preferences. This occurs where constraints on household consumption are relaxed
through production decisions establishing jointness of both household decisions
hence the non-separable household model.
Through this distinction, the extent to which observed production decisions such
as farmers’ choice of crops and production technology are profit maximizing can
be examined to determine whether household decisions are separable or not. For
farming-households, the separability of household decisions can be analyzed through
the extent to which observed farming decisions are profit maximizing or in line with
agricultural commercialization rather than other household objectives such as en-
suring food security. This approach has been the basis for formulating testable
hypothesis in several empirical studies on the separability of production and con-
sumption decisions of farming households. In particular, farmers’ choice between
food and cash crops; or low-risk but low return and high-risk but high return crops,
choice between improved and traditional varieties of inputs, and farmers’ responses
to exogenous price changes through supply and crop choices among several oth-
ers have be examined through the hypothesis of separable of household decisions.
On crop choices, see Von Braun and Kennedy (1986), Arslan and Taylor (2009)
and Arslan (2011) for empirical examples. Similarly, the diversification of crop
portfolio instead of specialization and the use of traditional instead of modern
and yield improving inputs have been examined under the same hypothesis- see
Morris (2007) for a recent review. Apart from crop choices, farmers’ response to
exogenous price changes have also been examined in the context of profit maxi-
mization in several studies. In particular negative and weak price elasticities of
supply among farmers following policy interventions to increase market price are
contrary to expectations- See Lau et al. (1978),Yoshimi et al. (1978) , Audavid-
haya et al. (1984); Singh et al. (1986a) and Strauss (1984a).
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These observations from production decisions of farmers and several other similar
agricultural decisions suggest that understanding the behavior of farming house-
holds requires a first hand understanding of their decision making process. As such,
identification of the conditions which influence separability or non-separability of
production and consumption decisions becomes a fundamental preliminary step.
2.2.2 Conditions for Separability and Non-Separability of Household
Decisions.
In the literature on agricultural households, the difference between separability
and non-separability of household decisions has been attributed to market condi-
tions and its effect on the substitutability of household and market produced goods.
On one end is a household model which assumes perfect markets - i.e. markets
are able to provide perfect substitutes to household produced goods which implies
equality of market and shadow prices. Other features of this assumption include
the belief that markets are complete and competitive, free of market frictions such
as significant participation/transactions costs to ensure perfect substitutability of
farm output and market goods; family labor and hired labor; and on-farm and off-
farm employment Singh et al. (1986d)Caillavet et al. (1994). This implies absence
of transactions costs in the marketing of farm output; existence of credit, insurance,
intermediate and other production related input markets. Under these conditions,
production and consumption decisions can be modeled as if they are made sepa-
rately since consumption decisions are unconstrained by market conditions. Hence,
household decisions can be thought as a two-stage process- the first stage involves
making production decisions to maximize profits; followed by consumption deci-
sions to maximize utility. Analytically, these conditions create recursiveness in
production and consumption decisions of farming households with profits from op-
timal production decisions used to maximize utility from consumption- hence the
name separable household model.
On the other hand, the absence of perfect substitutes for household produced
goods, adds a constraint to household consumption decisions. This occurs when
market frictions such as transactions costs drive a wedge between shadow and mar-
ket prices; or other factors which create a difference in utility from the consumption
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of market and household produced goods creating a missing market. This issues
have been discussed in a recent review by LaFave and Thomas (2014) and sev-
eral other previous work [Neary and Roberts (1980); Singh et al. (1986b,c); Taylor
and Adelman (2003); Caillavet et al. (1994); Coyle et al. (1994)]) challenging the
validity of the perfect market assumption. These market conditions have been ob-
served in rural communities of developing countries where markets are imperfect:
often undeveloped with transactions costs and other frictions; and/or incomplete:
missing insurance and credit markets; which constrain household decisions. The
breakdown of perfect substitution creates an additional constraint on consumption
decision- the inequality between market and shadow prices implies an endogenous
budget constraint linking production and consumption decisions of farmers. As a
result, households’ ability to satisfy consumption decisions is affected. To relax
these constraints, farmers may find it optimal to satisfy household consumption
from own-farm output hence the simultaneity of production and consumption de-
cisions in a non-separable household model .
Although the assumption of perfect markets has a significant bearing on the sep-
arability and non-separability of household decisions, this is only a sufficient con-
dition but not necessary for household decisions to modeled as being separately
determined. From the discussion above, it can be observed that separability is
achieved when farmers are price takers (i.e. market prices are exogenous rather
then endogenous shadow prices) and markets are used to execute transactions.
This is often the case when frictions such as transactions costs; market attributes
such as market isolation or less integration; and missing markets for insurance etc.
are absent. It is for this reason that the non-separability of household decision is
often examined along the lines of such market conditions.
2.2.3 Implications of Non-Separability on Production Decisions of Farm-
ing Households.
The conditions for non-separability of household decisions have been used to
formulate testable hypotheses about agricultural decisions of farming households.
For instance, under perfect markets, the separability of household decisions im-
plies that households are price takers and only changes in exogenous factors such
as market prices are expected to influence household decisions. Several empirical
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studies have examined this hypothesis through the responsiveness of farm output
(or marketed surplus) to changes in market price. Statistical evidence from these
studies indicate negative and/or weak price elasticities which are contrary to the
traditional Slutsky effect which is expected under separable household decisions
and perfect markets. These results are explained in a non-separable household
model as an endogenous household budget constraint resulting from a wedge be-
tween market and household shadow prices due to market failure. Since market
prices of goods produced and consumed by the household; and factors owned and
use by the household no longer reflect their respective subject/shadow prices, de-
cisions relating to the marketing and consumption of farm output; and supply and
demand of factors; are driven by shadow prices instead of market prices. As a
result, household attributes (taste or preference shifters as they are often called)
which influence shadow prices such as demographics, size of food consumption
among others affect production decisions through shadow prices thereby establish-
ing jointness of household decisions- (the profit effect-Yoshimi et al. (1978)). This
creates possibilities of both positive and negative price elasticities- See Henning
and Henningsen (2007) for a recent work on farmers’ response to price changes. It
is as a result of this that policy interventions such as price incentives which ignore
market failures do not create desired impacts.
In addition to farmer’s reaction to exogenous price changes, the implications of the
assumptions underpinning the separable household model on household behavior
have been examined through:
• Testing perfect substitution through households’ choice between market and
household-own goods (farm output and market goods for consumption; and
hired versus family labor for household labor demand); and
• A parametric approach of testing equality of shadow and market prices as
implied by perfect substitutability assumption of perfect markets.
The analysis of farming decisions examined through these approaches has been
done by studying the extent to which market frictions such as transactions costs;
or incomplete markets such as missing credit and insurance markets affect the
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substitutability of market and household produced goods.
Transactions Costs Effects and Farming Decisions
The role of transactions costs in non-separable household models has been con-
sidered through its effect on marketing farm output. It has been argued that
the presence of transactions costs lowers incentives for market participation by de-
creasing returns to market exchange of farm output which affect farmers’ ability to
satisfy consumption decisions- Renkow (1990), Goetz (1992a) among several oth-
ers. Similarly, these costs may also trigger non-market frictions such as traditional
and cultural factors (or subjective values as discussed in Arslan and Taylor (2009)),
which affect shadow prices of farm output (such as seed quality preservation- a phe-
nomenon also quite typical of African farmers) resulting in differences in utility
and imperfect substitution between own-farm output and market goods. Recent
findings by Bevis (2015) also showed that heterogeneity in nutrients content (zinc
in particular) between home and market produced staple crops may drive farmers
choice between market and household produced goods. These factors may quite
possibly be an alternative explanation for farmer’s choice of maize variety in the
paper by Arslan and Taylor (2009)- in addition to subjectivity, choice of traditional
varieties maybe constrained-optimal response to constraints imposed by transac-
tions costs in the markets for improved varieties of maize.
The effect of transactions costs on the diversification of farming activities has
also been studied. Omamo (1998a) examined the role of transaction costs in small
scale farmers’ decision to diversify or specialize in their agricultural production
decisions using data from Kenya. Conceptually, when transactions costs impose
binding constraints on market participation, anticipated efficiency gains from spe-
cialization in the production of certain crops could be undermined by disutility
from costly participation in markets. Omamo modeled households’ comparison
of gains between specialization and diversification in the face of transaction costs
using a General Algebric Modelling System (GAMS) which combines linear pro-
gramming production system with a translog utility function. Focusing on distance
to market as a measure of transaction costs1, he found that as distance increases
1Search, bargaining and waiting costs are ignored largely due to their unobservable nature
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(greater cost of participating in markets), inter-crop becomes the dominant tech-
nology of production. This implies that as trading costs rise, the opportunity cost
of specialization rises making it more profitable to diversify production.
Similarly, Van Dusen and Taylor (2005) examined the effect of transactions costs in
the form of distance to markets on farmers’ decision to diversify crop choices using
Poisson regression techniques on data from Mexico. They examined composition
of farmers’ crop portfolio (maize, beans and squash) and for each of these choices,
the number of varieties selected using Poisson regressions to account for the dis-
crete and count nature of farmer choices as defined above. Among the key findings
was that improvement in market conditions (for instance more integration) low-
ers participation costs thereby reducing the likelihood of farmers diversifying crop
choices since incentives to specialize increases.
Several other studies have examined the effect of transactions costs and other mar-
ket frictions on household labor allocation decisions. Barnum and Squire (1979)
examined the substitutability of household labor and hired labor when the former
is allocated to off-farm work among farmers in Malaysia. A key result from their
paper was that family labor was more likely to be replaced by remaining amount of
family labor instead of using hired labor contrary to expectations of perfect substi-
tutability of labor. Similar result was obtained by Rosenzweig (1980) in his study
of labor allocation decisions among classes of land holding and land-less farmers
in India. He further argued that the imperfect substitutability of family and hired
labor maybe attributed to the inequality between shadow and market wages of
labor driven by factors such as labor immobility especially among land holding
households and women. Other studies on the imperfect substitution of family and
hired labor have examined the of role of supervision costs as distortions to market
and shadow wage equality in the use of hired labor as a substitute to family labor:
Benjamin (1992), Lopez (1984, 1986) among others; and the effect of participation
costs driven by low integration (isolated) and thin markets across space: Feder
(1985) and Bardhan and Udry (1999). Under a non-separable household model,
the presence of these frictions may affect both labor allocations and production
decisions such as farmers’ choice of less labor intensive crops.
Another approach to examine the assumption of perfect market involves para-
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metric approaches used to estimate shadow prices. This motivated by the fact
that perfect markets imply equality of shadow and market prices. Arslan and
Taylor (2009) empirically estimated shadow prices of farmers’ subsistence crops in
Mexico focusing on two categories of maize farmers: users of traditional varieties
and users of improved varieties; and commercial or non-commercial farmers2. They
examined the equality of market and estimated shadow prices of traditional and
modern varieties of maize produced by commercial and non-commercial farmers
against the null hypothesis of equality as assumed in perfect markets. They failed
to reject the null hypothesis for maize farmers using modern varieties. However
for commercial and non-commercial traditional variety farmers, the null hypoth-
esis was rejected. Thus, statistical evidence to support equality of shadow and
market prices of traditional maize farmers was not found. The authors argued
that inequality between market and shadow prices may be due to the existence of
transactions costs in markets. This affects decisions of farmers by imposing price
bands relative to shadow prices which ultimately determines their choice of maize
market to participate. Similar techniques have also been applied on other farming
decisions such as labor supply decisions: Lopez (1984); Jacoby (1993)3,Benjamin
(1992), Skoufias (1994) and Abdulai and Regmi (2000).
Missing Markets and Farming Decisions
Apart from transactions costs effects discussed above, the effects on market
participation resulting in missing markets have also been considered in the liter-
ature. More formally, “...a market fails when the cost of a transaction through
market exchange creates disutility greater than the utility gain that it produces,
with the result that the market is not used for the transaction [resulting in miss-
ing markets]”(De Janvry et al. (1991a) p.1401)4. To examine the extent to which
household decisions are affected by transactions costs, additional constraints are
added to the household decision making process. In the case of production deci-
sions, the presence of transactions costs such as search, bargaining and transporta-
tion costs etc. affect the marketing of farm output by lowering gains from market
2with commercial farming defined as farmers who sold more than 30% of their maize output
3Jacoby et al. (1988) is an earlier unpublished version.
4Stiglitz (1989) discussed the effect of imperfect information on product market failures in developing
countries.
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exchange. As a result farmers’ decision to sell farm output is constrained by the
extent to which market prices differ from farmers’ valuation of farm output- i.e.
their shadow price. This participation constraint is often formulated by specifying
price boundaries which determine farmers’ choice of participating or not.
Similarly, in the case of consumption decisions, the presence of transactions costs
increase the cost of financing household consumption since market prices adjusted
for transactions costs are higher. As a result, farmers’ decision to purchase market
goods for household consumption is constrained by the extent to which market
prices differ from utility associated with consuming such goods. As a result, farm-
ers’ ability to balance household food demand is affected since participation in
food markets may be costly5.
In both production and consumption decisions, non-participation in ’formal ’ mar-
kets is constrained-optimal under binding constraints to market participation.
From the latter part of the statement mentioned above from De Janvry et al.
(1991a), non-participation in this context occurs when farmers use or devise alter-
natives to formal markets in selling farm output and/or satisfying household food
consumption thereby rending such markets missing . Under non-separable produc-
tion and consumption decisions, this is synonymous to internalizing formal markets
through household decisions. For instance, in the case of missing food markets,
farmers may respond through crop choices and composition of crop portfolio by
producing more of food crops. As a result, observed choice and diversity of crops,
may constitute optimal responses to constrained consumption decisions. Thus, in
the context of a utility maximizing framework, farmers’ choice between food and
cash crops can be examined as a function of relative differences between gains from
internalized food markets through food crop production and profits from cash crop
production. This provides a plausible explanation for farmers’ choice of food crops
over cash crops (even though the latter provides higher returns) and crop diversity
as oppose to specialization which are widely observed in several developing coun-
tries (Von Braun and Kennedy (1986)).
In addition to these conditions, markets may also be incomplete. This occurs when
5Similar analogy can be extended to missing labor markets and the use of family labor; missing input
markets such as fertilizer and seeds and the preservation of inputs across farming seasons.
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markets for certain goods/services which are needed by farmers such as credit and
insurance are absent- [Eswaran and Kotwal (1986, 1989)]. Incomplete markets af-
fect farmers’ ability to use efficient production technology due to credit constraints
and concerns about risk in the use of new technology. Differences in households’
risk bearing abilities as discussed by Ellis (1992) such as production and income
risk Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) have differential effects on farmers and
across different farming decisions. Mendola (2007) discusses the welfare implica-
tions of such market imperfections on farmers’ choice of farming technology; Feder
et al. (1985); Feder (1985) discuss the effect of risk introduced by volatility in farm
output and prices due to low yield agricultural production technology; distant, thin
and isolated markets; and weather shocks to yield; on production decisions. In a
non-separable household model, incomplete insurance markets also affect produc-
tion decisions through its effect on consumption. For instance, risk-averse farmers
may choose to insure household consumption by producing food crops or low risk
crops (Dercon (1996)); and to diversify rather than specialize in the production of a
single crop. Fafchamps (1992) simulated large and small households’ likelihood of
selecting cash crops relative to food crops when households face multivariate risk.
The paper explains farmer’s choice of food over cash crops along the lines of the
desire to ensure food sufficiency under imperfect markets and missing insurance
markets. In this context, the imperfection of markets may stem from isolation of
markets which creates volatility in food prices and ultimately farm income- the
risk of which small farm households may not be able to sustain and thus find it
optimal to satisfy household consumption before venturing into cash crop produc-
tion. The higher net returns from cash crop production enable farmers to relax
liquidity constraints especially where credit markets are missing.
In summary, the existing literature indicates that non-separability of farmers’ pro-
duction and consumptions decisions may be driven by market frictions such as
transactions costs or incomplete and missing markets. These conditions result in
the breakdown of the substitutability of household and market produced goods
thereby constraining households’ ability to balance its food demand. Responding
to these constraints through production decisions establishes jointness of house-
hold decisions. This can be examined through farmers’ choice of crops and the
extent to which they constitute responses to constraints on household consump-
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tion. Building on this, we consider two extensions:
• Using plot-level data to examine the extent to which farmers’ choice between
food and cash crops is influenced by constraints on household food consump-
tion and the need to internalize food markets.
• Examining the extent to which gains from crop diversity under non-separable
household decisions are reflected on household consumption using five rounds
of data on farmers’ crop diversity and consumption outcomes.
The first part of the chapter attempts to investigate the extent to which farmers’
selection of food crops over cash crops constitute efforts to internalize food markets
due to the presence of transactions costs which constrain household food demand.
Previous studies have mostly used household level data. We use a rich plot-level
data of crop choices, plot characteristics, household and community characteristics
in a given farming season. The use of household-level data ignores plot-level char-
acteristics which may significantly affect crop choices such as soil quality, plot sizes
and other agronomic factors. This shortcoming has been stressed in a recent survey
by LaFave and Thomas (2014). Household-level data also has limitations in it’s ap-
plicability in environments where farmers produce multiple crops since the choice
is only defined at household level. We also examine the hypothesis that farmers’
respond to constraints on household food demand due to imperfect food markets
through crop choices using alternative definition- crop diversity. In the presence
on constraints on household food demand, diversification of crop production (es-
pecially food crops) constitutes a strategy to insure household food consumption
and consumption smoothing. We test this hypothesis using five rounds of data
containing a measure of crop.
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2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Conceptual Framework
We consider an environment where households’ main economic activity is rain-
fed, multi-crop farming. Under these conditions, observed crop choices may be
influenced by constraints on household consumption due to transactions costs to
market participation and/or risk-aversion to poor harvest due to rain variation.
Where these constraints are binding, farmers are unable to balance their food de-
mand through food markets. However, through crop choices and diversity, farmers
can internalize food markets by producing crops needed for household consump-
tion instead of other crops meant to market exchange. This possibility establishes
jointness between farmers’ production and consumption decisions. We test this
hypothesis through: the factors influencing farmers’ selection of crops: food ver-
sus cash crops; and scale of crop diversity. Food crops (mostly grains) are mainly
used for household consumption whereas cash crops (mostly coffee) are mainly sold
at exogenous market prices. Since farmers in this setting practice multi-cropping,
we examine crop choices at plot-level and at household level- between subsistence
farmers (producing food crops only) and non-subsistence farmers (producing both
food and cash crops).
2.3.2 Theoretical Model
In a recent review of the literature on agricultural household models, Janvry
and Sadoulet (2006) highlight a few guidelines including: modeling a household
model with market failure requires a definition of specific form of market failure;
and also that non-separability of household decisions is idiosyncratic in nature and
not a market characteristic. As such responses to the resulting constraints imposed
by market failures tend to vary across households. With these caveats in mind, we
use plot-level data with household and market characteristics to examine farmers
choice between food and cash crops and diversification of their crop portfolio into
food and cash crops through the lens of responses to constraints on household
food demand due to frictions in food markets such as high transactions costs. We
assume that farmers’ production decisions involve choice of crop(s), allocation of
resources across the production of different crops-labor allocation and scale and
choice of production technology- size of plots relative to total land endowment,
23
use of intermediate inputs etc. At household level, crop portfolio consists of food
and/or cash crops. Consumption decisions on the other hand involve choosing
quantity of own-farm produced goods, market goods and leisure. Non-separability
of household decisions implies that we consider both decisions jointly.
Following (De Janvry et al., 1991a), we model farmers’ production decisions to
consist of: choosing between (and/or among) food and cash crops (qfkand q
c
k re-
spectively) to produce on a given plot k, using family (own) labor-qfl , hired labor-
qhl and other intermediate inputs such as fertilizer, seeds etc. which are differenti-
ated based on source- household saved and market purchased:qhx , q
m
x respectively.
Household inputs (family labor and saved intermediate inputs) and market inputs
(hired labor and market purchased inputs) enter the production function separately
to control for possible differences in productivity due to imperfect substitution un-
der imperfect markets. More formally, this is expressed in the following production
function at plot-level:
fk (q; z,k) = 0 (1)
which can take the form of Cobb-Doughlas production function with standard mi-
croeconomic assumptions: q is a vector of outputs with positive values
(
qfk , q
c
k > 0
)
and inputs with negative values and convex
(
qfl , q
h
l , q
h
x , q
m
x < 0
)
. z and k are vec-
tors of household and plot characteristics influencing production. Other standard
microeconomic assumptions about the production function such as fk (.)being con-
tinuous and twice-continuously differentiable everywhere in the interior of the pro-
duction set and quasi-concavity apply. Although the chapter focuses on market
failures in food markets, the possibility of similar conditions in input markets as
highlighted in the literature review cannot be ruled out. As a result, in making
input choices, farmers are likely to be constrained by missing markets for land and
other intermediate inputs; the non-substitutability of family and hired labor; and
saved and market purchased seeds among others in addition to the typical budget
constraint to input choices. While we do not explicitly incorporate these issues
in input markets in great detail, it is expected their effect on household welfare
has implications on farmers’ crop choices which is the main focus of this chapter.
One implication from our assumptions about the production function is that farm-
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ers exhaust their land endowments by dividing their total land endowment into a
number of finite plots on which they produce different or the same crops. As a
result, we define crop choices and production decisions at plot-level.
Farmers diversify activities by producing several crops in each farming period.
Based on this definition, we measure crop diversity using information about the
number of food crops
(
qf
)
and cash crops (qc) produced by farmers in a given farm-
ing season. Crop diversity for each farmer is constructed as an index using the num-
ber of crops produced from a set of major food and cash crops in Ethiopia. Based
on statistics provided by (Taffesse et al. (2011)), we define the set of food and cash
crops as: f = {teff, barley, wheat,maize, sorghum} and c = {coffee, chat}
which are used in the plot-level analysis of crop choices. The proportion of food
and cash crops produced out their respective subsets is weighted to ensure that
the index of crop diversity sums up to one. By this measure, diversity of crop
portfolio increases with the number and type of crops produced.
ıt = θf
(∑F
qf=1
(
qf
)
f
)
+ θc
(∑C
qc=1 (q
c)
c
)
(2)
Where ıt is the measure of crop diversity for farmer ı in period t.; and θf and
θc represent weights which sum up to 1.
We define farmers’ consumption decision to be composed of: consumption of own-
farm output-cf ; market purchased goods-cmand leisure-cl. Under perfect markets
cf and cm are considered perfect substitutes and thus equally valued (pı = p¯ı) .
This implies that the farmer becomes indifferent as to whether he/she obtains con-
sumption goods from either farm harvest or market purchased. However, markets
maybe characterized by frictions such as taxes, transactions costs, missing insur-
ance markets under risk aversion, thin or isolated markets, and/or differences in
production technology creating quality/valuation differentials between farm out-
put and similar market goods-De Janvry et al. (1991a). The presence of these
conditions drive a wedge between shadow and market prices of farm output re-
sulting in inequality of prices (p∗ı 6= pı) . As a result, markets are believed to fail or
become imperfect since the substitutability of own farm output and similar market
goods breaks down. This creates constraints on household consumption decisions
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such as food consumption. Where these constraints are binding, farmers ability to
balance food consumption between farm harvest (including previous endowment
of the good such as stored food)- (qı + Tı); and market goods (cı) is affected. To
incorporate this effect of market failure, household consumption decisions are sep-
arated into tradable goods and non-tradables. Tradables (T) represent goods for
which perfect markets exist and their demand is expressed as a function of ex-
ogenous market prices. Non-tradales (NT) on the other hand represent goods for
which markets fail as a result their demand and supply decisions are influenced
by shadow rather than market prices. Example of NTs include food crops such
as cereals which are available in the market but also produced by the household;
whereas cash crops such as coffee which are produced largely for market exchange
are examples of tradables. Therefore, consumption of non-tradable goods can be
supplied by the household through farm harvest or purchased from the market.
The extent to which farmers choose the former instead of the latter is expected
to be sensitive to the constraints imposed by market frictions thereby affecting
crop choices and creating jointness in household decisions. Tradable commodities
(T) on the other hand represent household purchase of goods provided only by
the market. Thus, these goods are by construction assumed to be exchanged in
markets at exogenously observed prices. Households are assumed to be endowed
with: time-Tl; land-Tk = k, ..., K; initial endowment of a given commodity ı-Tıand
exogenous source of income S.
Putting together farmers’ production and consumption decisions as discussed above,
the following utility maximization problem can be formulated subject to a set of
constraints.
max
c,q
U (c, z) (3)
s.t. :
∑
ı∈T
pıcı ≤
∑
ı∈T
pı (qı + Tı) + S (4)
∑
k∈Tk
fk (q; z,k) = 0 (5)
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pı = p¯ı ı ∈ T (6)
qı + Tı ≥ cı ı ∈ NT (7)
where equation (4) represents the cash constraints on household tradables; equa-
tion (5) represents the constraint imposed by production technology on each plot
owned by the farmer. Equation (7) refers to the equilibrium condition for all trad-
ables which are valued at exogenous market prices. Equation (6) refers to the
equilibrium condition for household non-tradables. Constraints on household con-
sumption decisions due to market frictions such as transactions costs and missing
food markets are formalized through farmers’ ability to balance equation (7). The
resulting Lagrangian from the constrained maximization is:
L = U (c, z)+λ
[∑
ı∈T
p¯ı (qı + Tı − cı) + S
]
+
∑
k∈Tk
αk [fk (q; z,k)]+
∑
ı∈NT
θı (qı + Tı − cı)
(8)
The optimal solutions from the above maximization problem generates demand
and supply functions for the household which are functions of prices and household
characteristics relating to preferences- i.e. taste shifters. The demand functions
illustrate farmers’ decision regarding the quantity of goods to consume and inputs
to use. Whereas the supply functions illustrate farmers’ decision regarding quan-
tity of farm output allocated to household consumption, market exchange and use
as inputs. Under separable household decisions, all goods are valued at market
prices since goods produced by the household are considered perfect substitutes
with similar market goods. As a result, production and consumption choices spec-
ified above are profit and utility maximizing respectively with both linked only
through farm profits from production which are used to finance household con-
sumption. This implies that the farmer chooses crops to produce and factors to
use to maximize revenue subject to a production function comprising of market
prices, factors and production technology for the production side of the household;
and chooses quantity of goods to consume to maximize utility subject to household
budget constraints comprising of market prices and household income (which is
often largely composed on farm income) for the consumer side of the household.
However, where market frictions such as transactions costs drive a wedge between
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shadow and market prices of the non-tradables, households’ ability to balance
their food demand is affected. The difference between market and shadow prices
of non-tradables creates endogeneity in the household budget constraint. Respond-
ing to this constraint by internalizing food markets through the use of farm output
for household consumption rather than market exchange establishes jointness in
household production and consumption decisions. As a result, household factors
(rather than market factors in the case of separable household decisions) influ-
ence production decisions such as crop choices through their effect on shadow
prices which replace market prices in the optimal demand and supply functions.
Through household characteristics such as size of food demand and risk-attitude
(especially in the absence of insurance markets), the inequality of shadow and
market prices widens as constraints on household consumption become binding
thereby increasing incentives to internalize food markets.
Since we model household decisions in this chapter as being jointly determined, the
prices in the optimal demand and supply functions for tradables are the exogenous
market prices since the markets for such goods are perfect and (pı = p¯ı) ı ∈ T .
On the other hand, due to market failures, household shadow prices influence the
optimal demand and supply functions for non-tradables. Since pı 6= p¯ı ı ∈ NT for
these goods, the shadow prices take the following form6:
pı = p
∗
ı =
θı
λ
(9)
where θı is the marginal utility from relaxing household’s ability to balance house-
hold food demand of non-tradables; and λ is the marginal utility from relaxing the
budget constraint.
Several paradoxes observed among farmers especially in rural areas of develop-
ing countries have been largely attributed to the role of shadow prices under
non-separable household decisions. For instance, the negative price elasticity of
marketed surplus, the production of food crops rather than cash crops which offer
higher market prices, diversification rather than specialization in crop production
among several others have been attributed to the fact that the optimal supply deci-
sions of farmers operating under market failures is the shadow rather than market
6Arslan and Taylor (2009) estimated shadow prices of maize producing farmers in Mexico. Under a strong
assumption that labor markets are perfect, they showed how the shadow price can be estimated from its analytic
relationship with market wages. Clearly, assuming perfect labor markets may be a strong assumption in the case
of rural Ethiopia.
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price. As a result, policy interventions such as price incentives, reallocation of land
initiatives, provision of extension services etc which ignore market failures and by
extension the wedge between shadow and market prices do not generate desired
policy outcomes of increased agricultural commercialization and/or the production
of cash crops.
The optimal demand and supply functions can be specified as an indirect util-
ity comprising of household characteristics and prices. (De Janvry et al., 1991a)
provide an analytic derivation of the optimal solution to the maximization problem
in their paper which is similar to the setup in this chapter. Given that under non-
separable household decisions, the shadow prices are also affected by household
characteristics, the indirect utility specified for this households typically comprise
of household and market characteristics- where the latter captures market fric-
tions such as transactions costs and the extent of market integration which drive
a wedge between market and shadow prices.
Preceding the supply decisions is farmers’ choice of crops between food and cash
crops and the composition of her crop portfolio ex-ante. Hence, optimal supply
decisions are likely to be affected by farmers’ crop choices ex-ante especially given
that farmers are both producers and consumers. As a result, jointness of household
decisions can be examined through the extent to which household characteristics
affect farmers’ choice between food and cash crops; and the extent to which they
diversify their crop portfolio rather than specialize. To do this, we assume that
farmers derive utility from their crop choices. Using the same structure of the
indirect utility for optimal solutions described above, an indirect utility function
comprising of household, market and plot characteristics can be specified for the
observed crop choices in a given farming period. Through this setup, we examine
the hypothesis that higher shadow price of farm output relative to market prices
results in farmers deriving greater utility from satisfying household consumption
from farm output and thus greater incentives to produce food crops relative to
cash crops.
Similarly, constrains on household consumption may also lower gains from spe-
cialization such that farmers derive greater utility from ensuring food security by
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diversifying crop portfolio. Under this hypothesis, indicators of household food de-
mand such as size of food consumption should significantly affect farmers’ choice
between food and cash crops; and crop diversity should contribute to households’
consumption smoothing. Other factors such as food prices, market accessibility
(distance and transport conditions) and a combination of household and market
characteristics should also significantly influence farmers’ crop choices7.
To empirically test this hypothesis, we express farmers’ crop selection into a Ran-
dom Utility Framework8. Therefore, choices can be modeled for household/farmer
ı choosing crop choice  on plot k where  ∈ J =
{
qfk , q
c
k
}
and qfk and q
c
k are set of
food and cash crops respectively as defined above.
U ık = U (X, Zı,Mk) + εı (10)
where X represents crop specific characteristics for a given crop ; Zı represents
household and community attributes for a given household ı ; and Mk represents
plot specific attributes for a given plot k.
Supposing that dfık, = 1 if household ı chooses food crop from q
f
k on plot k and
0 otherwise; similarly dcık, = 1 if household ı chooses cash crop from q
c
k on plot k
and 0 otherwise; such that at plot level, dfık,.d
c
ık = 0
9, the indirect utility of the
household at plot level can be represented as thus:
U∗ık = Uk
[
dfık,, d
c
ık|X, Zı,Mk
]
+ εı (11)
where εı represents the unobservable component of the choice selection varying
across households.
Across plots owned by a given household, total indirect utility for the household
7This approach builds on the typical test of separability and non-separability of household decisions established
in the literature. Under separable household decisions, only market prices influence household production and
consumption decisions. However, under non-separable decisions, non-market factors such as household attributes
affect household decisions through its effect on household shadow and market price differentials due to market
frictions such as transactions costs. See Taylor and Adelman (2003).
8See McFadden and Train (2000) for a discussion of how a Random Utility function can be used to capture
unobservable taste/preferences in consumer decision making process. Also, Van Dusen and Taylor (2005) adopted
similar framework in examining farmers choice to diversify crop choices under missing markets.
9This need not be the case at household level- the crop portfolio of households may contain both food and
cash crops. Thus dfık,.d
c
ı 6= 0 ∀k 6=  ∀ı is possible.
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can be formulated as:
U∗ı =
∑
k=1
Uk
[
dfık,, d
c
ık|X, Zı,Mk
]
+ εı (12)
2.3.3 Estimation Models
Equation (12) formalizes the representation of crop choices into a utility max-
imizing framework at household level. Using this expression, we can investigate
the extent to which crop choices are driven by non-separability of production and
consumption decisions resulting from constraints on household food demand due
to frictions in food markets. This is done empirically by using techniques to ap-
proximate the utility expressed in equation (12) through various definitions of crop
choices:
• Farmers’ choice between food and cash crops in a given farming period.
• Farmers’ diversification of crop production examined through an index of crop
diversity in a given farming period.
• The effect of crop diversity on household consumption in repeated farming
periods.
In all these models of crop choices, the focus of the analysis is on the effect of
indicators of household food demand. The larger the household food demand, the
more likely they are to be constrained by constraints due to market frictions such
as transactions costs, and thus have more incentives of internalizing food markets.
In the second part of the chapter, we examine the size of the effect of crop diversity
on household consumption to illustrate the extent to which crop choices constitute
effective strategies for farmers facing constraints on consumption.
Crop Selection: Food Crop vs. Cash crop
To estimate the utility farmers derive from observed plot-level crop choices in
the context of the chapter, it is important to take into account the structure of the
data. By defining crop choices as food and cash crops, a logit model can be fitted
on plot-level data to obtain farmers’ probability of selecting food crops relative to
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cash crops.
However, in the data, a given farmer can have multiple plots generating multi-
ple observations per household. In addition, farmers may also choose the same
crop on different plots. Other factors worth considering in choosing an appropri-
ate empirical technique include the role of unobservable factors (at household and
community levels) which are likely to influence crop choices. It is for this reason
that the utility function defined above follows a Random Utility Framework which
as discussed in Train (2003) can be easily approximated by multinomial Logit
Models.
In choosing an appropriate multinomial logit model, the structure of the data
plays an important role. For instance, a Nested Logit model cannot be used due
to the fact that farmers have multiple plots and thus make multiple choices. Simi-
larly, differences in plot characteristics (such as slopes and soil quality) which differ
across crops, introduce alternative variant attributes which cannot be incorporated
using a multinomial logit model.
Following Cameron (2009)(ch.15), Greene (2003) and McFadden and Train (2000),
the Mixed Logit Model10 can account for: unobserved heterogeneity across alter-
natives such as plot and crop specific characteristics; and unobserved household
preferences across crops. However, estimating a Mixed Logit model is computa-
tionally challenging since the likelihood function in a Maximum Likelihood esti-
mation technique cannot be solved analytically but rather by simulation (Train
(2003, 2008, 2009)).
An alternative to the Mixed Logit model is the Conditional Multinomial Logit
Model due to McFadden (1980). The main difference between the two models be-
ing the Conditional Logit’s assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA)- which implies that adding other alternatives does not change the relative
probabilities of existing alternatives. Train (2003) discusses further that the IIA
assumption implies that the stochastic component of a given alternative provides
10The Mixed Logit Model (a random effects estimator of the multinomial logit model) is an extension of the
original Multinomial Logit model due to McFadden (1980) to relax the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) and also account for heterogeneity in choice selection.
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no information about the stochastic component of another alternative. However,
violation of this assumption can be corrected by one of three options as discussed
by Train: 1) use an alternative model that captures the correlation in the stochas-
tic component of the alternatives. 2) Respecify the error of each alternative to
capture the correlated components leaving the uncorrelated component as white
noise11. 3) Proceed with estimation of the model bearing in mind that the esti-
mated model is at best an approximation of the representative utility function.
(Train (2003) Ch. 3). The Mixed Logit model relaxes this assumption and allows
for randomness in the parameters of the model to capture random taste variations
due to unobservable factors12.
In summary, the Mixed Logit model is an extension of the conditional logit model
which relaxes the IIA assumption. However, the Mixed Logit is computationally
challenging to estimate using Maximum Likelihood technique13. Using the Con-
ditional Logit model requires reasonable justification of the validity of the IIA
assumption. (Train, 2009) highlights that independence of unobserved character-
istics over time and in repeated choices validates the IIA assumption. Although
the possibility of repeated choice is maintained in the data, the objective of the
chapter makes it easier to validate the IIA assumption. More precisely, given that
the focus of the chapter is on the extent to which farmers’ choice between food and
cash crops (rather than choice of individual food and cash crops) are driven by
constraints imposed by market conditions on household food demand, the choice
set is defined by grouping individual crops. By this definition, it is reasonable
to assume that stochastic components of one choice provide no information to the
stochastic components of the other alternatives thereby validating the IIA assump-
tion and the use of the Conditional Logit Model. Anecdotal evidence also shows
that for most farmers in Ethiopia, a great proportion of food crop output is used
for household consumption while cash crops are largely traded in markets thus the
less likely degree of correlation.
11Such as the Mixed Logit model Train (2008).
12Hausman and McFadden (1984) propose a Hausman type test of the validity of the IIA assumption by
comparing the log likelihood values of the original model and an re-estimated model without one of the alternatives.
13An attempt to fit the individual crop choices on a Mixed Logit model in Stata using the command developed
by Hole (2007) building on an earlier work by Haan and Uhlendorff (2006), failed to achieve convergence after
several specifications.
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This strategy also has merits both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically,
it is complicated to specify a utility function which captures factors which in-
fluence differences in utility between individual crops of the same category for
instance two food crops such as maize and wheat. Furthermore, with a choice set
defined at individual crop-level, different regions will quite possibly have different
choice sets. Empirically, it is challenging to adequately control for differences in
agronomic and environmental factors which result in different choice sets of crops
across regions.
According to (Chamberlin and Schmidt (2011)) the major cereals produced in
Ethiopia: teff, wheat, maize, sorghum and barley which account for three-quarters
of total area cultivated, 29 percent of agricultural GDP in 2005/06 and 64 per-
cent of calories consumed. Taffesse et al. (2011) also provided similar statistics.
Other important crops identified by the report are: enset, oilseeds and pulses.
Export/cash crops on the other hand are mainly coffee and chat with coffee ac-
counting for 3.8 percent of GDP and chat generating 5 percent of total export
earnings (Chamberlin and Schmidt (2011)). In addition to their respective contri-
butions to aggregate agricultural output, the crops identified above also have very
high yield per hectare with maize topping the list- 2500 kg/ha while wheat, barley
and sorghum having yields in the range of 1200-1500kg/ha (Minot and Sawyer
(2013)). In the data, the crops produced by farmers are teff, barley, wheat, maize,
sorghum, enset, coffee and chat. Using survey statistics about agricultural pro-
duction in Ethiopia provided in Chamberlin and Schmidt (2011), Taffesse et al.
(2011) and Minot and Sawyer (2013), these crops can be grouped into food crops
(mostly grain crops):teff, barley, wheat, maize, and sorghum; and cash crops:coffee
and chat.
The utility function in (11) is defined at plot level for each household. How-
ever, for estimation purposes, crop choices as discussed above are categorized into
groups: food and cash crops. This facilitates estimation of the following econo-
metric specification of the Random Utility function by fitting a Conditional Logit
Model on plot-level crop choices in a single farming season14:
14(Long and Freese, 2006) illustrate the estimation of logit models in Stata.
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Y ık = x
′
β + z
′
iγ + k
′
kρ+ ε

ık  ∈ J =
{
f , c
} ∀k (13)
where Y ık takes the value of 1 for crop choice of a given group  on plot k such
that:
f = {teff, barley, wheat,maize, sorghum} and c = {coffee, chat};
xı is a vector of household factors such as information about food consumption,
risk attitude, food prices, household demographics among others which affect crop
choices; zı=vector of community attributes relating to market conditions which af-
fect crop choices through their effect on household access to markets such as road
conditions, distance to markets etc.; and kk= vector of plot characteristics which
affect crop choices such as soil quality; β, γ, ρ being parameters to be estimated.
Following (Train, 2003), the unobserved component of each utility at plot level-
εıkis assumed to be ııd extreme value distribution with a cumulative distribution
function F (εık) (with a variance
pi2
6
necessary to normalize the scale of the utility
function); and a density function f (εık) both defined below.
F (εık) = exp
− exp−ε

ık (14)
f (εık) = exp
−εık exp
(
− exp−εık
)
(15)
The IIA assumption is implied by the independence of the unobservable component
across alternatives. This means εık of the utility from alternative  (for instance
food crops) is unrelated to ε`ık from the utility of alternative ` (cash crops for in-
stance) for  6= `. The implication of this according to Train (2003) is that the
observable component of the model facilitates a reasonable approximation of the
utility function and unobservable component is essentially ’white noise’ .
For compactness, let the observable component of the choice selection be defined
as: V ′ik =
(
x
′
, z
′
i,k
′
k
)
;with the vector of parameters Ψik = (βj, γj, ρj). The logit
choice probabilities can be derived as shown below.
The probability that a given household ı chooses a crop of group  on plot k can
be defined as:
Pr
ik
() = Prob
(
U ık > U
`
ık
) ∀ , ` ∈ J  6= ` (16)
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= Prob
(
V ′ik + ε

ık > V
`′
ik + ε
`
ık
) ∀ , ` ∈ J  6= ` (17)
= Prob
(
εık < V
`′
ik + ε
`
ık − V ′ik
) ∀ , ` ∈ J  6= ` (18)
Utilizing the independence assumption the cumulative distribution of all the alter-
natives becomes the product of the individual cumulative distributions. Therefore
a given εık`, the choice probability can be defined as:
Pr
ik
() | εık =
∏
 6=`
exp− exp
−(V `′ik+ε`ık−V
′
ik)
(19)
Since ε`ık is not given, the choice probability is the integral of Prik () | εık evaluated
for all ε`ık weighted by its density defined in (15):
Pr
ik
() =
ˆ (∏
 6=`
exp− exp
−(V `′ik+ε`ık−V
′
ik)
)
exp−ε
`
ık exp
(
− exp−ε`ık
)
dε`ık (20)
With further algebraic manipulations, the following closed form solution for the
probability of choosing  on plot k by household ı can be obtained:
Pr
ik
() =
exp
(
Ψ′ikV
′
ik
)∑
`=1
(
Ψ`′ikV
`′
ik
) (21)
for choice  such that U ık > U
`
ıkfor ` 6=  and dık = 1 for choice  and 0 otherwise.
The Conditional Logit model can be estimated using maximum likelihood tech-
nique. The resulting Log likelihood function for (21) becomes:
logL =
N∑
ı=1
K∑
k=1
dık log
[
Pr
ik
()
]
(22)
Intensity of Crop Diversity
At household level, plot-level crop choices can be used to construct a mea-
sure of crop diversity defined in equation (2)- the number of crops of possible
choices produced by a farmer in a given farming season. Under the same hypoth-
esis being tested in the chapter, this measure can be examined in the context
of farmers’ response to constraints on household food demand. Farmers’ facing
binding constraints on consumption due to imperfect food markets, incentives to
internalize food markets by diversifying their crop portfolio- especially food crops;
36
may outweigh gains from specialization. In addition, with missing credit markets
imposing credit constraints to expand production; and missing insurance markets
affect risk-averse farmers’ production decisions, gains from specialization maybe
further lowered. The latter is likely to strengthen incentives for food production
through food security especially in a community where farming is mostly rain-fed15.
Thus the combination of imperfect food markets and risky production under miss-
ing credit and insurance markets imply that the decision to diversify crop portfolio
maybe driven by gains/utility farmers derive from ensuring food security. This oc-
curs by internalizing imperfect markets and hence insuring consumption against
risks due to rains and/or price volatility resulting from less integrated markets. We
test this hypothesis by regressing our measure of crop diversity on household and
market characteristics. Let Yı the measure of crop diversity for farmer ı expressed
as a percentage using equation (2); xı is a vector of household factors such as
information about food consumption, food prices, household demographics among
others which affect crop choices; zı=vector of community attributes relating to
market conditions. Given that our measurement of crop diversity is constructed
using an index ranging between zero and one; a two-limit Tobit model which ac-
counts for the censoring on both the upper and lower limits is an alternative and
is used.
Yı = x
′
ıθ + z
′
ıϑ+ ξı (23)
Testable Hypotheses:
Testing the hypothesis that farmers’ selection of food and cash crops; and the
diversity of their crop portfolio is driven by constraints on household food demand
from the above estimation is done by examining:
1. the effect of indicators of household food demand on crop choices and crop
diversity while controlling for other household attributes. Thus, it is expected
15Van Dusen and Taylor (2005) examines the effect of market conditions (such as distance to markets) on
farmers’ crop diversity. Similarly, in a recent paper Skoufias et al. (2017) examines household’s occupational
diversification between off-farm and on-farm; and across agricultural and non-agricultural sectors based on similar
reasoning.
Porter (2012a) examined the effects of shocks due to rain and other idiosyncratic shocks such as illness and
pests on consumption and income diversification strategies using the same earlier rounds of the data used in this
chapter.
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that households with larger food consumption are on average more likely to
face binding constraints on food demand in the presence of transactions costs
and thus have higher incentives of selecting and diversifying food crop pro-
duction to reduce reliance on markets to balance household food demand.
Similarly, in the absence of formal insurance, risk averse farmers have incen-
tives of producing food crops relative to cash crops; and to diversify rather
than specialize to ensure household food security. In testing this, we con-
sider the size and significance of βˆ and θˆ from equations (13) and (23)- crop
selection and diversity respectively.
2. the effect of indicators of transactions costs and other market frictions on
farmers’ choice between food and cash crops and on farmers’ crop diversity.
It is expected that farmers facing high transportation costs (measured through
distance to market, road and transport conditions) or live in less integrated
communities (measured through distance to major town) are on average more
likely to be constrained by imperfect food markets or earn lower profits from
cash crop production. It is expected that these farmers will on average have
have higher incentives of producing food crops relative to cash crops and
diversify food crop production. This is tested using the estimated parameters:
γˆ and ϑˆ from equations (13) and (23) for crop selection and crop diversity
respectively.
Gains From Crop Diversification
To further investigate the extent to which non-separability of production and
consumption decisions influences crop choices, we examine the effect of crop diver-
sity on household consumption. While other consumption smoothing strategies for
rural farmers exist, the use of agricultural diversification through the production
of multiple crops across several plots is a common practice Alderman and Paxson
(1994). In rural Ethiopia, the use of other strategies such as the accumulation and
depletion of assets such as livestock; and informal insurance through risk-sharing
arrangements are common risk-coping strategies. Empirical studies on the use of
these strategies using the same data is found in Porter (2012a) and Hoddinott et al.
(2009) respectively. The effectiveness of these strategies is often limited. For in-
stance, poorly developed asset markets and the correlation of market price of assets
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and shocks constrain the ability of farmers to smoothen consumption through the
sale and purchase of livestocks Dercon (2000). Informal insurance arrangements
such as risk-sharing between households and through semi-formal local associa-
tions often provide partial insurance against idiosyncratic shocks leaving covariate
shocks largely uninsured. Therefore, to better minimize the effect of shocks, it
is reasonable for farmers to use multiple risk-coping strategies which complement
each other and also to internalize some markets. Through crop choices farmers’
are able to reduce their reliance on markets to meet their food demand especially
where market failures for food are typical. This can be complemented with the
use of livestock and/or risk-sharing arrangements16. Under this hypothesis, gains
from diversifying crop production should be reflected on household consumption
as it insures households against consumption variation. In addition, through inter-
nalized food markets and the use of household production to satisfy consumption,
the scale of crop diversity should have a large effect on household consumption.
This can be tested through the effect and size of crop diversity on household con-
sumption in repeated farming periods using a consumption smoothing framework
as shown below.
ln (Cıt) = α0 +X
P
ıtα1 + α2Dıt + α3Dıt •R∗rt + εıt (24)
where ln (Cıt) is the log of total household consumption per capita; X
P
ıt are
household indicators of permanent income- such as livestock units (lagged to avoid
endogeneity), total land area, etc.; and Dıt is our measure of crop diversity; and R
∗
rt
is information about rainfall defined using the deviation of yearly rainfall at time
period t from long-run community average for community r : R∗rt =
(
Rrt − R¯r
)
as done by Paxson (1992). This is done to capture transitory effect of rainfall on
income. Since the data is constructed as a balanced panel, we estimate equation
(24) using Fixed Effects estimator to account for unobserved heterogeneity across
households. However, since the year intervals between the rounds of survey are
uneven, we also use a pooled OLS estimator with time and community fixed ef-
fects and clustered standard errors to estimate equation (24). The parameters of
16 In testing the extent to which crop diversity facilitates consumption smoothing, effort is made to capture the
role played by livestocks. The use of informal insurance arrangements is examined in greater detail in chapter 4.
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interest are: α2, α3 the effect of diversification on total household consumption.
Testable Hypothesis.
We test the hypothesis that farmers’ diversification of crop production facilitates
consumption smoothing by reducing reliance on markets to balance household
food demand and ensuring food security by examining the effect of diversity on
consumption through:
1. the size and significance of αˆ2and αˆ3for total consumption. Under the hy-
pothesis, the net effect of crop diversity on consumption should be positive
and significant. Households with more diversified crop portfolio are expected
to be more consumption/food secure. For these farmers, shocks which affect
returns from farming through lower crop yield due to rain variation, pest inva-
sion etc.; or lower (higher) market price for farm output (market goods) such
as price volatility are expected to have a lesser effect on household consump-
tion since several food markets can be internalized through the consumption
of output from various crops produced by the farmer.
2.3.4 Data
The data used is from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) admin-
istered by the University of Addis Ababa, the Center for the Study of African
Studies (CSAE) at the University of Oxford and the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI). The survey is longitudinal household dataset which
is representative of rural Ethiopia. Data collection started in 1989 with follow up
rounds in 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2004 and 2009. Over the years, the coverage
of the survey has been expanded from an initial number of 6 administrative units
to 15 across 4 of Ethiopia’s 11 regions surveying 1,477 households. See Dercon
(2004a) for a detailed discussion of the dataset. A description of each variable is
provided in table (10) in the Appendix.
The first part of the chapter which examines farmers’ crop selection and diver-
sity uses the latest round of the survey collected in 2009. As a preliminary step,
we use household-level data from this round to examine: the likelihood that a
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given farmer produces food crops only (referred to as subsistence farmer) relative
to a combination of food and cash crops (referred to as non-subsistence farmer);
and factors which influence the intensity of farmers’ crop diversity. We also use the
plot-level data from this round, to investigate the factors which influence farmers’
choice of food and cash crops. In total, the sample size consists of 802 households
and 3,147 plots and crop choices17.
The second part of the chapter which investigates the extent to which crop di-
versity affects household consumption uses five rounds of the data (rounds two
through six) to form a balanced panel. In each round, a measure of crop diver-
sity is calculated using the number of food and cash crops produced as defined in
equation (2) and used to estimate its effect on household consumption.
Summary Statistics
Below we present a summary of the characteristics of households in the 2009
round of the survey which is used to examine crop choices. In addition, a summary
of community infrastructure relating to market accessibility and plots characteris-
tics are also reported.
17Households in the Northern Region of Tigray are excluded since they do not produce the cash crops considered
in the chapter- coffee and chat.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Round 9 Collected in 2009
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Household Characteristics:
Food Crop Only Farmer (=1) 0.488 0.5 0 1 802
Index of crop diversity 30.123 14.041 0 75 802
Index of food crop diversity 32.253 19.323 0 100 802
Hh. Food Share (lagged) 0.787 0.151 0.102 1 802
Risk 0.593 0.268 0 1 801
Hh. Land in Hec. (Lagged) 1.498 1.826 0 36.206 800
Hh. Number of plots 5.32 2.674 1 17 802
Hh. Size 5.964 2.534 1 16 802
Hh. Head Age 51.777 14.701 15 120 784
Male Headed hh. (=1) 0.668 0.471 0 1 802
Education yrs: No Schooling 0.459 0.499 0 1 802
Education yrs: Adult Lit. 0.188 0.391 0 1 802
Education yrs: Basic Educ. 0.281 0.45 0 1 802
Education yrs:Secondary Educ. 0.045 0.207 0 1 802
Education yrs: Higher Educ. 0.005 0.07 0 1 802
Community Infrastructure:
Food Price Index (Lagged) 1.14 0.083 0.976 1.259 802
Better Transport (=1) 0.504 0.5 0 1 802
Better Roads (=1) 0.791 0.407 0 1 802
Distance to Mkt. (in Km) 2.914 3.091 0 11 802
Distance to Major Town (in Km) 8.799 6.310 3 25 802
Rainfall Deviation from avg. 60.785 58.321 -69.600 143.1 802
Plot Characteristics:
Plot size (in Hectares) 0.528 3.759 0 200 3142
Soil Quality-Lem (v.good) 0.655 0.476 0 1 3147
Soil Quality-teuf (good) 0.081 0.272 0 1 3147
Soil Quality-Lem-teuf (avg.) 0.264 0.441 0 1 3147
Plot slope (Flat=1) 0.816 0.387 0 1 3147
Plot Slope (sloping=1) 0.168 0.374 0 1 3147
multiple crop plot 0.544 0.498 0 1 3147
cash crop (=1) 0.226 0.418 0 1 3147
Food crop (=1) 0.774 0.418 0 1 3147
The table above provides a summary of different attributes of households in
the data. Characteristics such as the size of households’ food consumption, risk
attitude18, land endowment, household size and attributes of its head indicate
the extent to which constraints on household food consumption are likely to be
binding and/or farmers’ ability to internalize food markets through crop choices.
18Risk preferences are elicited from lotteries with outcomes defined in monetary terms (risk-money) and returns
to market exchange (risk-market). We use these responses to construct a measure of risk preferences- 0=certainty;
1= risk loving; 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 represent values attached to choices with increased levels of risk but less than the
risky choice. This is done separately for both outcomes which are then combined to construct a single measure
of household risk-attitude.
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The following observations are made about households in the data:
• On average, food consumption comprises of 78.7% of total household con-
sumption.
• Farmers tend to diversify their crop portfolio by producing at least more than
crop. Slightly more than half of the farmers in the data (51.2%) produce both
food and cash crops.
• Apart from diversification of crops, farmers also use multiple plots-an average
farmer has 5 plots with an average of 1.5hectares of land. Land endowment
does not seem to vary significantly across households in the data as indicated
by the small standard deviation. This is perhaps due to the fact that land is
centrally distributed in Ethiopia.
• Average risk-preference of households is 0.596 on a scale of 0-1 where 0- risk
averse and 1- risk-loving.
Similarly, community characteristics such as distance to market, transport and
road conditions and distance to major town illustrate the extent to which con-
straints to market participation are likely to exist. This affects crop choices through
farmers’ ability to balance food demand directly or indirectly through incentives
to produce cash crops. A couple of observations in the data include:
• The average distance to markets in the data is 3km. However, most farmers
live in communities which are 9km away from a major town. This suggests
that farmers are likely to face constraints in accessing major markets with
more customers for agricultural produce and wide choice of household con-
sumables.
• However, slightly more than half of the farmers live in communities with im-
provements in transport to other destinations; and upto 80% live in commu-
nities with improvements in road conditions. These developments are likely
to lower transportation costs and other costs associated with market partici-
pation.
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• Rainfall in 2008 was generally better than the average in previous years from
most farmers in the data.
Jointly, this information is used to examine the extent to which farmers’ choice
between food and cash crops and the intensity of crop diversity (especially food
crop production) is driven by market frictions which constrain household food
demand. Under this hypothesis, differences in the attributes of subsistence and
non-subsistence farmers can be examined in the context of the extent to which the
constraints due to imperfect markets are binding and hence the need to internalize
food markets. We examine these differences by conducting a t-test of household
characteristics between farmers producing food crops only (i.e.. subsistence farm-
ers) and farmers producing food and cash crops. The results are reported below:
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Table 2: Test of Means: Subsistence Vs. Food & Cash Crop Farmers: Round 9
Food & Cash Crop Farmer Subsistence Farmer Test of diff.
Variable mean mean p-value
Household Characteristics:
Index of crop diversity 38.970 20.823 0.000
Index of food crop diversity 23.317 41.645 0.000
Hh. Food Share (lagged) 0.770 0.806 0.001
Risk 0.629 0.555 0.000
Hh. Land in Hec. (Lagged) 1.056 1.965 0.000
Hh. Number of plots 5.100 5.552 0.016
Hh. Size 6.144 5.775 0.039
Hh. Head Age 52.303 51.229 0.307
Male Headed hh. (=1) 0.633 0.706 0.028
Education yrs: No Schooling 0.504 0.412 0.009
Adult Lit. 0.090 0.292 0.000
Basic Education 0.319 0.240 0.014
Secondary Education 0.056 0.033 0.121
Higher Edu. 0.005 0.005 0.960
Community Characteristics:
Food Price Index (Lagged) 1.109 1.173 0.000
Better Transport (=1) 0.759 0.235 0.000
Better Roads (=1) 0.783 0.798 0.615
Distance to Mkt. (in Km) 3.199 2.615 0.007
Distance to Town (in Km) 7.321 10.352 0.000
Rainfall Deviation from avg. 67.192 54.051 0.001
A few striking differences between subsistence and food and cash crop farmers
which relate to the key hypothesis of the chapter are summarized below:
• The average food consumption of subsistence farmers is higher than food and
cash crop farmers. Under our hypothesis, this difference is likely to drive gains
from producing food crops among subsistence farmers especially where con-
straints on food demand are binding. This possibility is further strengthened
by the magnitude of food crop diversity among subsistence farmers which is
also in line with empirical evidence that farmers in developing countries tend
to produce cash crops only after producing sufficient amount of food crops
for household consumption (Fafchamps (1992)).
• Food and cash crop farmers are more risk-loving on average. This is not
surprising given that in an environment where farming is mostly rain-fed and
formal insurance markets are missing, risk-averse farmers (especially towards
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ensuring food security) are likely to produce low-risk low return crops such
as food crops primarily for household consumption.
• On average, subsistence farmers have more hectares of land than food and
cash crop farmers. Thus subsistence farmers’ decision to produce food crops
only does not appear to driven by smaller land endowment.
These differences which indicate that subsistence farmers have larger endowment,
greater amount of food consumption and less risk-loving suggest that the decision
to produce food crops maybe an indication of the non-separability of household
decisions introduced by constrains on household consumption. Based on these
characteristics, subsistence farmers’ decision to produce food crops only may re-
sult from binding constraints on household food demand which may not be the
case for other farmers. As a result, subsistence farmers have a greater need to
internalize food markets and hence choose to produce food crops instead of cash
crops.
Similarly, differences in community characteristics are also observed between sub-
sistence and non-subsistence farmers. A summary is provided below:
• Although subsistence farmers live closer to markets than food and cash crop
farmers, improvements in transport conditions are more common in non-
subsistence farming communities.
• Also, food and cash crop farmers on average live closer to major towns and
thus more likely to easily access larger and more integrated markets.
• Food prices in the subsistence farming communities are also higher compared
to food and cash crop farming communities. This provides further incentives
for subsistence farmers to produce food crops relative to cash crops.
In the second part of the chapter where we examine the magnitude of the gains
from crop diversity, we use data on household consumption (including food share
of total consumption); household livestock, land endowment and index of crop
diversity. Also included is information about food prices. The data as summarized
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below is obtained over ten-year period (between 1994-2004) i.e. 5 rounds of the
ERHS data; from the same 802 households used in the first part of the chapter.
Table 3: Summary Statistics: Rounds 2-6 Collected between 1994-2004
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Total consumption 463.413 405.779 6.514 4823.598 4006
Food consumption 371.125 338.555 2.14 3499.899 4006
Food share (%) 0.802 0.152 0 1 4010
Real cons. per capita 73.416 65.188 2.387 731.732 4006
crop diversity 0.244 0.174 0 0.917 4010
food crop diversity 0.282 0.222 0 1 4010
Land area (in hectares) 1.339 1.2 0 16.25 3918
4Land area -0.014 1.055 -12.75 13.25 2572
Number of plots 3.761 2.802 0 18 4010
num cash crop 0.414 0.627 0 2 4010
num food crop 1.689 1.334 0 6 4010
Number of crops 3.602 2.475 0 13 4010
4Number of crops -0.289 3.174 -16 16 3361
4Number of plots -0.244 2.751 -12 10 3361
Food price index 110.788 13.511 78.617 142.802 4010
Livestock Units 2.803 2.688 0 58.3 3633
Rain (deviation from avg) 0 241.304 -690.440 610.64 4010
As can be seen from above, food consumption represents a substantial portion
of total household consumption- on average, 80% of household expenditure is al-
located to food consumption. The production of food crops also appears to be a
common practice. On average, farmers produce more food crops than cash crops
as indicated by the average number of food crops produced (1.689) relative to
cash crops (0.414); and the diversity in the number of food crops produced (0.282)
compared to food and cash crops (0.244). Households have an average of 1.339
hectares of land. However land endowments appear to be fairly constant overtime.
The consumption data is measured at household level at per adult equivalent using
units provided by the World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines. The measure
of food prices- The Food Price Index, was constructed using village level prices at
the time of the survey. See Porter (2012a) and Dercon and Krishnan (1998) for a
discussion of the construction of the consumption variables.
In general, farmers produce at least one food crop on multiple plots. Diversifi-
cation of crop production is indicated by the index of crop diversity and average
number of crops produced by farmers. Since food consumption constitutes a large
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portion of household consumption, constrains on households’ food demand are
likely to have a significant welfare effect on farmers. The presence of other con-
straints due to absence of formal insurance markets and exposure to risk of rain
variation and food price volatility create further incentives to internalize food mar-
kets by ensuring food security and minimize income risk through diversified crop
production. The effectiveness of this strategy can be investigated through the ef-
fect of crop diversity on household consumption. This is the basis of the second
part of the chapter.
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2.4 Results
Under the hypothesis that crop choices of farmers are influenced by non-separability
of household decisions due to constraints on food demand, indicators of the size of
household food consumption, risk-attitude and indicators of market accessibility
should significantly affect farmers’ crop choices. We test this by estimating the
following models:
• First, using household-level data, we examine the effect of household and
community characteristics on the likelihood that a given farmer produces
food crops only (i.e. subsistence farmer) relative to producing both food and
cash crops;
• We then examine the effect of similar covariates on farmers’ crop diversity
measured using both weighted number of food and cash crops; and weighted
number of food crops only produced estimated using a two-limit Tobit model.
• Using plot-level data, we examine the factors which influence the likelihood
of producing cash crops relative to food crops on a given plot estimated using
logit and conditional logit model.
More specifically, the test of the hypothesis is done through the analysis of:
• the individual effect of household food consumption on crop choices;
• the combined effects of household food consumption and risk attitude; and
• the combined effects of household food consumption and access to market
indicators.
The focus on the effect of household food consumption, risk attitude and market
characteristics follows the hypothesis being examined in this chapter which is built
on the role of market failures in food markets and its effect on households’ ability
to balance its food demand. The interaction of household food consumption with
risk attitude and indicators of market access is motivated by the work of Janvry
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and Sadoulet (2006) in their review of agricultural household models. They high-
lighted the gap in our understanding of the relative differences in the magnitude
of factors that affect farmers’ production of food crops rather than cash crops.
This involves examining various factors that affect crop choices to pin down the
difference in the size of factors relating to risk of food insecurity relative to other
determinants such as the presence of high transactions costs. We implement this
by interacting the size of household food demand (which illustrates the extent to
which the household is constrained by food market failures) with household risk
preferences to capture the role of food security concerns; and with market charac-
teristics which indicate participation costs and market integration to capture the
effect of transactions costs and price risk. Another motivation for this approach
is the fact that non-separability of household decisions is idiosyncratic (and not
market) in nature. Therefore, responses to the resulting constraints are often het-
erogeneous even for households involved in similar activities. For this reason, we
include both household and market characteristics in our analysis of crop choices
and also examine differences in the diversification of crop portfolio across farmers
in addition to choice between food and cash crops.
The second part of the chapter uses household panel data to examine the ef-
fect of crop diversity on household consumption estimated using pooled OLS and
Fixed Effects estimators. We test this by examining the sign and significance of
crop diversity on consumption.
The results from these models and the discussion of the results are provided below.
2.4.1 Household Level Analysis
Subsistence Vs. Food and Cash Crop Farmers.
We begin examining the extent to which crop choices at household level by
estimating a logit model on farmers’ likelihood of being a subsistence or food and
cash crop farmer. We focus on the effect of indicators of household food con-
sumption, risk attitude and accessibility to markets (which proxy for transactions
costs) on farmers’ likelihood of producing food crops only relative to food and
cash crops. The average marginal effects obtained using Stata’s margins, dydx
command are presented below. The regression output from which the marginal
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effects are obtained is provided in the Appendix.
Table 4: Avg. Marginal Effects for Food Crop Production- Logit Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Food Share * Risk Food Share * Markets
variable dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err
Household Characteristics
Hh. Food cons. (lagged) 0.546*** (0.092) 0.565*** (0.094) 0.516*** (0.095)
Risk -0.145*** (0.053) -0.140*** (0.053) -0.122** (0.048)
Hh. Land in Hec. (Lagged) 0.016 (0.037) 0.0160 (0.037) 0.011 (0.022)
Hh. Number of plots 0.007 (0.007) 0.007 (0.007) 0.004 (0.006)
Hh. Head Age -0.003** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) -0.002* (0.001)
Hh. Size -0.009 (0.006) -0.009 (0.001) -0.007 (0.005)
Education yrs: Adult Lit. 0.038 (0.040) 0.041 (0.040) 0.052 (0.039)
Basic Education -0.027 (0.040) -0.026 (0.039) -0.010 (0.036)
Secondary Education 0.006 (0.068) 0.003 (0.068) 0.043 (0.059)
Higher Edu. -0.046 (0.110) -0.039 (0.108) -0.047 (0.113)
Male Headed hh. (=1) 0.088*** (0.034) 0.087*** (0.033) 0.071** (0.030)
Mkt. & Community Factors
Better Transport (=1) -0.651*** (0.083) -0.655*** (0.084) -0.653*** (0.037)
Better Roads (=1) -0.066 (0.044) -0.065 (0.044) -0.047 (0.032)
Distance to Mkt. (in Km) -0.028*** (0.005) -0.029*** (0.005) -0.026*** (0.005)
Distance to Town (in Km) -0.044*** (0.009) -0.044*** (0.008) -0.049*** (0.007)
Food Price Index (Lagged) 1.220*** (0.223) 1.230*** (0.224) 1.191*** (0.225)
Rainfall Deviation from avg. -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001)
Observations 781 781 781
R-squared 0.397 0.399 0.457
chi2 276.3 271.4 215.0
Note: Dependent variable is a binary variable (=1 if farmer produced food crop(s) only; and 0 otherwise.
The specifications: 1=no interactions; 2= Food share and risk attitude; 3= Food share and mkt. characteristics
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
From the table above, it can be observed that households with larger share of
expenditure on food consumption are more likely to produce food crops. All, else
equal, increase in the proportion of household food expenditure is on average, asso-
ciated with a 54.6% increase in the probability that a given farmer produces food
crops only instead of food and cash crops. This effect is reinforced when household
food consumption is combined with risk preferences- the net average effect of food
consumption increases to 56.5%. However, conditioned on market characteristics
such as distance to market, transport and road conditions and distance to major
towns, the net effect of food consumption is smaller compared to the two other
specifications.
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In all the specifications, the size of household food consumption appears to have a
large and statistically significant effect on farmers’ choice between food and cash
crops. Since crop choices are defined at household level in this model the effect
of lagged household food consumption (which is assumed to be exogenous) can be
analyzed through the extent to which observed crop choices constitute constrained-
optimal response to constrained household food consumption. These constraints
may result from market frictions such as transactions costs which affect house-
holds’ ability to balance food consumption through market purchases; or due to
missing insurance markets and risk-aversion of farmers. Under these conditions,
risk-averse farmers with high proportion of expenditure allocated to food con-
sumption are more likely to face binding constraints on their food demand. The
presence of these constraints breaks the substitutability of market and farm output
thereby affecting households’ ability to balance food consumption through mar-
ket purchases. Rather than relying on markets for household food consumption,
households for whom these constraints are binding have incentives to internalize
food markets through crop choices. These gains appear to increase with the degree
of risk-aversion and size of household food consumption. By producing food crops
only (rather than food and cash crops), farmers are able to satisfy household food
consumption through farm harvest instead of market exchange. This minimizes
consumption risk due to food price volatility and ensures food security since the
food crops considered in this chapter are typically low risk due to their resistance
to adverse climatic conditions. The resulting utility from internalized food markets
may outweigh market returns from cash crop production (net of transactions costs)
and in the presence of subjectivity towards own-farm output, yield higher utility
compared to the consumption of market goods. Where grains from the latter
are substantial such that farmers strictly prefer balancing household food demand
through own-farm output instead of market purchases, missing food markets are
discussed in De Janvry et al. (1991a) are created resulting in non-separability of
household decisions.
Another interesting result from the table above is the effect of risk preferences
on farmers’ likelihood of being a food crop only producer. On average, more
risk-loving households are less likely to be food crop only producers- the aver-
age marginal effect is 14.5%. As highlighted above, under the premise that the
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production of food crops facilitates households’ ability to balance food demand,
non-separability of household decisions occurs especially among risk-averse farm-
ers. Subsistence farmers may be risk-averse towards fluctuations in household
consumption and thus produce food crops to ensure food security. Furthermore,
where formal insurance is not available, credit constrained farmers engaged in
rain-fed agriculture face risk of poor yield due to rain variation and price risk due
to poorly developed and less integrated markets. These conditions lower incen-
tives for cash crop production and affect farmers’ ability to maximize utility from
consumption financed by returns from farming. Under these climatic conditions,
investments in cash crop production may be risky compared to the production of
food crops which are resistant to rain-variation, pests etc. As a result, risk-averse
farmers resort to producing drought-resistant, low-risk, low return crops only- a
characterization which fits the profile of most food crops. To further substantiate
the significance of household food demand on crop choices, it can be observed that
the net average effect of risk preferences is smaller when household food consump-
tion is combined with risk and even smaller when food consumption is interacted
with indicators of market access. Thus while risk-loving farmers are more likely
to be involved in cash crop production, the effect is sensitive to differences in the
share of food consumption across farmers. Therefore, concerns about household
food security (as indicated by the size of household food consumption) are likely
to dampen the extent to which risk-loving farmers choose cash crops.
Differences in community characteristics relating to market accessibility also ap-
pear to influence farmers’ likelihood of specializing in food crop production relative
to producing food and cash crops. Community infrastructure especially improve-
ment in transport conditions significantly influence farmers choice of crops. The
average marginal effect from the table shows that farmers in communities with im-
proved transportation are 65.3% less likely to specialize in food crops only relative
to farmers in communities without such improvements. The effect of improve-
ments in road conditions is similar, albeit smaller in magnitude and statistically
insignificant. These improvements are likely to lower transactions costs thereby
making constraints to market participation to purchase household consumables or
exchange farm output (such as cash crops) less binding. See Jayne (1994) and
Omamo (1998a) for similar studies. However, distance to market and major towns
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are both associated with a decrease in the likelihood of farmers specializing in food
crops only relative to producing food and cash crops. This is surprising given that
increase in distance to markets (within the community or nearest market outside
the community) implies higher transactions costs all else equal and hence lower
gains from cash crop production. However, this effect is independent of the state
of transport and road conditions which are likely to dampen the effect of distance
on transactions costs and hence crop choices.
At community level, farmers facing higher food prices are also more likely to spe-
cialize in food crop production relative to a combination of food and cash crops.
This is perhaps because food price inflation (or volatility as studied by Fafchamps
(1992)) lowers farmers’ ability to meet household food demand thereby increasing
grains from producing food crops. This effect is likely to be more pronounced
in communities where farmers face other constraints on food consumption due
to market frictions. Under these conditions, incentives to produce food crops for
household consumption are likely to be higher than gains from market returns
from cash crop production.
Crop Diversity
The analysis above focuses on crop choices at household level defined as farmers’
likelihood of specializing in food crops or producing food and cash crops. How-
ever, with plot-level data and given that farmers produce multiple food and/or
cash crops across several plots, the diversity in farmers’ crop portfolio can be mea-
sured. Using two measures of crop diversity: producing a combination of food and
cash crops; and producing several food crops, we examine the factors which influ-
ence the extent to which farmers diversify their crop choices with a focus on the
effect of household food consumption, risk-attitude and market conditions. The
marginal effects from the tobit model are presented below for all three specifica-
tions for each measure.
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Table 5: Avg. Marginal Effects for Crop Diversity:
Basic Food Share * Risk Food Share * Markets
variable dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err
Household Characteristics
Hh. Food cons. (lagged) -10.446*** (2.936) -10.673*** (2.937) -9.391*** (2.924)
Risk 2.306 (1.815) 2.233 (1.831) 1.753 (1.80)
Hh. Land in Hec. (Lagged) -0.130 (0.447) -0.135 (0.448) -0.031 (0.395)
Hh. Number of plots 1.656*** (0.218) 1.658*** (0.218) 1.679*** (0.216)
Hh. Head Age 0.030 (0.033) 0.030 (0.033) 0.017 (0.034)
Hh. Size 0.191 (0.202) 0.192 (0.202) 0.193 (0.20)
Male Headed hh. (=1) -0.132 (1.130) -0.109 (1.130) -0.126 (1.112)
Education yrs: Adult Lit. -0.923 (1.309) -0.936 (1.315) -0.877 (1.30)
Basic Education -0.555 (1.321) -0.571 (1.321) -0.612 (1.298)
Secondary Education -1.374 (2.861) -1.329 (2.843) -1.489 (2.847)
Higher Edu. 0.037 (4.154) -0.064 (4.217) 0.519 (4.110)
Mkt. & Community Factors
Better Transport (=1) 12.079*** (2.011) 12.054*** (2.017) 12.962*** (1.937)
Better Roads (=1) 5.858*** (1.394) 5.862*** (1.393) 6.337*** (1.384)
Distance to Mkt. (in Km) 0.745*** (0.193) 0.751*** (0.193) 0.870*** (0.210)
Distance to Town (in Km) 0.630*** (0.203) 0.627*** (0.204) 0.855*** (0.222)
Food Price Index (Lagged) -2.123 (8.288) -2.407 (8.310) 1.1788 (8.376)
Rainfall Deviation from avg. 0.054** (0.023) 0.053** (0.023) 0.0819*** (0.025)
Observations 781 781 781
R-Squared 0.0361 0.0361 0.0394
log likelihood -3042 -3041 -3031
Note: The dependent variable is a measure of crop diversity (i.e both food and cash crops) ranging btw 0-100.
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Diversification of Food Crops
In addition to total crop diversity (food and cash crops), we also examine farm-
ers’ food crop diversification.
Table 6: Avg. Marginal Effects for Crop Diversity (Food Crops)
Basic Food Share * Risk Food Share * Markets
variable dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err
Household Characteristics
Hh. Food Share (lagged) 13.137*** (3.424) -3.961* (2.214) 12.998*** (3.803)
Risk -4.10* (2.206) -0.097** (0.043) -3.640* (2.123)
Hh. Land in Hec. (Lagged) 0.326 (0.341) 0.334 (0.343) 0.266 (0.317)
Hh. Number of plots 2.939*** (0.258) 2.936*** (0.258) 2.914*** (0.252)
Hh. Head Age -0.098** (0.043) 13.519*** (3.508) -0.086** (0.043)
Hh. Size 0.258 (0.258) 0.256 (0.258) 0.230 (0.253)
Male Headed hh. (=1) 4.850*** (1.396) 4.812*** (1.392) 4.814*** (1.385)
Education yrs: Adult Lit. 1.944 (1.702) 1.965 (1.700) 2.151 (1.689)
Basic Education -2.505 (1.587) -2.482 (1.584) -2.617* (1.575)
Secondary Education 0.309 (3.538) 0.241 (3.546) 0.702 (3.491)
Higher Edu. 3.497 (10.046) 3.652 (9.923) 3.423 (9.999)
Mkt. & Community Factors
Better Transport (=1) -23.451*** (1.931) -23.409*** (1.931) -24.019*** (1.923)
Better Roads (=1) 10.546*** (1.638) 10.542*** (1.636) 10.787*** (1.687)
Distance to Mkt. (in Km) -0.376** (0.189) -0.387** (0.191) -0.420** (0.211)
Distance to Town (in Km) -1.911*** (0.201) -1.905*** (0.201) -2.000*** (0.220)
Food Price Index (Lagged) -22.771*** (8.035) -22.313*** (8.008) -25.345*** (8.027)
Rainfall Deviation from avg. -0.261*** (0.020) -0.259*** (0.020) -0.273*** (0.0229)
Observations 781 781 781
R-Squared 0.0752 0.0753 0.0788
log likelihood -2997 -2997 -2943
Note: The dependent variable is a measure of food crop diversity (i.e various food crops) ranging btw 0-100.
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Similar to household level crop choices, the size of households’ food consump-
tion has a statistically significant effect on farmers’ crop diversity. It is observed
that as the size of household food consumption increases, the extent to which farm-
ers’ diversify crop production by producing both food and cash crops decreases.
However, the opposite effect is observed when crop diversity is restricted to food
crops only- increase in food consumption is associated with an increase in farmers’
diversification of food crops. The average marginal effect of an increase in food
consumption is: a 10.446% decrease in crop diversity (i.e. the extent to which
farmers producing food and cash crops where 100 implies producing all food and
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all cash crops in the set of crops used); and a 13.137% increase in food crop di-
versity (i.e. the extent to which farmers produce food crops where 100 implies
producing all food crops in the set of crops used). Similar to our analysis of house-
hold crop choices, households with larger food consumption are likely to be more
constrained by market frictions in output markets and thus have more incentives
to produce more food crops, all else equal. By producing several food crops (in-
stead of producing both food and cash crops), these farmers are more easily able
to internalize food markets and hence reduce their reliance on food markets to
balance household food demand. This effect is however, independent of household
risk-preferences. This is shown in the second specification of food crop diversity
where the combined effect of risk and food demand on farmers’ crop decisions is
captured. The net effect of food demand on food crop diversity is negative- in-
crease in food consumption conditional on household risk attitude lowers food crop
diversity. As with the analysis of household crop choices, this result illustrates the
extent to which the effect of household food consumption on farming decisions is
sensitive to differences in risk preferences across farmers.
On average, risk-loving farmers are more likely to diversify crop production by pro-
ducing both food and cash crops. Although, this effect is statistically insignificant,
the effect of risk on food crop diversity is statistically significant and negative. It
is perhaps because of this that the net effect of household food consumption when
interacted with risk on food crop diversity is negative i.e. risk-loving attitude is
generally associated with a decrease in the diversify food crop production. It is
important to stress that the effect of risk on crop diversity through the production
of food and cash crops; and through the production of several food crops maybe
sensitive to the fact that the food crops considered in the chapter are generally low
risk low-return crops. As a result, the marginal cost (or risk of losses) associated
with adding a food crop to a crop portfolio is small and hence the statistically
insignificant effect of risk attitude on producing food and cash crops. Similarly,
because risk associated with producing food crops is small, risk-loving farmers can
easily specialize in the production of food crops whereas risk-averse farmers choose
to produce several food crops as shown by the statistically significant effect of risk
on food crop diversity. Therefore, it is perhaps because of the differences in risk
inherent in food and cash crops that household risk-attitude has a different effect
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on farmers’ diversity of crop choices.
The effect of community characteristics is similar to what is observed in the analysis
of household level crop choices. Improvements in infrastructure such as transport
conditions and road networks are on average associated in with an increase in crop
diversity. The effect is even larger when the combined effect of food consumption
and market accessibility on crop diversity is captured. It is equally not surpris-
ing that such improvements are associated with a decrease in food crop diversity
since the effect of lower transactions costs resulting from improved market access
is likely to boost the incentives for cash crop production (due to higher market
prices) and hence the need to diversify crop portfolio. Similar to the results above
the effect of distance to market and major town are both smaller and contrary
to expectations. This might be as a result of the fact that transport and road
conditions have a greater effect on transactions costs than distance to markets and
hence the counter intuitive effect.
2.4.2 Plot Crop Choices- Food vs. Cash Crops
In addition to household level crop choices, we also examine crop choices at
plot-level by estimating a logit model on farmers’ choice of food and cash crops.
However, to capture the fact that a given farmer makes multiple choices on several
plots, we also use a conditional logit model.
Logit Model:
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Table 7: Avg. Marginal Effects for Plot Crop Choices- Logit Model
Basic Food Share * Risk Food Share * Markets
variable dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err
Household Characteristics
Hh. Food Cons. (lagged) -0.315*** (0.047) -0.320*** (0.048) -0.302*** (0.050)
Risk 0.098*** (0.030) 0.095*** (0.029) 0.092*** (0.029)
Hh. Size 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003)
Male Headed hh. (=1) -0.071*** (0.018) -0.0703*** (0.017) -0.068*** (0.017)
Hh. Head Age 0.001** (0.001) 0.001** (0.001) 0.001* (0.001)
hh. Number of crops 0.021*** (0.003) 0.021*** (0.003) 0.020*** (0.003)
Hh. Number of plots -0.038*** (0.004) -0.038*** (0.004) -0.035*** (0.004)
Hh. Land in Hec. (Lagged) -0.007 (0.001) -0.007 (0.010) -0.005 (0.008)
Education yrs: Adult Lit. -0.021 (0.026) -0.022 (0.026) -0.023 (0.026)
Basic Education 0.007 (0.022) 0.007 (0.022) 0.007 (0.021)
Secondary Education -0.030 (0.038) -0.030 (0.038) -0.042 (0.037)
Higher Edu. 0.044 (0.082) 0.045 (0.082) 0.042 (0.083)
Mkt. & Community Factors
Food Price Index (Lagged) 0.261** (0.122) 0.260** (0.122) 0.290*** (0.113)
Distance to Town (in Km) 0.024*** (0.003) 0.024*** (0.003) 0.025*** (0.003)
Better Roads (=1) -0.052** (0.025) -0.052** (0.025) -0.090*** (0.032)
Distance to Mkt (in Km) 0.017*** (0.003) 0.017*** (0.003) 0.019*** (0.003)
Better Transport (=1) 0.366*** (0.037) 0.366*** (0.038) 0.331*** (0.026)
Rainfall Deviation from avg. 0.003*** (0.0003) 0.003*** (0.0003) 0.003*** (0.000)
Plot Characteristics
Plot size (in Hectares) -0.0003 (0.001) -0.0003 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
Soil Quality-Lem (v.good) 0.088*** (0.025) 0.087*** (0.025) 0.085*** (0.025)
Soil Quality-lem teuf (ok) 0.024 (0.027) 0.023 (0.027) 0.025 (0.027)
Plot slope (Flat=1) -0.071 (0.053) -0.072 (0.053) -0.081 (0.057)
Plot Slope (sloping=1) 0.028 (0.055) 0.028 (0.054) 0.009 (0.059)
Observations 3,083 3,083 3,083
R-squared 0.214 0.214 0.225
chi2 549.7 546.4 539.0
log likelihood -1287 -1287 -1269
Note: The dependent variable is a binary variable =1 if crop on plot is a cash crop; and 0 if it is a food crop
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Conditional Logit Model:
Table 8: Avg. Marginal Effects: Plot Crop Choices- Conditional Logit
Basic Food Share * Risk Food Share * Markets
variable dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err
Household Characteristics
Hh. Food Cons. (lagged) -0.652*** (0.096) -1.045*** (0.196) -1.296*** (0.242)
Risk 0.154*** (0.059) -0.336* (0.195) 0.177*** (0.057)
Hh. Size -0.001 (0.007) -0.0001 (0.007) -0.001 (0.006)
Male Headed hh. (=1) -0.112*** (0.037) -0.115*** (0.036) -0.117*** (0.034)
Hh. Head Age 0.002 (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
hh. Number of crops 0.036*** (0.006) 0.037*** (0.006) 0.035*** (0.006)
Hh. Number of plots -0.074*** (0.009) -0.075*** (0.009) -0.072*** (0.009)
Hh. Land in Hec. (Lagged) -0.022 (0.044) -0.020 (0.034) -0.013 (0.021)
Education yrs: Adult Lit. -0.056 (0.048) -0.057 (0.049) -0.056 (0.048)
Basic Education 0.002 (0.043) 0.007 (0.043) 0.009 (0.042)
Secondary Education -0.057 (0.077) -0.057 (0.078) -0.086 (0.075)
Higher Edu. 0.047 (0.146) 0.0536 (0.132) 0.046 (0.144)
Mkt. & Community Factors
Food Price Index (Lagged) -0.442*** (0.124) -0.198 (0.141) -0.005 (0.172)
Distance to Town (in Km) 0.028*** (0.006) 0.033*** (0.006) 0.001 (0.012)
Better Roads (=1) -0.084* (0.048) -0.090* (0.049) -0.304*** (0.017)
Distance to Mkt (in Km) 0.019*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.006) 0.068*** (0.019)
Better Transport (=1) 0.521*** (0.086) 0.567*** (0.079) 0.382*** (0.017)
Rainfall Deviation from avg. 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001)
Plot Characteristics
Plot size (in Hectares) -0.0003 (0.002) -0.0003 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002)
Soil Quality-Lem (v.good) 0.088** (0.040) 0.099*** (0.038) 0.111*** (0.037)
Soil Quality-lem teuf (ok) 0.009 (0.041) 0.011 (0.041) 0.021 (0.040)
Plot slope (Flat=1) -0.192*** (0.071) -0.171** (0.070) -0.177** (0.076)
Plot Slope (sloping=1) -0.039 (0.074) -0.0177 (0.074) -0.032 (0.080)
Observations 6,166 6,166 6,166
R-squared 0.415 0.417 0.427
chi2 1015 1036 1059
log likelihood -1944 -1937 -1905
Note: The dependent variable is a binary variable =1 if crop on plot is a cash crop; and 0 if it is a food crop
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
At plot level, in both the logit and conditional logit models, increase in house-
hold food consumption is associated with a decrease in the probability of selecting
cash crops relative to food crops. The effect is larger in the conditional logit model
where the average marginal effect of an increase in household food consumption
is associated with a decrease in the probability of selecting cash crops relative to
60
food crops by 65.2% (compared to 31.5% in the logit model).
Overall, across specifications, the net effect of household food consumption is larger
when difference in risk-preferences across households is considered through an in-
teraction of both variables. This is in line with the results obtained in the house-
hold level analysis of crop choices. As such, the interpretation of the effect of food
consumption on crop choices remains unchanged. All else equal, increase in house-
hold food consumption in the presence of market frictions such as transactions
costs is likely to constrain households’ ability to balance food demand through
market exchange. Where these constraints are binding, farmers have incentives to
internalize food markets through crop choices to maximize utility. Thus the deci-
sion to produce food crops rather than cash crops may result from the fact that
gains from less reliance on markets to balance household food demand and hence
achieve food security are higher than returns from producing cash crops. This
difference is even larger when differences in risk preferences are accounted for as
indicated in the second specification in which an interaction of food consumption
and risk is added. The effect of risk-attitude through food consumption is likely
to occur through farmers’ concern for food security. Risk-averse farmers are likely
to attach higher utility to food security and hence internalized food markets com-
pared to risk-loving farmers. As a result, the effect of food consumption becomes
more pronounced when risk is considered.
The effect of risk preferences on individual crop choices also follows a priori ex-
pectations. Risk loving farmers are more likely to select cash crops relative to
food crops. The average marginal effects indicate that as farmers become more
risk-loving, the probability of selecting cash crops relative to food crops increases
by 15.4% on average (and 9.8% in the logit model). The net effect of risk on
crop choices when interacted with food consumption is mixed. The logit model
indicates that the probability of selecting cash crops increases by 9.5% (a slight de-
crease from 9.8% in the basic specification). The conditional logit model indicates
that the probability of selecting cash crops decreases by 33.6% (from an increase of
15.4% in the basic specification). While it might difficult to reconcile these results,
it indicates the sensitivity of the effect of food consumption on crop choices to risk
preferences and vice-versa. An important result which has been documented in
the literature is the role of risk on crop choices. In particular risk-aversion is gener-
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ally associated with selecting low-return crops in several farming communities. As
highlighted above, food crops considered in this chapter which are mostly cereals
are generally low-risk due to their resistance to adverse climatic conditions. It is
thus not surprising that where farmers are concerned about food security espe-
cially in the presence of yield and price risk and constraints on households’ food
demand, the selection of food instead of cash crops is constrained optimal.
As with the household level crop choices, the state of community infrastructure also
influences crop choices. Farmers in communities with improvements in transport
conditions are on average more likely to select cash crops relative to food crops.
Although the size of the effect decreases when the difference in food consumption
across households is accounted for, the effect is still statistically significant and
positive. Farmers in communities with improved transportation are 38.2% more
likely to select cash crops (or 33.1% from the logit model) after controlling for dif-
ferences in the size of household food consumption. The effect of improvements in
road conditions, distance to market and major town are individually smaller and
contrary to expectations as found in the analysis of household level crop choices.
In summary, non-separability of farmers’ production and consumption decisions is
observed through the effect of household food consumption and risk preferences
on crop choices- both selection of food and cash crops; and crop diversity. These
effects are interpreted as indicators of the extent to which household consumption
decisions are constrained by market conditions. In response, farmers internalize
food markets through crop choices thereby establishing jointness between produc-
tion and consumption decisions. The sources of frictions in markets which are
likely to drive the link between crop choices and household consumption include
transactions costs to market participation. The results indicate that community
infrastructure relating to market access also has a significant effect on observed
crop choices. The presence of these frictions breaks the substitutability of farm
output and market goods and reinforces farmers’ subjectivity towards own-farm
harvest for household consumption. This creates incentives for farmers to produce
food crops for household consumption thereby reducing reliance on markets to
meet food demand. These gains which ultimately ensure household food security
are potentially larger than returns from cash crop production or specialization
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especially for risk-averse farmers facing price and yield risk without formal insur-
ance.
2.4.3 Gains from Crop Diversification?
Using both household and plot-level crop choices to examine farmers’ selec-
tion of food and cash crops and diversification of crop portfolio, it is observed
that household food consumption and risk preferences significantly influence crop
choices. This result shows the importance of crop choices for farming households
especially when household decisions are non-separable. One interpretation of this
finding is that farmers can internalize food markets by producing crops needed for
household consumption to reduce reliance on markets in balancing household food
demand. Thus farmers producing several crops are on average expected to be less
constrained by frictions which affect household consumption. These farmers are
expected to rely less on markets and more on own-farm harvest to achieve food
security and higher consumption. This implication of our result can be tested by
examining the effect of crop diversity on household consumption overtime. Using
measures of crop diversity and household real consumption per capita from data
collected in five waves of the ERHS (rounds 2 through 6) over a 10-year period we
examine the effect of diversity on household consumption using Pooled OLS and
Fixed Effects Estimators.
The results are reported below:
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Table 9: Gains from Diversification
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
VARIABLES log (r.cons) log (r.cons) log (r.cons) log (r.cons)
Total crop diversity 0.325*** 0.417***
(0.100) (0.119)
Food crop diversity 0.249*** 0.360***
(0.0850) (0.0984)
rain deviation from avg. -0.000135 -0.000156 -0.000114 -0.000150
(0.000103) (0.000103) (0.000106) (0.000104)
diversity*rain dev. 0.000304 0.000304 0.000230 0.000275
(0.000304) (0.000261) (0.000321) (0.000262)
Livestock Units (Lagged) 0.0150*** 0.0147*** 0.00865 0.00816
(0.00432) (0.00434) (0.00665) (0.00663)
land area (in hectares) 0.0220* 0.0210 0.0316* 0.0311*
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0167) (0.0167)
Constant 3.675*** 3.652*** 3.794*** 3.787***
(0.0565) (0.0604) (0.0440) (0.0447)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Dummies Yes Yes
Hh. Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 3,290 3,290 3,290 3,290
R-squared 0.230 0.229 0.062 0.062
Adj. R-squared 0.225 0.225 0.0592 0.0597
F 53.29 53.66 18.97 18.55
Note: The dependent variable is defined as log of household consumption per capita
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results indicate that, all else equal diversification of crop portfolio in-
creases household consumption. In both measures of crop diversity (total diversity-
production of food and cash crops; and food crop diversity- production of several
food crops) and using both pooled OLS and fixed effects estimators, household
consumption increases with crop diversity. Increase crop diversity through the
production of food and cash crops is associated with an increase of 41.7% increase
in household consumption on average. Whereas an increase in food crop diversity
is associated with a 36% increase in consumption on average. Although the effects
in the OLS model are smaller in magnitude, they are statistically significant. The
joint effect of crop diversity and rainfall variation is small and statistically insignif-
icant. The motivation for the interaction of crop diversity and rain deviation from
average overtime is to capture the transitory nature of crop output on consump-
tion as done by Paxson (1992). In the specifications without this interaction, the
effects are generally larger but remain positive and statistically significant. It is
also important to highlight the differences in the effects of crop diversity (defined
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as a producing food and cash crops) and food crop diversity (defined as producing
several food crops) on household consumption. The effect of the former appears to
be larger in magnitude in both the pooled OLS and Fixed Effects estimated mod-
els. This perhaps illustrates the fact that by diversifying crop portfolio into food
and cash crops, farmers are better able to minimize risk of consumption fluctua-
tions. Although a combination of different food crops enables farmers internalize
food markets, but this strategy might be limited by the lack of heterogeneity- the
sensitivity of the individual crops to shocks such as pest invasion, rain variation
etc. are likely to be correlated. On the other a portfolio comprising food and cash
crops is likely to be less sensitive to shocks on one of the crop categories.
The positive effect of crop diversity on household consumption can be explained
in several ways. In an environment where formal insurance is absent and frictions
in output markets impose constraints on consumption decisions, diversifying crop
portfolio constitutes an ex-ante coping strategy for idiosyncratic shocks (Dercon
(2002)). Through crop diversity (supplemented by other strategies as reported by
Dercon (1996)), farmers can be insured against consumption fluctuations due to
yield and/or price risk. In a recent work, Mazunda et al. (2015) (Chap. 5 pp.
44-49) provide evidence of the effect of crop diversity on household consumption
through food and nutrition security of farming households in Malawi. Hirvonen
and Hoddinott (2016) also showed that crop diversity among Ethiopian farmers
is associated with a significant increase in the nutritional diversity of children in
households facing constraints in accessing food markets. These findings illustrate
the non-separability of household production and consumption decisions through
crop choices as strategies used to internalize food markets to ensure food security
and facilitate household nutritional diversity.
In general, the results provide statistical evidence that through crop choices, farm-
ers have incentives to internalize food markets. It appears, through the produc-
tion of several crops, constraints on farmers’ ability to balance household food
consumption can be relaxed. Therefore, non-separability of household decisions
among farming-households as indicated by the effect of household food consump-
tion and risk attitude on crop choices can be interpreted as a constrained-optimal
response to existing market conditions. In this chapter, we considered these effects
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using different definitions of crop choices- selection between food and cash crops
at household and plot level; and diversity of crop portfolio through the production
of multiple food and cash crops.
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2.5 Robustness Tests
The conditional logit model (also referred to as McFadden’s Conditional Logit
Model) offers a technique to incorporate individual and/or alternative fixed effects
in modeling choices. This is considered as its improvement to other discrete choice
models such as the alternative specific conditional logit model (which is a special
case of the Conditional Logit model where fixed effects are ruled out). As a matter
of fact, the conditional logit model can be estimated using the asclogit command
in Stata since the post-estimation commands to obtain marginal effects for the
asclogit are well developed- which is not the case for the clogit command. We
followed this route (with the appropriate set-up of the data). However, concerns
about the effect of unobserved time invariant crop and farmer attributes on crop
choices still deserve proper attention. For this reason, a conditional logit estima-
tion using the clogit command is necessary.
Despite these considerations, other concerns about the conditional logit model
still remain. In particular, preference heterogeneity in repeated choices by individ-
uals and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption are relevant
in our analysis since farmers make multiple choices of crops on different plots. Ac-
cording to Train (2003), the IIA assumption implies that the stochastic component
of a given alternative provides no information about the stochastic component of
another alternative. However, violation of this assumption can be corrected by one
of three options as discussed by Train: 1) use an alternative model that captures
the correlation in the stochastic component of the alternatives. 2) Re-specify the
error of each alternative to capture the correlated components leaving the uncorre-
lated component as white noise19. 3) Proceed with estimation of the model bearing
in mind that the estimated model is at best an approximation of the representative
utility function. (Train (2003)Ch. 3).
Although the conditional logit model is used in a context which is reasonable
enough to argue that the IIA assumption is valid since the choice set is defined us-
ing grouped categories of crops- grains/food crops and cash crops. These categories
of crops (as oppose to the individual crop choices which form these categories) are
19This can be facilitated by the Mixed Logit model as discussed in Train (2008) which can be estimated in
Stata using the command mixlogit developed by Hole (2007) building on an earlier work by Haan and Uhlendorff
(2006).
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not expected to be significantly correlated as alternative choices. However, we
attempted a re-estimation of crop choices using the Mixed Logit Model which
considers these concerns with the Conditional Logit Model- See Hole (2007) for a
discussion of this approach).
Therefore, while the conditional logit model incorporates fixed effects; the mixed
logit model estimated using mixlogit is used to relax the IIA assumption and con-
sider preference heterogeneity in choice models. On the basis of these concerns,
we fit a mixlogit on the individual plot-level crop choices. The results are reported
in the appendix. In general, the results do not seem to be very different from the
results obtained from the conditional logit model.
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2.6 Conclusion
Farming households make both production and consumption decisions. Produc-
tion decisions serve as a direct source of food for household consumption (produc-
ing what to eat) and/or indirectly through market exchange of farm output with
the returns used to meet other household needs (producing to purchase what to
eat). The relationship between household decisions is often examined through the
lens of existing market conditions. In environments where markets conditions are
such that consumption decisions are constrained, farmers may choose to respond
through production decisions thereby creating jointness/simultaneity in household
decisions. This may occur through farmers’ crop choices: the selection of food and
cash crops; and crop diversity.
Frictions in the form of transactions costs and household subjective values towards
own-farm output render markets imperfect by driving a wedge between market
prices and endogenous household shadow prices. Differences in valuation between
’the market’ and ’the farmer’ lead to the breakdown of the perfect substitutability
of farm output and market goods and family and hired labor. Where this frictions
occur in food markets, farmers’ face constraints on their ability to satisfy house-
hold consumption from farm profits. Through this relationship, farming decisions
such as crop choices can be used to internalize food markets and reduce reliance
on markets by producing food crops instead of cash crops to balance household
food demand.
We test this hypothesis using household and plot-level crop choices of farmers
in rural Ethiopia. We model farmers’ choice between food and cash crops and the
extent to which they diversify their crop portfolio as a function of household and
market or community factors and plot-specific characteristics. We examine the ex-
tent to which observed crop choices reflect non-separability of household decisions
through the effect of indicators of binding constraints on household food demand
such as the size of household food demand, risk-attitude and market accessibility.
We find statistical evidence that increase in household food consumption and risk
aversion is associated with a decrease in the probability of selecting cash crops
relative to food crops. For agricultural households, the effects of these house-
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hold characteristics on crop choices can be interpreted as indicators of jointness of
production and consumption decisions due to constrained consumption decisions.
Through crop choices, farmers have incentives to produce food crops for household
consumption thereby reducing reliance on markets to meet food demand. These
gains which ultimately ensure household food security are potentially larger than
returns from cash crop production or specialization especially for risk-averse farm-
ers facing price and yield risk without formal insurance.
To further confirm whether non-separability of household decisions is reflected
through crop choices as means of internalizing food markets, we examine the ef-
fect of crop diversity on household consumption overtime. Using five rounds of
data on crop diversity and household consumption of the same farmers, we exam-
ine the size of gains from diversifying crop production by estimating a pooled OLS
and Fixed Effects model. In both models, crop diversity is associated with increase
in household consumption. Surprisingly, the effect of diversifying crop portfolio
into food and cash crops has a larger effect on consumption than producing several
food crops. This is perhaps because by producing both food and cash crops (rather
than several food crops), risk of income loss due to poor harvest or price volatility
is minimized thereby ensuring food security.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Description of Variables
Table 10: Description of Variables
Variable Description
Household Characteristics:
Food Crop Only Farmer (=1) A binary variable for farmers’ of food crops only.
Index of crop diversity An index of crop diversity measuring using the number of food & cash crops produced
Index of food crop diversity An index of crop diversity measuring using the number of food crops produced
Hh. Food cons. The proportion of household expenditure on food consumption.
Risk A measure of household risk-attitude constructed using lotteries
Hh. Land in Hec. Household land endowments in hectares.
Hh. Number of plots Number of plots used by household
Hh. Size Household size
Hh. Head Age Age of household head
Male Headed hh. (=1) Male headed household
Education yrs: No Schooling Education level of household head= No Schooling
Education yrs: Adult Lit. Education level of household head= Attended Adult Literacy program
Education yrs: Basic Educ. Education level of household head= Basic/Primary Education
Education yrs:Secondary Educ. Education level of household head= Secondary School.
Education yrs: Higher Educ. Education level of household head= Higher Education-Post secondary
Community Infrastructure: These were collected from eldrly members of a community such as Village head
Food Price Index (Lagged) Food Price Index provided in ERHS
Better Transport (=1) Improvement in access to other towns due to better transport systems
Better Roads (=1) Improvement in access to other towns due to better road network
Distance to Mkt. (in Km) Distance to market in kilometers
Distance to Major Town (in Km) Distance to major town in kilometers- A measure of market/community integration
Rainfall Deviation from avg. Constructed as annual community rainfall less 20 year average (from 1989).
Plot Characteristics:
Plot size (in Hectares) Plot size in hectares
Soil Quality-Lem (v.good) Soil quality of plot- Lem is considered to be a very good quality
Soil Quality-teuf (good) Soil quality of plot- teuf is considered to be a good quality, secondary to lem
Soil Quality-Lem-teuf (avg.) Soil quality of plot- Lem-teuf is considered to be an average quality.
Plot slope (Flat=1) Slop of plot- Flat
Plot Slope (sloping=1) Slope of plot- sloping
multiple crop plot Plot with several crops planted on
cash crop (=1) Cash crop plot- coffee or enset
Food crop (=1) Food crop plot- Teff, Barley, wheat etc.
2.7.2 Estimated Models
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Table 11: Food Crop only Production vs. Food + Cash Crops: Logit Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES foodonly foodonly foodonly
Hh. Land in Hec. (Lagged) 0.115 0.117 0.0867
(0.270) (0.274) (0.179)
Hh. Number of plots 0.0543 0.0514 0.0338
(0.0510) (0.0505) (0.0486)
Risk -1.067*** 1.580 -1.009**
(0.398) (2.158) (0.403)
Hh. Head Age -0.0197** -0.0196** -0.0137*
(0.00799) (0.00798) (0.00817)
Hh. Food cons. (lagged) 4.017*** 6.150*** -8.804***
(0.713) (1.987) (3.010)
Hh. Food cons.*risk -3.319
(2.701)
Better Transport (=1) -4.787*** -4.832*** -21.47***
(0.654) (0.670) (3.546)
Better Transport*Hh. Food cons. 19.49***
(3.831)
Better Roads (=1) -0.482 -0.477 12.79***
(0.322) (0.320) (2.861)
Better Roads*Hh. Food cons. -16.11***
(3.312)
Distance to Mkt. (in Km) -0.208*** -0.213*** -1.801***
(0.0372) (0.0382) (0.307)
Distance to Mkt.* Hh. Food cons. 1.933***
(0.348)
Distance to Town (in Km) -0.321*** -0.326*** -1.129***
(0.0609) (0.0623) (0.216)
Distance to Town*Hh. Food cons. 0.885***
(0.218)
Food Price Index (Lagged) 8.974*** 9.074*** 9.812***
(1.659) (1.678) (1.895)
Hh. Size -0.0693 -0.0687 -0.0541
(0.0431) (0.0430) (0.0452)
Male Headed hh. (=1) 0.646** 0.641** 0.586**
(0.252) (0.251) (0.255)
Education yrs: Adult Lit. 0.277 0.298 0.422
(0.286) (0.287) (0.309)
Basic Education -0.193 -0.186 -0.0832
(0.288) (0.287) (0.290)
Secondary Education 0.0404 0.0191 0.348
(0.489) (0.490) (0.480)
Higher Edu. -0.331 -0.286 -0.383
(0.809) (0.791) (0.925)
Rainfall Deviation from avg. -0.0281*** -0.0281*** -0.0360***
(0.00598) (0.00609) (0.00571)
Constant -4.361 -6.101** 6.316*
(2.754) (3.101) (3.838)
Observations 781 781 781
R-squared 0.397 0.399 0.457
chi2 276.3 271.4 215.0
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Tobit Estimation of: Diversity of Crop Portfolio
Food & Cash Crop Diversity Food Crop Diversity
VARIABLES diversityIndex diversityIndex diversityIndex diversityIndex diversityIndex diversityIndex
Hh. Land in Hec. (Lagged) -0.130 -0.135 -0.0306 0.326 0.334 0.266
(0.447) (0.448) (0.395) (0.341) (0.343) (0.317)
Hh. Number of plots 1.656*** 1.658*** 1.679*** 2.939*** 2.936*** 2.914***
(0.218) (0.218) (0.216) (0.258) (0.258) (0.252)
Risk 2.306 -3.152 1.753 -4.100* 5.096 -3.640*
(1.815) (9.783) (1.799) (2.206) (10.34) (2.123)
Hh. Head Age 0.0298 0.0296 0.0168 -0.0976** -0.0973** -0.0857**
(0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0337) (0.0433) (0.0433) (0.0427)
Hh. Food Cons. (lagged) -10.45*** -14.73* 13.43 13.14*** 20.34** 25.05*
(2.936) (7.825) (10.29) (3.424) (8.904) (14.45)
Hh. Food Cons.*risk 6.855 -11.53
(11.82) (12.58)
Better Transport (=1) 12.08*** 12.05*** 26.91*** -23.45*** -23.41*** -31.99***
(2.011) (2.017) (5.683) (1.931) (1.931) (7.504)
Better Transport*Hh. food cons. -17.76*** 10.15
(6.549) (9.067)
Better Roads (=1) 5.858*** 5.862*** 0.812 10.55*** 10.54*** 29.26***
(1.394) (1.393) (6.905) (1.638) (1.636) (10.18)
Better Roads*Hh. food cons. 7.035 -23.52*
(8.527) (12.27)
Distance to Mkt. (in Km) 0.745*** 0.751*** 4.154*** -0.376** -0.387** -2.378**
(0.193) (0.193) (1.092) (0.189) (0.191) (1.110)
Distance to Mkt.* Hh. food cons. -4.181*** 2.492*
(1.260) (1.285)
Distance to Town (in Km) 0.630*** 0.627*** 1.508*** -1.911*** -1.905*** -1.479**
(0.203) (0.204) (0.490) (0.201) (0.201) (0.661)
Distance to Town*Hh. food cons. -0.831* -0.663
(0.500) (0.753)
Food Price Index (Lagged) -2.123 -2.407 1.179 -22.77*** -22.31*** -25.35***
(8.288) (8.310) (8.376) (8.035) (8.008) (8.027)
Hh. Size 0.191 0.192 0.193 0.258 0.256 0.230
(0.202) (0.202) (0.200) (0.258) (0.258) (0.253)
Male Headed hh. (=1) -0.132 -0.109 -0.126 4.849*** 4.812*** 4.814***
(1.130) (1.130) (1.112) (1.396) (1.392) (1.385)
Education yrs: Adult Lit. -0.923 -0.936 -0.877 1.944 1.965 2.151
(1.309) (1.315) (1.300) (1.702) (1.700) (1.689)
Basic Education -0.555 -0.571 -0.612 -2.505 -2.482 -2.617*
(1.321) (1.321) (1.298) (1.587) (1.584) (1.575)
Secondary Education -1.374 -1.329 -1.489 0.309 0.241 0.702
(2.861) (2.843) (2.847) (3.538) (3.546) (3.491)
Higher Edu. 0.0367 -0.0639 0.519 3.497 3.652 3.423
(4.154) (4.217) (4.109) (10.05) (9.927) (9.999)
Rainfall Deviation from avg. 0.0542** 0.0535** 0.0819*** -0.261*** -0.259*** -0.273***
(0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0254) (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0229)
Constant 6.888 10.70 -19.74 71.26*** 64.86*** 66.05***
(12.85) (14.55) (16.68) (11.89) (13.31) (17.57)
Observations 781 781 781 781 781 781
R-Squared 0.0361 0.0361 0.0394 0.0752 0.0753 0.0788
ll -3042 -3041 -3031 -2997 -2997 -2943
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Plot Crop Choices: Logit & Conditional Logit Estimation
Logit Estimation Conditional Logit Estimation
VARIABLES cashcrop cashcrop cashcrop cashcrop cashcrop cashcrop
Hh. Size 0.0128 0.0130 0.0133 -0.00775 -0.000817 -0.00546
(0.0248) (0.0249) (0.0246) (0.0389) (0.0384) (0.0375)
Male Headed hh. (=1) -0.523*** -0.518*** -0.510*** -0.644*** -0.662*** -0.679***
(0.130) (0.130) (0.129) (0.211) (0.205) (0.196)
Hh. Head Age 0.00965** 0.00974** 0.00808* 0.00999 0.0116* 0.00859
(0.00451) (0.00451) (0.00461) (0.00744) (0.00704) (0.00678)
Risk 0.720*** -0.340 0.687*** 0.885*** -3.013** 1.024***
(0.219) (1.015) (0.216) (0.341) (1.523) (0.329)
Education yrs: Adult Lit. -0.161 -0.163 -0.175 -0.328 -0.332 -0.327
(0.198) (0.199) (0.202) (0.287) (0.294) (0.289)
Basic Education 0.0491 0.0526 0.0491 0.00920 0.0402 0.0490
(0.158) (0.158) (0.157) (0.247) (0.245) (0.238)
Secondary Education -0.231 -0.225 -0.324 -0.332 -0.330 -0.518
(0.300) (0.301) (0.302) (0.462) (0.466) (0.472)
Higher Edu. 0.308 0.314 0.298 0.267 0.303 0.261
(0.551) (0.545) (0.564) (0.823) (0.747) (0.818)
Food Price Index (Lagged) 1.919** 1.912** 2.162*** -2.534*** -1.137 -0.0286
(0.894) (0.894) (0.838) (0.714) (0.809) (0.997)
Hh. Food Cons. (lagged) -2.324*** -3.207*** -1.087 -3.742*** -6.913*** -8.705***
(0.362) (0.965) (1.693) (0.561) (1.444) (1.784)
Hh. Food Share*risk 1.367 5.098***
(1.315) (1.961)
Better Transport (=1) 2.697*** 2.701*** 6.373*** 2.992*** 3.254*** 6.689***
(0.267) (0.268) (1.618) (0.493) (0.450) (2.037)
Better Transport*Hh. food Cons. -4.425** -3.937*
(1.850) (2.286)
Better Roads (=1) -0.381** -0.387** -4.944** -0.483* -0.519* -7.749***
(0.186) (0.187) (2.092) (0.277) (0.279) (2.594)
Better Roads*Hh. food Cons. 5.585** 8.869***
(2.487) (3.106)
Distance to Mkt. (in Km) 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.573*** 0.111*** 0.127*** 0.489***
(0.0218) (0.0221) (0.130) (0.0342) (0.0340) (0.147)
Distance to Mkt.* Hh. food Cons. -0.564*** -0.456***
(0.153) (0.175)
Distance to Town (in Km) 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.224*** 0.158*** 0.189*** -0.0631
(0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0831) (0.0361) (0.0369) (0.0920)
Distance to Town*Hh. food Cons. -0.0460 0.328***
(0.0913) (0.119)
Hh. Number of crops 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.147*** 0.207*** 0.214*** 0.203***
(0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0223) (0.0338) (0.0343) (0.0334)
Hh. Number of plots -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.263*** -0.426*** -0.431*** -0.417***
(0.0336) (0.0335) (0.0327) (0.0557) (0.0537) (0.0510)
Hh. Land in Hec. (Lagged) -0.0521 -0.0526 -0.0386 -0.127 -0.115 -0.0764
(0.0731) (0.0732) (0.0583) (0.253) (0.197) (0.124)
Plot size (in Hectares) -0.00212 -0.00219 -0.000665 -0.00159 -0.00170 -0.000192
(0.00971) (0.00974) (0.00934) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.00959)
Soil Quality-Lem (v.good) 0.648*** 0.642*** 0.635*** 0.505** 0.571*** 0.641***
(0.188) (0.188) (0.189) (0.229) (0.220) (0.217)
Soil Quality-Lem-teuf (avg.) 0.178 0.167 0.191 0.0497 0.0625 0.122
(0.200) (0.200) (0.202) (0.236) (0.234) (0.230)
Plot slope (Flat=1) -0.525 -0.527 -0.605 -1.102*** -0.982** -1.025**
(0.390) (0.388) (0.428) (0.405) (0.403) (0.440)
Plot Slope (sloping=1) 0.210 0.205 0.0692 -0.225 -0.102 -0.186
(0.404) (0.402) (0.443) (0.424) (0.423) (0.461)
Rainfall Deviation from avg. 0.0239*** 0.0237*** 0.0259*** 0.0284*** 0.0300*** 0.0333***
(0.00253) (0.00253) (0.00266) (0.00430) (0.00391) (0.00376)
Observations 3,083 3,083 3,083 6,166 6,166 6,166
R-squared 0.214 0.214 0.225 0.415 0.417 0.427
chi2 549.7 546.4 539.0 1015 1036 1059
ll -1287 -1287 -1269 -1944 -1937 -1905
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Plot Crop Choices: Mixed Logit Estimation
(1) (3) (7)
VARIABLES Mean Mean Mean
Hh. Size 0.0119 0.0124 0.0130
(0.0252) (0.0252) (0.0245)
Male Headed hh. (=1) -0.538*** -0.534*** -0.519***
(0.140) (0.140) (0.136)
Hh. Head Age 0.00997** 0.0100** 0.00825*
(0.00469) (0.00469) (0.00454)
Risk 0.777*** -0.355 0.731***
(0.229) (1.175) (0.222)
Years of Eduction -0.00493 -0.00336 -0.0146
(0.0706) (0.0706) (0.0686)
Food Price Index (Lagged) 2.054** 2.041** 2.215**
(0.953) (0.952) (0.934)
Hh. Food Cons. (lagged) -2.432*** -3.361*** -0.889
(0.399) (1.030) (1.746)
Foodshare*risk 1.449
(1.478)
Better Transport (=1) 3.025*** 3.027*** 6.514***
(0.286) (0.286) (1.219)
Better Roads (=1) -0.399** -0.401** -4.599***
(0.192) (0.192) (1.189)
Distance to Mkt. (in Km) 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.603***
(0.0284) (0.0285) (0.139)
Distance to Town (in Km) 0.192*** 0.193*** 0.233**
(0.0285) (0.0286) (0.107)
Hh. food Cons.*Better Transport -4.322***
(1.420)
Hh. food Cons.*Better Roads 5.165***
(1.426)
Hh. food Cons.*Distance to Mkt. -0.590***
(0.164)
Hh. food Cons.*Distance to Town -0.0404
(0.123)
Hh. Number of crops 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.161***
(0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0238)
Hh. Number of plots -0.310*** -0.310*** -0.287***
(0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0349)
Hh. Land in Hec. (Lagged) -0.0566* -0.0573* -0.0429
(0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0307)
Plot size (in Hectares) 0.000326 0.000272 0.000966
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0102)
Soil Quality-Lem (v.good) 0.657*** 0.652*** 0.646***
(0.235) (0.235) (0.231)
Soil Quality-Lem-teuf (avg.) 0.159 0.150 0.175
(0.247) (0.247) (0.243)
Plot slope (Flat=1) -0.512 -0.515 -0.604
(0.435) (0.434) (0.438)
Plot Slope (sloping=1) 0.192 0.187 0.0548
(0.445) (0.445) (0.448)
Rainfall Deviation from avg. 0.0265*** 0.0263*** 0.0280***
(0.00245) (0.00245) (0.00250)
cash crop -7.286*** -6.541*** -8.628***
(1.559) (1.728) (2.239)
Observations 6,166 6,166 6,166
chi2 15.79 15.60 8.749
ll -1281 -1281 -1266
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3 Transactions Costs Effects on Farmers’ Use of Farm Out-
put: Market Exchange versus Household Consumption.
Abstract
We investigate transactions costs effects on farmers’ market participation through their
use of farm harvest for market exchange and household consumption. We test the hypothesis
that the presence of transactions costs constrains market participation by lowering returns
from market exchange of farm output thereby increasing gains from alternative uses of farm
harvest such as household consumption. Previous studies have largely focused on the ef-
fects of transactions costs on market exchange. However, for farming households facing
joint determination of production and consumption decisions, transactions costs are likely
to also affect farmers’ use of farm harvest for household consumption. The chapter makes a
contribution in this regard. We also examine the heterogeneity of transactions costs effects
across crop choices (categorized into cash and non-cash crops); and across farmers based
on differences in diversity of crop portfolio. We test this hypothesis using 3 rounds of the
Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS) data collected between 1999 and 2009. We find
statistically significant effect of indicators of transactions costs on both farmers’ marketing
and consumption of farm output with the effect on the former being larger. In particular,
distance to market lowers the volume of farm output sold and increases the proportion of
household consumption obtained through farm harvest. On the other hand, improvements
in roads and markets are associated with an increase volume of farm output used for market
exchange; and a decrease in the amount use for household consumption. We interpret these
results as the role of costly exchange of farm output due to transactions costs which create
disincentives for farmers to participate in markets as sellers of farm output and possibly in
making purchases for household consumption. Due to the relationship between production
and consumption decisions for farming households, the use of farm harvest for household
consumption under binding constraints on market participation, is constrained-optimal since
it enables households internalize food markets.
Keywords: transactions costs, market participation, farming-households, internalized mar-
kets, double-hurdle, Ethiopia.
JEL Classification: D12 D13 O13 Q13
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate the effect of transactions costs on farmers’ alloca-
tion of farm output to market exchange; and the volume of household consumption
satisfied through household production. Using plot-level data, the quantity of farm
output sold in markets is obtained and aggregated across all crops produced on all
plots owned by the household. Using rich consumption data, the contribution of
home production to each item consumed (relative to other sources such as market
purchases) is obtained. We combine this information on marketing and consump-
tion of farm output with household and market/community characteristics relating
to transactions costs to examine the extent to which costly market exchange in-
fluences farmers’ decision to sell farm output or satisfy consumption through farm
harvest.
Typically, studies in this area of research have focused on examining transactions
costs effects on households’ market participation as sellers or as buyers. However,
given that subsistence farmers participate in markets as both sellers and buyers, we
consider transactions costs effects on both uses of farm output to better illustrate
the extent to which household market participation is constrained by transactions
costs. The presence of transactions costs lowers incentives for market participation
due to lower returns from market exchange or higher costs of meeting consump-
tion decisions. For subsistence farmers, these two effects are linked through the
household budget constraint- lower returns to farming constrain farmers’ ability
to finance household consumption decisions since crop income represents a large
share of household income (see Dercon and Krishnan (1996)). This relationship
also implies that subsistence farmers’ have incentives to respond to these con-
straints by internalizing food markets through the production of crop(s) primarily
for household consumption rather than market exchange. This reduces reliance
on formal markets to meet household consumption- especially food demand; and
hence non-participation or lower intensity of participation in markets. These re-
sponses establish jointness in household production and consumption decisions
since choice of crops and diversity of crop portfolio are influenced by consumption
preferences- see Singh et al. (1986d).
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These relationships establish the foundation for studies on the extent to which
farming decisions such as crop choices and allocation of farm output; are affected
by market conditions. The hypotheses tested in these studies are formulated on
the basis that farmers’ choice of food crops over cash crops; and allocation of farm
output for household consumption rather than market exchange are constrained-
optimal responses to binding constraints on market participation due to frictions
such as transactions costs.
We define market participation using farmers’ allocation of farm harvest between
market exchange and household consumption hence the jointness in household de-
cisions. Other uses of farm output such as inputs for subsequent farming periods
and barter with other households are not considered20. Through these definitions,
we hypothesize that the presence of transactions costs reduces farmers’ incentives
to participate in markets as sellers farm output (due to lower net-returns from mar-
ket exchange) or buyers of market goods (due to higher net costs of purchases).
This occurs due to constraints on farmers’ marketing of farm output and ability to
balance household food demand due to transactions costs. We further hypothesize
that in response to these constraints, alternative uses of farm harvest to market ex-
change such as household consumption are constrained-optimal. By internalizing
food markets through the consumption of farm harvest, farmers reduce reliance
on formal markets to maximize utility from consumption. This relationship be-
tween production and consumption decisions establishes jointness/non-separability
in household decisions.
We test these hypotheses separately using farmers’ decision to sell farm output
(and the amount sold); and size of internalized food markets. This is defined using
the contribution of farm harvest to the quantity consumed of a given item relative
to other sources such as quantity of purchased goods. This is done for all items
consumed by a household in a given period and aggregated to household level.
In addition, we extend this framework to examine the heterogeneity of transac-
tions costs effects across farmers based on differences in crop choices (cash crop
20These uses are likely to be very small as indicated by the size of the contribution of gifts and other exchange
of goods between households to total household consumption. The descriptive statistics indicate that, on average,
71% of items consumed by households surveyed is market purchased, 26% is household produced and 3% is
obtained from other households (exchanges, gifts etc.).
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versus non-cash crop) and diversity of crop portfolio. The role of differences in
crop choices and diversity is motivated by the fact that farm output from food
crops such as cereals is mainly used for household consumption (although a small
percentage may be used for market exchange to finance other household needs).
Cash crops such as coffee on the other hand are predominantly produced for mar-
ket exchange. As a result, differences in farmers’ choice of crop and composition
of crop portfolio are likely to create a heterogeneous effect of transactions costs on
market participation such that cash crop producers (whether produced with other
food crops or not) are less constrained by transactions costs.
The data used in the analysis is obtained from 3 rounds of the Ethiopia Ru-
ral Household Survey (ERHS) collected between 1999 and 2009. We construct a
panel data of farmers’ marketing of farm output and use for household consump-
tion along with indicators of transactions costs, farmers’ choice of crop (cash crop
versus non-cash crops) and a measure of crop diversity. Farmers’ market participa-
tion decision is defined as a two stage process defined and examined separately for
both selling and consuming farm output. In the first stage, farmers make a discrete
choice of participating or not (i.e. to sell or not; and consume farm output or not).
The second stage represents the continuous choice of scale of participation (i.e.
the quantity of farm output to sell and consume). This approach is widely used
in the literature to capture the possibility of a differential effect of transactions
costs on the two stages of farmers’ market participation decision. Empirically, we
estimate transactions costs effects on market participation as defined above using
Cragg’s double hurdle model (which accommodates corner solutions as optimal
responses to binding constraints on marketing decisions). The first hurdle repre-
sents the discrete choice and second hurdle represents the continuous choice. Other
concerns such as unobservable household heterogeneity is controlled for by aug-
menting the double hurdle model with Correlated Random Effects implemented
by adding time-averaged household characteristics.
We find statistical evidence that distance to market and major town lowers both
farmers’ probability of participating as sellers and conditional on participation the
volume of farm output sold. Distance to market is assumed to reflect the size of
explicit marketing costs such as transportations costs; and implicit costs such as
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opportunity costs of time spent selling farm output. Distance to major town on the
other hand, is assumed to indicate the extent of market integration and access to
larger markets with bigger cliente`le. Improvements in road conditions and markets
appear to have a larger effect on farmers’ intensity of participation. Sellers of farm
output in communities with such improvements and hence lower transactions costs
appear to participate more intensely on average. These results illustrate the effect
of costly exchange as constraints on farmers’ marketing of farm output- especially
non-cash crop farmers and farmers with less diverse crop portfolio whose discrete
choice to participate appears to be constrained by distance to market.
The use of farm harvest for household consumption also appears to be influenced
by transactions costs. Similar to marketing of farm output, the effect of distance
to market is much smaller. However, improvements in road conditions and mar-
kets significantly lower the use of farm harvest for household consumption. In
general, we interpret these results as the role of costly exchange of farm output
due to transactions costs which create disincentives for farmers to participate in
markets as sellers of farm output and possibly in making purchases for household
consumption. Due to the involvement of farming households in both production
and consumption activities, responses to these constraints can occur through the
increased use of farm harvest for household consumption and decreasing the vol-
ume of farm output used for market exchange.
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3.2 Literature Review
For farming households, market participation involves the sale of farm output
and the purchase of goods for household consumption. The relationship between
these two is established through household budget constrain since returns from
market exchange are used to finance consumption decisions. Alternatively, where
farmers are involved in the production of food crops, farm output can be used
for market exchange or household consumption. Farmers’ choice between these
two strategies has been examined in the context of existing market conditions.
In particular, the production of food crops and use of farm output for house-
hold consumption may be driven by differences in utility derived from market and
household produced goods for consumption decisions; or differences in market and
shadow prices for sale of farm output.
What drives these differences in utility or prices? Growing empirical evidence
points towards costly exchange such as transactions costs to market participation.
The presence of transactions costs distorts market prices and utility farmers derive
from consuming market goods. This lowers incentives to participate in markets as
sellers of farm output and buyers of goods for household consumption. The effect
on marketing of farm output occurs through lower returns net of transactions costs
which constrain market participation and farmers’ ability to finance consumption
decisions. Similarly, the presence of transactions costs in food markets increases
market prices relative to farmers’ valuation thereby constraining farmers’ ability
to balance household food demand. Farmers’ response to these constraints can
be examined through crop choices, participation and intensity of participation in
markets. Farmers likely to be constrained by transactions costs have incentives
to produce food crops ex-ante primarily for household consumption rather than
cash crops for market exchange. By internalizing food markets, the constraints
on consumption decisions are relaxed since farmers reduce reliance on markets to
meet household consumption decisions. Similarly, these constraints can be relaxed
by using farm output for household consumption rather than market exchange re-
sulting in non-participation or low intensity conditional on participation in output
markets. These responses have been cited as explanations for the weak response
to agricultural policy targeting increased market participation of farmers imple-
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mented through exogenous price increases reported by several studies.
The heterogeneity in the extent to which constraints due to transactions costs
are binding on farmers’ market participation in a given community can be exam-
ined through differences in choice of crops and farmers’ ability to internalize food
markets among others. Farmers producing cash crops such as coffee are expected
to be more market oriented and less likely to be constrained by transactions costs
compared to non-cash crop producers. We consider this extension in the chapter.
The chapter draws from contributions by several studies on market participation
of farming households. A selected review is discussed in the following sections
highlighting the state of the literature and the contributions this chapter attempts
to make.
3.2.1 Price Changes, Market Participation & Transactions Costs
Price increases for agricultural produce have been a common policy targeting
increased agricultural commercialization in the developing world. It is hypothe-
sized that such interventions would create incentives for farmers to expand pro-
duction of cash/export crops (relative to subsistence crops), increase intensity of
market participation (i.e. increased quantity of farm output sold), and food se-
curity (through higher returns from farming) ceteris paribus . Several papers have
attempted to test this hypothesis by examining farmers’ response to changes in
market prices- the price elasticity of marketed surplus (total farm output net of
household consumption of farm output) such as Strauss (1984b) and several other
studies reviewed in Singh et al. (1986d). Extensions of these papers incorporated
other dimensions such as the role of household inventory (Renkow (1990)); and
household risk (Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991)). Contrary to expectations, sev-
eral studies reported weak (in some cases negative) price elasticity of marketed
surplus.
A common explanation for this result is built around the assumption about the
state of markets. The construct of the hypothesis that price increases create an
incentive strong enough to influence farmers’ marketing of farm output is set of
the belief that markets are perfect. This assumption implies that prevailing mar-
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ket prices reflect farmers’ valuation of farm output such that market prices equate
farmers’ shadow prices. As a result of the equality of prices, market and simi-
lar household produced goods (through farming activities) are perfect substitutes
to the household making consumption decisions. Under these conditions, farm-
ers’ production and consumption decisions can be examined separately (akin to a
firm-household structure) for the purposes of an empirical study. The separability
of household decisions implies that farmers choose production decisions to maxi-
mize farm profits; which are then used to finance consumption decisions chosen to
maximize utility (Singh et al. (1986d)).
Under this theory of farming households, differences in expected and observed
responses to price changes can be attributed to market conditions. The presences
of market frictions such as transactions costs in market exchange create inequality
between market and shadow prices of farm output. This establishes jointness in
household production and consumption decisions. The simultaneity in household
decisions stems from endogeniety in the budget constraint due to shadow prices
which constraints households’ ability to satisfy consumption decisions from returns
to selling farm output. Where this constraint is binding, alternative strategies to
market participation such as production of subsistence crops for household con-
sumption rather than cash crops for market exchange; and/or limiting market
participation by consuming a greater share of own-farm output maybe considered
by farmers. These considerations are formally incorporated into what is often re-
ferred to as models of agricultural households (See Singh et al. (1986d)) and used
in several empirical studies on the behavior of farming households.
3.2.2 Transactions Costs and Market Participation
In light of these concerns, attempts have been made to identify market condi-
tions which drive a wedge between market and shadow prices of farm output and
market goods. A particularly popular explanation for the differences in prices is
built around the theory of costly exchange due to Coase (1937) in which he dis-
cussed that economic transactions do not occur in frictionless environments. This
argument has been extended to market participation of farmers in which transac-
tions are defined as market exchange of farm output and purchase of market goods
for household consumption. The frictions highlighted by Coase (1937) occur when
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markets are characterized with “...pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs associated
with arranging and carrying out an exchange of goods and services” as defined
by Holloway et al. (2000) p.280 thereby constraining market participation deci-
sions. Thus they broadly relate to various forms of costs associated with market
exchange such as search, negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of agreements,
cost of transportation among others hence the term transactions costs. In the
marketing of farm output which has attracted a lot of attention in the literature,
farmers also face costs due to risk of spoilage and uncertainties about marketing
outlets and price changes Sadoulet and De Janvry (1995b), Staal et al. (1997)
among others.
In developing countries, these costs are driven by the state of rural infrastruc-
ture such as road networks, access to information, support services among others;
and household characteristics such as access to information, means of transport,
experience etc. Farmers in communities with poor infrastructure, face isolated and
thin markets, risk wastage of farm output and price volatility. These conditions
result in high participation costs thereby constraining farmers’ decision to partic-
ipate in markets (Staal et al. (1997))21. The link between transactions costs and
market participation is such that under high transactions costs, “...transactions
simply do not occur, or substitute institutions emerge to allow the transactions
to take place” leading to missing markets De Janvry et al. (1991b). This results
from the fact that high transactions costs create disutility greater than the util-
ity created from market exchange such that a corner solution of non-participation
can be optimal. This observation has been widely accepted as an explanation for
the weak response to exogenous price increases due to policy interventions aimed
at creating incentives to increase the scale of agricultural commercialization (see
Weber et al. (1988)).
Analytically, transactions costs are incorporated into farmers’ market participa-
tion decisions as constraints in the form of price boundaries with shadow prices as
benchmarks. Where market prices net of (or adjusted for) transactions costs are
21Osborne (2005) examined competitiveness of markets in Ethiopia and fails to find statistical evidence
to support perfect competition in Yetem (low trade volume and distant market) but inconclusive evidence
against imperfect competition for Debre Zeit (high trade volume and nearer to capital city).
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too low (or too high for purchasing decisions) relative to shadow prices, farmers
may find it optimal to opt out of participating in markets. This, as discussed in
Minot et al. (1999), explains the low price elasticity of marketed surplus (defined
as farm harvest less household consumption) found in earlier empirical studies and
thus the need to consider the market participation costs in the formulation of agri-
cultural policy as highlighted in Braun et al. (1994).
Similarly, in a widely cited paper in the transactions costs effects literature, Goetz
(1992b) illustrated the differential effects of price interventions on autarkic, sellers
and buyers under costly market participation such as the presence of transactions
costs in both selling and buying decisions. Under these conditions, government
intervention to increase market prices is likely to benefit households who are net-
sellers in markets since returns from market exchange of farm output is likely to
be higher than costs of purchases. Net-buyers on the other hand, are likely to lose
from such interventions since price inflation of purchases may outweigh gains from
sales. Non-participating or autarkic households may not gain from such interven-
tions. Similar concerns are also raised in Braun et al. (1994) and Omamo (1998b).
However, examining transactions costs effects on farmers’ discrete market partic-
ipation decision (i.e. to participate or not) maybe restrictive. Heterogeneity in
transactions costs effects may result in not only different outcomes for market par-
ticipants and non-participants but also among participants. To capture this, the
marketing of farm output decisions can be defined to follow a two-stage process- a
discrete choice of participation versus non-participation; and a continuous choice
of intensity/volume of participation22.
In an influential paper on market participation decisions of agricultural households,
Goetz (1992b) examined strategic factors which influence buying and selling de-
cisions of coarse grain producing farmers in Senegal. Using a two-step estimation
process, he examined farmers’ decision to participate and intensity of their partic-
ipation. In the first stage, the probability that a given household will choose to
participate as a buyer/seller is examined as a function of household characteristics
22The extent to which discrete and continuous marking decisions are sequentially or simultaneously determined
has also attracted some interest. A recent study was done by Bellemare and Barrett (2006). They reported sta-
tistical evidence of sequential determination of marking decisions using data from farmers in Kenya and Ethiopia.
85
and estimated using a probit model. In the second stage, a switching regression
model is estimated for buyers and sellers in which households select themselves
into buying and/or selling. Contrary to expectations, he found that higher prices
were associated with higher likelihood of households participating as buyers. This
he attributed to the possibility that increased prices may signal a likelihood of
food scarcity encouraging farmers to increase their inventory of grains. Other fac-
tors such as access to technology reduces households likelihood of participating as
buyers but larger household size increases it; better market information influences
households participation decision as sellers; access to means of transport (cart)
decreases chances of participating as buyer unless it is accompanied with better
information. The opposite is found for sellers.
In terms of volume of participation, scarcity of rice intensifies buyer participa-
tion in grain markets. Conditional on participation, the intensity of participation
(which is measured by the volume of purchases and sales of buyers and sellers
respectively) increases with improved access to production enhancing technology.
Increased household size influences quantity transacted by buyers; while higher
dependency ration increases the quantity sold.
The link between link between market conditions and household characteristics
in farmers’ market participation decisions as reported by Goetz (1992b) raised
interest in examining the role of transactions costs on agricultural commercial-
ization. This has been done by identifying indicators of transactions costs and
measuring its effects- i.e. the extent to which costly exchange drives heterogene-
ity in households’ marketing decisions- participation versus non-participation; and
low or high intensity conditional on participation.
3.2.3 Identifying Transactions Costs Effects on Market Participation.
The identification of transactions costs involves obtaining measures of market
accessibility such as distance to market and state of infrastructure, availability of
public goods such as agricultural support services; and household characteristics
which influence or ease market participation (Sadoulet and De Janvry (1995b)).
To examine the effect of these measures on the two-stage market participation
decision framework proposed by Goetz (1992b), Key et al. (2000) proposed dif-
ferentiating transactions costs into: Proportional Transaction costs (PTCs) and
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Fixed Transaction costs (FTCs). PTCs are dependent on quantity bought or sold
such as transportation costs; FTCs on the other hand are independent of quantity
such as search and bargaining costs.
Although this distinction provides conceptual foundation for examining the role
of transaction costs, empirical identification is rather challenging since measures
of transactions costs can only be obtained when transactions occur-i.e. farming-
households participates as a seller of farm output or buyer of market goods. The
effect of transactions costs on non-participants is empirically challenging. With
these limitations, several studies on market participation attempted to estimate
the extent to which the indicators of transactions costs highlighted above drive the
differences in observed marketing decisions- participants and non-participants; and
differences in the intensity of participation among participants. A typical applica-
tion is presented in Goetz (1992b) by including indicators of transaction costs in
marketed surplus equations to back its effect on participation decisions23. To sep-
arately identify and estimate proportional and fixed transaction costs is even more
challenging. However, Key et al. (2000) proposed a censored regression threshold in
their work on market participation and supply decisions of corn farmers in Mexico.
In another application, Vakis et al. (2003) argued that in an environment where
farmers face multiple markets, observed choice of market can be used to exam-
ine the extent to which transactions costs affect market participation. They re-
ported that fixed transactions costs are quite large for potato farmers in Peru
and potentially affected by information sharing among co-villagers. Hence, lower
transactions costs effects for potato farmers can be achieved with improvements in
information about markets. However, the authors did not examine the size of the
effect of transactions costs relative to producers of other crops in the community.
Barrett (2008) proposed a parametric approach to estimating transactions costs
for cereal farmers in Eastern and Southern Africa. In his work, market prices are
adjusted for household, crop and location specific indicators of transaction costs
(such as public goods, households characteristics that influence negotiation skills,
household liquidity etc.).
23Similar approach was used to examine the effect of transaction costs on land rental- Skoufias (1995)
and labor market imperfections-Sadoulet et al. (1998).
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Indicators of transactions costs apart from distance to markets and household at-
tributes such as community characteristics have also been considered to pin down
heterogeneity in transactions costs effects on market participation across space.
To motivate this, Renkow et al. (2004) in an attempt to quantify fixed transaction
costs and its effect on demand and supply decisions of maize growing households
in Kenya using a maximum likelihood approach reported that fixed transaction
costs are estimated to be around a price band of 15.5% around the market price.
Allowing for transactions costs differentials across villages, they found that: vil-
lages served by truck have a fixed transaction cost of about 11% while those served
by animals or bicycle have fixed transaction costs of the magnitude of 15%. The
effect of distance is significant for villages served by trucks but insignificant for
villages with bicycles or animals as means of transport.
These results provide empirical evidence that differences in market participation is
sensitive to differences in the state of markets across communities. In particular,
the competitiveness of markets, access to extension/support services, quality of
roads, geographic factors such as connectedness or proximity to major town(s) ap-
pear to influence market participation. These effects operate by constraining access
to information, spatial transmission of prices and incentives for arbitrage. Barrett
(2008) considers these factors by defining transactions costs in terms of access to
markets, integration of local markets with global markets, trader competition, fis-
cal policies that affected road networks, security, exchange rate devaluation that
increased cost of tradables such as fuel, price risk etc.
Disintegration of markets over space due to high transportation costs and differ-
ences in agricultural productivity as highlighted in Fafchamps (1992) are likely
to drive volatility in prices. In his simulated model with three hypothetical
households- fully commercialized, partially commercialized and mostly self-sufficient
household, he argued that to create incentives for cash crop production, policies
to integrate food markets and/or fix food crop prices need to be implemented.
Such policies will facilitate cash crop production by reducing food price variance,
covariance between individual output and total supply, a more elastic supply (due
to substitution possibilities in more integrated markets) and ultimately less re-
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liance on self-sufficiency. This is expected to reduce farmers’ desire to internalize
food markets and thus expand scale of agricultural commercialization by produc-
ing cash crops.
Other than community infrastructure, differences in agronomic factors across vil-
lages introduce variation in agricultural productivity thereby affecting market par-
ticipation of farmers within the community and the size of markets across com-
munities. The differences in climatic and related conditions across communities
affects the number of possible crop choices and hence the size of markets within the
community. Communities with bigger crop choice sets by virtue of their agronomic
characteristics, are likely to attract a large number of buyers from neighboring com-
munities thereby increasing the size of markets. Furthermore, where markets are
less integrated or connected, the transmission of prices and access to information is
constrained thereby affecting gains from market participation. Earlier studies on
market integration relied on correlation between prices of pairs of markets. Later
studies examined correlation of price differences between pairs of markets. Re-
cent studies using spatial price transmission have used co-integration techniques
of prices in different markets to examine market integration. Badiane and Shively
(1998) examined the role of spatial market integration on price changes and trans-
mission between local (main market of a net importing region) and central (main
market of a net exporting region) markets controlling for the effect of transporta-
tion costs of the speed of adjustment/convergence of prices across maize markets
in Ghana. They reported that the extent of integration between the two local
markets and a central market differ in part due to differences in distance and level
of market infrastructure creating differences in price transmission. On average, it
takes 4 months to achieve complete adjustment of prices across prices.
The nature of price transmissions according to Abdulai (2000) may not by sym-
metric as assumed in most of the earlier papers (i.e. following a shock to central
market prices, local market prices follow similar (symmetric) response and that
the tendency to move towards long run equilibrium is always present). Differences
in market imperfections in the form of government intervention, positive inven-
tory, collisions by middlemen etc. overtime may affect the nature of the linkage
across markets at various time periods. Such relationships are better captured by
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threshold models of dynamic equilibrium. He failed to find statistical evidence to
support the existence of symmetric price adjustments in maize markets in Ghana.
Getnet (2008) also reports weak transmission of grain prices in Ethiopia. Although
it appears that the duration for complete adjustment of prices is long providing
opportunities for arbitrage, the existence of transportation costs due to distance
between markets overshadows possible gains from arbitrage.
Other forms of community infrastructure such as group marketing associations,
agricultural cooperatives and extension services have been considered. The avail-
ability of these agricultural support institutions are expected to influence market
participation decisions by lowering search costs and information asymmetry about
markets. Staal et al. (1997), Holloway et al. (2000) among other studies have con-
sidered these factors.
3.2.4 Responding to Transactions Costs Effects
The resulting jointness in household decisions under binding constraints on
market participation due to transactions costs can be examined through the ex-
tent to which the link between production, consumption marketing and storage of
farm output decisions ais influenced by indicators of transactions costs. See Park
(2006) for a comprehensive discussion of these inter-linkages. This relationship
stems largely from the fact that under binding constraints on market participa-
tion, farmers’ ability to balance household food demand is affected. As a result,
agricultural decisions of subsistence farmers are likely to be sensitive to food se-
curity concerns where transactions costs result in uncertainties about markets
and price risk/volatility (as discussed in Ellis (1993)). Thus, in addition to non-
participation in markets, farmers may find it optimal to internalize food markets
through ex-ante and ex-poste production decisions. Conceptually, this response
follows directly from the creation of substitute institutions to formal markets which
are missing due to high transactions costs discussed by De Janvry et al. (1991b).
Several of these faming decisions have been examined in the literature. On crop
choices, Jayne (1994) and Omamo (1998b) examined the effect of marketing costs
(such as distance to market) on farmers’ likelihood of producing cash crops. Sim-
ilarly, Fafchamps (1992) examined food price volatility, rural market integration
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and crop choices. Other decisions such as choice of market have also been studied
by Hobbs (1997) and Fafchamps and Hill (2005) among others.
Renkow (1990) (one of the earlier papers exploring heterogeneous effects of trans-
actions costs) examined the relationship between household farm output inventory
and marketed surplus of small-scale and large-scale (defined by farm size) farmers
in India. In particular, the study examined the extent to which differences in the
intensity of market participation (and the need to keep positive inventory of farm
output) between large-scale and small-scale farmers can be attributed to differ-
ences in transactions costs effects and anticipated gains from arbitrage. Although
larger production capacity of large-scale farmers create incentives for arbitrage and
positive inventory (since they face lower average transactions costs), food security
concerns of small-scale farmers did not significantly influence storage demand. The
author explains this result as the role of government funded food for work projects
received by small-scale farmers.
The work of Renkow (1990) had a couple of limitations as identified in later work:
specification of storage costs across time periods, the definition of food security
in the inventory demand function depended on a specific functional form of the
storage cost and assumption of risk neutrality24. Saha and Stroud (1994) used
quarterly panel data of farmers marketing of farm output from Shirapur-India to
account for these shortcomings. They reported that risk responses of households
differ by farm size and food security may not be the only motive behind farmers’
decision to hold positive inventory; arbitrage (or convenience yield as referred to in
the literature) may explain part of such behavior. However, food security appears
to be an important motivation for deficit farmers to hold positive storage of farm
output during times when speculative motive was absent. Getnet (2008) report
similar findings for grain farmers in Ethiopia. Farmers lack formal mechanisms to
absorb price risks except to abandon or reduce improved production technology25.
24Binswanger and Sillers (1983) discuss how differences in household’s attitude towards income risk affect
farming decisions.
25Benirschka and Binkley (1995) offer a different approach by building on the theory of optimal resource
extraction. The alternative approach- the theory of efficient commodity markets, argues that differences between
spot prices and futures prices should equate storage and insurance costs. However, empirical evidence has found
otherwise- the gap between the two prices is usually less than storage costs. They examined storage decisions
across producing regions and marketing decisions over time using US data.
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On choice of farming technology and marketing of farm output, Alene et al. (2008)
examined transactions costs effects on Kenyan farmers’ demand for fertilizer and
supply of maize by estimating demand and output supply functions. They reported
that marketing decisions are significantly influenced by access to technology facili-
tated by access credit and support services such as extension works. Jointly, these
factors are expected to relax transactions costs constraints by facilitating expan-
sion in scales of production and improve access to information about markets and
production techniques. In terms of use of fertilizer, they reported that access to
means of transport increases fertilizer use while distance to fertilizer market has
the opposite effect, all else equal.
Aside from responses to constraints due to transactions costs through produc-
tion decisions ex-ante, such constraints can be relaxed through ex-poste responses
such as farmers’ allocation of farm output to household consumption. Much of the
empirical literature in this area of research has focused on examining transactions
costs effects through marketing of farm output. However, due to the jointness in
household decisions, the presence of transactions costs is likely to affect both the
marketing of farm output and use of farm output for household consumption. The
former is likely to be driven by lower net-returns whereas the latter may consti-
tute a substitute institution to missing food markets (ala De Janvry et al. (1991b))
since it enables households reduce reliance on markets for household consumption.
These studies provide statistical evidence that the link between farming decisions
such as choice of crops and production technology and transactions costs occurs
through constraints on market participation which establish jointness of house-
hold decisions. The effect on market participation occurs through costly exchange
of farm output and purchase of goods for household consumption due to trans-
actions costs. Through various contributions in the literature, these costs can
be identified from the state of community infrastructure which indicate market
accessibility- distance to and integration of markets, access to information about
market prices etc; and household characteristics such as experience in farming,
search and bargaining skills, information processing skills among others.
Several studies have examined transactions costs effects on marketing of farm
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output through farmers’ decision to sell farm output and the quantity sold by
sellers of a given crop. Rather than focusing on market participation at individual
crop level, we extend this framework to incorporate multi-crop farming by defin-
ing market participation at household level through the aggregate of output of all
crops produced by farmers in a given farming period. Marketed surplus of each
crop defined as the proportion of farm output a given crop sold is obtained for
each crop produced by a farmer. An index of intensity of market participation
is constructed at household level using these measures and used as our definition
of market participation. In addition, we also examine role of differences in crop
choices and diversity of crop portfolio on the extent to which constraints on market
participation due to transactions costs are binding. We expect these differences to
be influenced by differences in market orientation between cash and non-cash crop
producers and size of internalized food markets through crop diversity to minimize
the impact of transactions costs effects on farmers’ ability to meet consumption
decisions26.
The main contribution however is in the analysis of transactions costs effects on
farmers’ use of household produced goods for household consumption. We hy-
pothesize the size of household consumption basket satisfied through self-produced
goods reflects the extent to which market participation is constrained by trans-
actions costs. Previous studies have largely focused on the effect of transactions
costs on marketing of farm output. While this provides an indirect indication of
the extent to which transactions costs may constrain consumption decisions due
to lower returns to market exchange, a direct effect can be obtained through the
analysis of transactions costs on farmers’ use of farm output for household con-
sumption. By combining the analysis of transactions costs effects on marketing
of farm output and use of household produced goods for household consumption,
we can obtain a better insight into the effect of transactions costs on farming-
household decisions and the differential effect of transactions costs on marketing
and consumption decisions.
The data from three rounds of the ERHS is used to construct a rich balanced
26Other studies have considered the role of sharecropping and interlocking of factor markets as responses to
imperfect markets. See Bardhan (1980), Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) among others.
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panel at household level. This enables us to deal with the problem of unobserved
heterogeneity typical in studies using cross-sectional data. Each round of data con-
tains information about households’ marketing of farm output, use of farm output
for household consumption, household characteristics such as household wealth,
ownership of a means of transport, number of plots and information about house-
hold head among others. Community characteristics such as distance to market
and major town, road conditions, food prices, availability of agricultural support
services are also obtained. We combine this information to examine the effect to
which transactions costs constrain market participation and the heterogeneity of
such effects. Using the same framework, we also examine transactions costs effects
on farmers’ use of household produced goods for consumption.
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3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Conceptual Framework
Before outlining the theoretical and empirical models and the data used for the
analysis, a description of the setting we examine with a summary of household
activities is presented below.
• The production side of the household consist of activities relating to rain
fed farming and similar agricultural activities- the production of food and/or
cash crops. Output from a given farming season is mainly used for household
consumption and market exchange. Other uses of farm output include as
inputs for subsequent farming periods and as gifts and barter with other
households. We do not consider these other uses in our analysis.
• Household consumption decisions are satisfied through market purchases and/or
use of farm harvest. The volume of market purchases and consumption of farm
harvest expressed as a proportion of the total quantity of each item consumed
by the household in a given period of time is obtained. Other sources such
as barter and gifts represent a small proportion and are not considered in the
analysis.
• Households participate in markets as sellers of farm output and buyers of
goods for household consumption. Some of the goods purchased are also
produced by the households. The substitutability of market and household
produced goods and hence the intensity of market participation is expected to
be sensitive to the presence of transactions costs. Under binding constraints
on market participation, household responses include non-participation, low
intensity of participation or internalizing food markets through the use of
household produced goods for household consumption. Other factors which
are likely to affect this relationship include exposure to risk due to uncer-
tainties about rain and price volatility resulting from thin and less integrated
markets.
• Based on this relationship, we examine the effects of transactions costs and
household risk preferences on household market participation defined above.
Transactions costs are indicated by the state of community infrastructure (dis-
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tance to market, distance to major towns, and road conditions) and household
characteristics such as levels of education, ownership of means of transport,
production capacity etc; whereas risk preferences are elicited from household
choices in lotteries with monetary payoffs constituting cash and market price
of farm output.
• We also examine the heterogeneity of transactions costs effects on farmers
based on differences in crop choices (cash versus non-cash crop farmers) and
diversity of crop portfolio.
3.3.2 Theoretical Model
Following Barrett (2008), we describe household decisions as follows below. We
begin with an illustration of the notation used:
Household Consumption:
• Households consume goods indexed by  in a given time period - c where
 = 1, 2, . . . J . This goods are obtained from:
• Household/self produced goods- ch ; and
• Market purchased goods-cm
For compactness, let c be a vector of all goods consumed by households.
Household Production:
• Households produce q quantities of good  in a given time period; using
qx quantity of inputs which are either market purchased-q
m
x ; or household
produced-qhx such as saved seeds.
• Household produced goods are for consumption-ch ; sold at market prices-qm ;
For compactness, let q be a be a vector of production related variables where out-
put enter with positive values (q > 0) and inputs with negative values (qx < 0).
To describe transactions costs effects on household decisions, we begin with a
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benchmark model which illustrates household behavior in the absence of transac-
tions costs. This is followed by a definition of transactions costs with which we
augment the benchmark model to illustrate transactions costs effects on farmers’
allocation of farm output.
In the absence of transactions costs, the utility maximization problem of a repre-
sentative farming-household is presented below27:
max
c,q
U (c, ;Zcı ) (25)
where Zcı - demand shifters of household ı.
The utility maximization is subject to the following constraints:[(
J∑
=1
(
p
(
ch + c
m

)))
+
(
X∑
x=1
(
px
(
qhx + q
m
x
)))] ≤ [ J∑
=1
(p.q)
]
+W (26)
p
(
ch + q
m

) ≤ p (q + cm )+ e (27)
f (q;Zqı ) = 0 (28)
c, q, qx ≥ 0 (29)
Equation (26) represents the budget constraint relating total household expendi-
ture on consumption and farm inputs to total household income (revenue from sale
of farm output and exogenous/non-farm income-W ). Given that market partici-
pation decisions affect household utility through household’s ability to satisfy food
demand, we define equation (27) to represent balance of household food consump-
tion which relates the value of self-produced goods used for household consumption
and sold at market prices; to the value of farm produced goods, market purchased
consumables, food obtained from other households and endowments such as pos-
itive inventories of food. Equation (28) represents the household’s production
technology while equation (29) represents non-negativity constraints on consum-
ables, farm output and input.
27Labor supply decisions are ignored since the main focus of the chapter is on market participation decisions.
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A key feature of the description above is that food consumed from own-farm out-
put and market-purchased are equally valued-p. This is as a result of the fact
that in the absence of transactions costs (or at least where they do not impose
binding constraints to market participation), household produced and market pur-
chased goods are expected to be equally valued in prices (equality of market and
shadow prices) and in utility since they are assumed to be perfect substitutes. As
a result, they are not differentiated in the way they enter the the utility function.
Analytically, this implies identical marginal utilities for household consumables
irrespective of source- (first order conditions with respect to ch and c
m
 all include
the same p).
To incorporate transaction costs, we define the following parametric prices (market
prices adjusted for transaction costs) as done by Barrett (2008):
pmb = p + τ
c
(
Sı, Aı, Gk,Wı; c
m

) ∀c (30)
pms = p − τ c
(
Sı, Aı, Gk,Wı, q
m

) ∀c (31)
pa = p (32)
Where pmb in equation (30) is the price for market purchases (including farm
inputs); pms in equation (31) is the price received for market exchange of farm
output; and pa is the autarky or household shadow price. Furthermore, let θ
b
 = 1
for purchases of good  in a given time period; and 0 otherwise28; and θs = 1 for
transactions involving sale of farm output of crop  in time period t; and 0 other-
wise. The magnitude of transactions costs affect the extent to which pmb 6= pat; and
pms 6= pa and farmers’ decision to participate in markets (as sellers of farm output
or buyers of household consumables) or internalize food markets by self-producing.
Transaction costs (which are allowed to vary across different c markets result-
ing in differences in net returns across farmer market choice) are expressed as a
28Transactions costs effects on input purchases are not considered in this chapter thus we restrict our focus to
purchase of household consumables and sale of farm output.
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function of: S- Search costs; A−household assets, G−community factors/Public
goods- such as roads, agricultural support services etc; W and mas defined before-
exogenous income and marketed surplus of crop  respectively. Although no spe-
cific functional form is imposed on the parametric price specification, reasonable
assumptions are made about its first order conditions. For selling farmers, search
costs increases transactions costs effects; household assets/endowments reduce
transactions costs effects; improvements in rural infrastructure reduce transac-
tions costs effects; and household wealth reduces transactions costs effects.
The redefinition of prices above in equations (30-32) expresses the nature of trans-
actions costs. Using these definitions, we augment the benchmark model described
above with transactions costs adjusted definition of market prices. As a result,
household budget constraint defined in equation (26) and household balance of
food demand defined in equation (27) of the basic model all change accordingly.
The transactions costs adjusted household maximization problem thus becomes:
max
c,q
U (c, ;Zcı ) (33)
subject to the following constraints:[
J∑
=1
[(
pmb
(
cm .θ
b

))
+
(
pa
(
ch
))]
+
X∑
x=1
[(
pmbx
(
qmx .θ
b
x
))
+
(
pax
(
qhx
))]] ≤ (34)
[∑J
=1 p
(
q − ch
)
.θs
]
+W
pa
(
ch
)
+ pms
(
qmt .θ
s

) ≤ pa (q) + pmb (cm .θb)+ e (35)
f (q;Zqı ) = 0 (36)
c, q, qx ≥ 0 (37)
The presence of fixed transactions costs creates discontinuity in the maximization
problem and thus obtaining optimal household decisions requires Kuhn-Tucker
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conditions. In general, it can be observed from the redefined prices that transac-
tions costs drive a wedge between market and shadow prices resulting in
(
pa 6= pmb
)
.
This breaks down the substitutability of market and household produced goods
(cm and c
h
 ) constraining households’ ability to balance their food demand as spec-
ified in equation (35). The extent to which the constraint is binding is sensitive to
the magnitude by which shadow prices differ from market prices- i.e. the size of
transactions costs. High transactions costs resulting in constrained market partic-
ipation can be relaxed by reducing reliance on markets to balance equation (35)
which can be achieved through internalized markets by increasing the consumption
of farm harvest (hence reducing the amount of farm harvest allocated for market
exchange) and reducing the purchase of market goods. In this chapter, we focus
on the former- the effect of transactions costs on farmers’ use of farm harvest for
market exchange and household consumption.
For farming households producing crops which can be used for market exchange or
household consumption, this response establishes jointness in household decisions.
This implies that production decisions such as crop choices and the marketing
of farm output are affected by consumption decisions such as the proportion of
household consumption obtained from farm harvest relative to volume of market
purchases- i.e. the size of internalized food markets. As a result of this relation-
ship, optimal demand and supply decisions which relate to household production
(such as demand and supply of inputs) and consumption such as purchase of good
and consumption of farm harvest are no longer a function of prices only (as in
the case where transactions costs are absent) but also household attributes (taste
shifters) which affect shadow prices such as indicators of the extent to which con-
straints on consumption are binding and risk-preferences. These decisions have
implications household market participation- as buyers of goods for consumption,
labor or other factors; and sellers of farm output or factors such as labor.
In summary, under transactions costs constrained market participation, constrained
optimal household choices such as quantity of household consumption of own-farm
output, market purchased goods for household consumption, and quantity of farm
output used for market exchange are a function of factors other than market prices.
This can be illustrated in the following sketches of the optimal solution for house-
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hold demand and supply decisions29. These constrained optimal decisions are now
functions of transactions costs adjusted market prices (instead of exogenous mar-
ket prices) and household characteristics or taste shifters for the different regimes-
non-participating households, buyers and sellers:
• c∗h
(
.pa
)
;
• c∗m
(
.pmb
)
;
• q∗m
(
.pms
)
;
c∗h
(
.pa
)
represents the constrained-optimal quantity of good  consumed from
farm harvest as a function of transactions costs adjusted shadow price; whereas
q∗m
(
.pms
)
represents the constrained optimal marketed surplus of crop  as a func-
tion of transactions costs adjusted market prices. c∗m
(
.pmb
)
(which is not consid-
ered) in this chapter is the constrained-optimal quantity of good  consumed from
market purchases.
Through these equations, we test the following hypotheses. Under binding con-
straints on market participation such that pa > p
ms
 farmers are not sufficiently
incentivized to sell farm output and thus face constraints on their ability to balance
household food consumption. Constrained optimal responses to these conditions
such as non-participation and low intensity conditional on participation have been
considered extensively in the literature. Non-participating households may choose
to satisfy household food demand through the consumption of own-farm output
to relax constraints on consumption decisions, Participating households (depend-
ing on the extent to which market participation constraints are binding), may
chose a combination of own-farm output and market purchased goods. The use
of household produced goods relaxes constraints on consumption decisions by re-
ducing reliance on formal markets to generate returns from sale of farm output to
finance consumption decisions or to purchase goods for household consumption.
The extent to which constraints due to transactions costs are binding and hence
29We restrict out attention to supply and demand functions for consumption and marketed surplus. Other
decisions such as use and purchase of inputs and labor are ignored but generally follow similar structure in the
presence of transactions costs.
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the need to internalize food markets through the use farm output for household
consumption is expected to differ across farmers based on crop choices and diver-
sity of crop portfolio.
Suppose crops produced by a given farmer can be further divided into food crops
f = 1, 2, . . . , F (such as grains, and other household consumables-eggs, chicken,
firewood, etc.) and market-exchange crops k = 1, 2, . . . K (such as coffee, etc)
∀f 6= k and f, k ∈ J . Furthermore, output of f crops-qft are largely for household
consumption (meaning c∗hf > q
∗m
f or zero marketed surplus q
∗m
f = 0; is possi-
ble). Whereas, output of k (qk) is largely used for market exchange (meaning
q∗mk > c
∗h
k ). The quantity of f items household consumes-cf can be obtained from:
self-production-chf ; or market purchased- c
m
f . Households’ choice to consume from
own production-chf rather than market-purchased-c
m
f , when driven by transactions
costs which drive a wedge between market and shadow prices
(
pmbf ≥ paf
)
; follows
utility maximization. Farmers derive a higher utility from internalized food mar-
kets for which participation is constrained by transactions costs. This influences
crop choices and composition of crop portfolio since farmers which are less likely
to be constrained by transactions costs may choose to produce cash crops; whereas
farmers more concerned about household security choose to internalize more mar-
kets by diversifying their agricultural activities to reduce reliance on markets.
These differences imply that heterogeneity in the effects of transactions costs may
occur due to differences in the gap between shadow prices of farm output and
market prices of cash and non-cash crops and hence differences in market partic-
ipation. Similarly, heterogeneity of in the effects of transactions costs on market
participation due to differences in crop diversity may occur through differences
in the gap between shadow and market prices. Increased diversity may result in
greater food security which relaxes transactions costs effects.
3.3.3 Empirical Framework
The two-step technique proposed by Key et al. (2000) to solving the theoretical
model defined above simplifies the estimation of households’ market participation
decisions. In the first step, households choose optimal consumption and produc-
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tion decisions conditional on market participation. In the second step, households
choose levels of participation which maximizes utility- i.e. intensity of participa-
tion. We implement similar approach on farmers’ use of farm output for household
consumption. Although household utility derived from participating (or not) in
markets cannot be directly observed or measured, this technique helps define a
suitable estimation procedure in which marketing decisions are defined as a two
stage decision: the discrete choice of regime selection- seller or non-seller; and
conditional on this decision, the continuous choice of intensity of participation can
be observed from household data.
Transactions costs effects on market participation decisions differ both across
households (due to differences in shadow prices which are a function of house-
hold characteristics) and also for any given household’s decision to participate and
the intensity of their participation. This further motivates a two-step estimation
approach. This implies that two sets of parameters are of interest- the effect of
observable factors of the probability of a given household’s regime choice and the
effect of similar factor (or perhaps different) on the intensity of household’s par-
ticipation.
Econometric Model
One way of estimating the two-stage market participation decisions of farming
households is the two-stage Heckman model- Heckman (1976). In the first stage
- the selection stage, the determinants of household’s regime choice- seller ver-
sus non-seller/autarkic are examined using a probit model. In the second stage,
the determinants of the intensity of participation conditional on participation are
examined by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to fit a quantity transacted re-
gression controlled for selection bias using the inverse mills ratio (IMR) from the
first stage probit. Goetz (1992b) among others have used this technique in this line
of research. Others such as Renkow et al. (2004) propose a maximum likelihood
approach since the restrictions required to achieve identification in the selection
stage depend on unknown parameters to be estimated in the quantity transacted
equation of the 2-stage selectivity model. However, the maximum likelihood esti-
mation relies on restrictive assumptions to be more efficient that the traditional
two-step process Wooldridge (2010).
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In addition and perhaps the widely discussed shortcoming of the use of the tra-
ditional Heckman model in studies on market participation is that it considers
non-participation of households as missing observations rather than corner solu-
tions and uses this to control for selection bias in studies where market participants
are of interest. However, under binding constraints to market participation due to
transaction costs, non-participation by farmers may be optimal.
In light of this shortcoming, corner solutions models such as the traditional To-
bit (due to Tobin (1958)) and modifications of it have been used. Some of the
modifications include the censored tobit model which has been criticized in that a
zero outcome of market participation is considered irrational choice (See Holloway
et al. (2000)); the ordered Tobit (See Bellemare and Barrett (2006)). Holloway
et al. (2004) propose non-zero censoring since under transaction costs assuming
censoring at zero introduces bias in the parameters because a zero outcome maybe
a corner solution (non-participation due to lower net-returns from participation
driven by high transactions costs). The shortcoming of the tobit model (and by
extension its modifications) is its restrictive assumption that both stages of farm-
ers’ marketing decision (regime choice and intensity of participation) are generated
by the same process Wooldridge (2003).
In the context of this chapter, this assumption implies that the same set of co-
variates that affect farmer’s discrete choice of market participation also affect the
continuous choice of intensity of participation. However, given the theoretical mo-
tivation for the differential effects of fixed and proportional transactions costs on
discrete and continuous marketing decisions, assuming homogeneity as required
by the Tobit model may be restrictive. For instance, while both fixed and propor-
tional transaction costs may affect farmers’ discrete marketing decision, however,
farmers’ continuous marketing decision conditional on participation is likely to
be largely driven by proportional transaction costs Key et al. (2000). Thus, a
modification of the Tobit model which allows both decisions to be determined by
separate processes is required. Cragg (1971) proposed the Cragg truncated normal
Double Hurdle model (due to Cragg (1971)) relaxes the restrictive assumption of
the Tobit model to allow for separate processes.
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Following Wooldridge (2010), we define the following econometric model for mar-
ket participation:
yıt = Xıtβ + ıt (38)
where yıt is the regime choice of a given household at a given time period (=1 for
sellers and =0 for self-sufficient/non-selling households); and in the use of farm out-
put for household consumption (1= use of farm output and 0 otherwise) expressed
as a function of a vector of exogenous variables Xıt (household and community
characteristics which influence market participation); β are sets of parameters to
be estimated. However, yıt is only observed for sellers when the sales index or
proportion of household consumption obtained from household produced goods:
sıt(to be defined below) is greater than zero for a given household ı. We define
sellers are those households that realize a non-zero quantity of farm output of
which they sell a positive quantity; non-sellers on the other hand are those house-
holds with a non-zero quantity of farm output but do not sell a positive quantity30.
sıt = Zıtθ + Aıtϑ+ εıt > 0 (39)
where Zıt is a set of explanatory variables (household and community and market
characteristics which influence intensity of market participation); θ is a vector of
parameters to be estimated.
Following Cragg (1971),ıt and εıt are assumed to be normally distributed with
zero covariance and conditionally independent. The assumption of conditional in-
dependence of the errors has been seen as being restrictive in some applications
of the double hurdle model (Garcia and Labeaga (1996); Jones (1992)). However,
even when such assumption is relaxed, the results obtained have not significantly
differed from results from the original assumption.
Similar to implementing the Heckman 2-stage model and following Wooldridge
(2010) the double hurdle model is estimated in two stages/tiers (Equations (38)
and (39)). In the first stage, the regime choice is estimated to follow a probit
30Because our data is restricted to production data, regime choice is restricted to sellers and non-sellers; purchase
decisions are excluded.
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model (such that P (yıt = 1|Xıt) = Φ (Xıtβ)) and in the second stage, the inten-
sity of participation is estimated to follow a truncated normal distribution31. Thus,
the general formulation of the Cragg model integrates a probit model into a trun-
cated normal model resulting in the following density function:
f (yıt, sıt|XıtZıt) = {1− Φ (Xıtβ)}1(y=0)
[
Φ (Xıtβ) (2pi)
− 1
2 σ−1 exp
{− (sıt − Zıtθ)2 /2σ2} /Φ (Zıtθ/σ)]1(y=1)
(40)
Taking the log of the above density functions yields the log-likelihood function.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation technique is used to select β, θ and σ values
which is maximized the log-likelihood function. Since there are no restrictive as-
sumptions imposed on the parameters, the Maximum Likelihood estimator for β,βˆ
is the probit estimator for yıt ≡ 1[sıt > 0] on Xıt; and θˆ can be obtained from the
Maximum Likelihood Estimator from the truncated normal regression32. From the
above, the following expressions can be obtained:
P (sıt = 0|Xıt) = 1− Φ (Xıtβ) (41)
P (sıt > 0|Xıt) = Φ (Xıtβ) (42)
E (sıt|sıt > 0, Zıt) = Zıtθ + σ ∗ λ (Zıtθ/σ) (43)
E (sıt|Xıt, Zıt) = Φ (Xıtβ) [Zıtθ + σ ∗ λ (Zıtθ/σ)] (44)
where λ (Zıtθ/σ) = φ (Zıtθ/σ) /Φ (Zıtθ/σ) is the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) and
σ-sigma is obtained from maximizing the log-likelihood function defined in the
econometric model andφ is the standard normal probability distribution function
(Burke (2009)). Equations (41) through (44) are: probability of not selling; prob-
ability of selling; average partial effect on intensity of participation conditional
on selling; and unconditional average partial effect on intensity of participation
respectively. To identify transactions costs and participation in informal market
effects on farmers’ marketing decisions, the following empirical issues require at-
tention.
31The model was also estimated using Probit and OLS for the two stages respectively. The parameter
estimates from the OLS estimation differ from those of the truncated normal regression. Results are
presented in the Appendix.
32Joint estimation of the two stages of the Double Hurdle model in Stata is facilitated by Burke (2009)
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Defining Market Participation
Farming households in rural Ethiopia produce multiple crops which differ across
households and overtime; and also across space making a study of marketing of
farm output for individual crops empirically challenging. Furthermore, it is ex-
pected that the marketing decisions of farm output overlap across crops produced
by a given household. For these reasons, we define market participation at house-
hold level. A sales index for participating households is calculated as the pro-
portion of total farm output sold of a given crop (i.e. marketed surplus) which
is aggregated across all crops produced by a given household in a given farming
period. On the other hand, non-sellers/autarkic farmers produce a non-zero quan-
tity but do not sell a positive quantity of farm output. The use of an index is
motivated by the following features of the data:
• Quantities of output for each crop are expressed in local units whose conver-
sion factors to standard units differ across crops and communities. However,
the quantity sold is measured in similar units with the quantity of output
making it easy to obtain sales index at crop level.
• Certain households hold multiple plots of similar crops for which they may
choose to sell output from one plot but report zero sales from another plot.
This creates the possibility of multiple regimes for a single crop in a given
household making analysis quite complicated.
More precisely, household sales/marketing index is calculated as follows:
Sales Index for a given crop  produced by household ı for which a quantity of
q(in local units) is produced and m(in local units) is sold.
st =
(
mt
qt
)
∀j ∈ Jı ∀t (45)
Household sales index is arrived at by calculating the average sales index from
all the crops in its portfolio thus converting the plot/crop level data to household
level.
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Isıt =
(∑J
=1 s∑J
=1 J
)
∀ı∀t (46)
Apart of selling farm output, we also consider the use of farm output for house-
hold consumption. We define the size of households’ internalized markets using
information about the components of households’ consumption basket. As high-
lighted before, we assume that household consumption is satisfied through market
purchased (cmk ), household produced goods
(
chk
)
and gifts and exchanges with other
households (cek) indexed by k. The size of internalized food markets is defined as an
index constructed from the proportion of total consumption of each item obtained
from own harvest of the household. For each item a given household reports to
have consumed, we obtain the proportion of it obtained from the household’s farm
output. This is then averaged across all items consumed by the household in a
given period to obtain the size of internalized markets. By this construction, the
index of households’ consumption of own harvest is bounded between 0 and 1.
chıt =
( ∑K
k=1 c
h
k∑K
k=1
(
chk + c
m
k + c
e
k
)) ∀ı∀t (47)
The motivation for this measure is to obtain an indication of the extent to which
households rely on self-produced goods for household consumption and its sensi-
tivity to the presence of transactions costs. It is important to highlight that this
measure suffers from a couple of limitations. Information such as the existence of
markets for goods used for household consumption and differences between items
(self-produced and market purchased goods in consumption basket among others
are not captured by the index. This is largely due to limitations in the data. We
therefore interpret the results of transactions costs effects on use of farm harvest
for household consumption with these concerns in mind.
Defining Transaction Costs
As mentioned earlier, following earlier work in the literature, transactions costs
are divided into fixed and proportional/variable costs. In addition, as highlighted
in Renkow et al. (2004), studies of this nature may be motivated by two objec-
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tives: measuring the size of transactions costs, or examining the degree to which
transactions costs affect households’ market participation decisions. This chapter
focuses on the latter in the context of farming-households producing crops used for
both household consumption and market exchange. However, the challenge with
examining the effect of transaction costs (as mentioned in numerous works such
as Key et al. (2000)) is the unobservable nature of such costs. Transactions which
do not occur due to high transaction costs are not observed and where market
participation occurs, recording transactions costs such as search costs, bargaining
costs etc is difficult. With the objective of examining the extent to which transac-
tions costs affect marketing decisions (and not quantifying such costs), indicators
of transactions costs from household and community characteristics can be used.
Based on these characteristics, Fixed and Proportional Transactions Costs can be
identified and used in the analysis of market participation among households. Fol-
lowing Key et al. (2000), Fixed Transactions costs are defined as costs associated
with search and bargaining efforts and can be identified from indicators of commu-
nity connectedness with markets (state of rural infrastructure and public goods)
and/or household head’s attributes relating to marketing ability and experience.
Proportional Transactions costs on the other hand are associated with distribu-
tions costs and thus identified from transportations costs among other costs which
vary with quantity of farm output transacted.
Although all these indicators of transactions costs are included in our analy-
sis, the focus is on distance to market and distance to major town as two main
indicators of transactions costs in the literature. Distance to market encompasses
various indicators of transactions costs-both explicit such as transportation costs;
and implicit such as opportunity costs of time spent in transacting farm output or
purchasing goods for household consumption. This perhaps justifies its popularity
in the literature. The other main indicator of transactions costs is distance to
major town which captures information about market integration, access to bigger
markets with more cliente`le for selling farm output and more sellers of goods for
household consumption; and possibly better deal in terms of prices.
Crop Diversity Index
We construct an index of crop diversity using information about the number of
food and cash crops produced such that the measure of diversity increases with the
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Table 15: Transactions Costs Indicators
Variable Explanation Name of Variable
Fixed Transactions costs.
Household Head’s Age Older household heads are likely to have greater
experience and perhaps better search and bargaining
skills
Hh. Head’s age
Agric. Cooperatives, Extension Services
and Local Association Membership of
Household Head
These factors jointly enhance access to information and
thus lower search costs. In addition, Cooperatives
facilitate group marketing- See Staal et al.
(1997),Holloway et al. (2000) and Alene et al. (2008).
Agric. Cooperative;
Agric. Extension
service;
IDDIR Member.
Distance to market and major town. Communities closer to markets and major towns are
expected to be more connected with other markets and
thus face lower transportation costs, and lower effort in
searching for higher prices. SeeFafchamps (1992), Jayne
(1994) , Omamo (1998b) and Barrett (2008)
Distance to mkt (in
km); and
Distance to major town
in (km).
Proportional Transactions Costs.
Improvements in road and
market conditions.
Communities with improvements in road and market
conditions or have better road networks are expected to
face lower transportation costs since less time is spent in
distributing farm output.
Better road; and
Improved mkt.
Farmers choice of market Differences in intensity of participation across markets
differentiated by distance (participants of village
markets relative to other markets) may be driven by
differences in transactions costs. SeeVakis et al. (2003)
Village mkt Seller.
Cart ownership In societies where carts are important means of
transport, cart owners are expected to be able to
transport larger amount of farm output and thus face
lower per unit transportation costs. SeeGoetz (1992b)
Cart owner.
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number of food
(
qf
)
and cash (qc) crops produced out of the set of major food and
cash crops considered in our analysis-f = {teff, barley, wheat,maize, sorghum} andc =
{coffee, chat}. These crops represent the major food and cash crops produced in
Ethiopia (Taffesse et al. (2011)). The proportion of food and cash crops produced
out their respective subsets is weighted to ensure that the index of crop diversity
sums up to one.
ıt = θf
(∑F
qf=1
(
qf
)
f
)
+ θc
(∑C
qc=1 (q
c)
c
)
(48)
Where ıt is the measure of crop diversity for farmer ı in period t.; and θf and
θc represent weights which sum up to 1.
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3.3.4 Data
The Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS) is longitudinal household dataset
which is representative of rural Ethiopia. Data collection started in 1989 with fol-
low up rounds in 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2004 and 2009. Over the years, the
coverage of the survey has been expanded from an initial number of 6 administra-
tive units to 15 across 4 of Ethiopia’s 11 regions surveying 1,477 households. See
Dercon (2004a) for a detailed discussion of the dataset. We use 3 rounds (over a
period of 10 years) of the survey (ERHS) (1999, 2004 and 2009) to form a bal-
ance panel of 699 households with data on their market participation (i.e. sale
of farm output), wealth/assets, demographics and community infrastructure. A
description of each variable is provided in table (22) in the Appendix.
Table 16: Summary Statistics: Selected Variables- Rounds 5-7 of ERHS (1999-2009)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Mkt. Participation (seller=1) 0.616 0.487 0 1 2097
hh. sales index 0.340 0.236 0.001 1 1291
use farm harvest (=1) 0.850 0.357 0 1 2097
Prop. of Self-produced Consumed Items 0.305 0.160 0.043 1 1807
Prop. of Qty. obtained from harvest (all items) 0.144 0.116 0.001 0.807 1783
Prop. of Qty. obtained from harvest 0.809 0.257 0.030 1 1783
Hh. head’s age 53.305 15.994 11 100 2097
Hh. head (male=1) 0.578 0.494 0 1 2097
Hh. size 5.397 2.675 1 18 2088
Number of plots 5.109 2.511 1 17 2097
Tropical Livestock Units 2.292 4.224 0 38.38 2097
IDDIR member (=1) 0.248 0.432 0 1 2097
Food price Index (Deviation from avg.) 0.49 1.125 -0.642 2.324 2097
Agric. cooperative (=1) 0.66 0.474 0 1 2097
Agric extension Service (=1) 0.853 0.354 0 1 2097
Distance to mkt. (in km) 4.855 5.848 0 36 2097
Distance to major town (in km) 9.420 6.541 0 25 2097
Number of mkts in Community 1.943 1.918 0 9 2097
better road (=1) 0.642 0.479 0 1 2060
improved mkt. (=1) 0.492 0.5 0 1 2097
Choice of mkt. (village mkt=1) 0.298 0.458 0 1 1291
cart owner (=1) 0.103 0.304 0 1 2097
Crop diversity Index (Food & cash crops) 0.271 0.145 0 0.917 2097
Crop diversity Index (Food Crops only) 0.322 0.191 0 1 2097
Cash crop farmer (=1) 0.14 0.347 0 1 2097
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Allocation of Farm output: Market Exchange and Household Consump-
tion
As reported in the descriptive statistics above, on average, 61% of farmers in
the data participate in markets as sellers. However, on average, only 34% of farm
output is sold by sellers which by some measure, indicates low intensity of partic-
ipation. This phenomenon is typical in many rural areas of the developing world
and serves as the motivation for this area of research- See Weber et al. (1988) for
a discussion of policies targeting increased agricultural commercialization. The
use of household produced goods for household consumption also appears to be
common among farming households in rural Ethiopia. On average, 85% of farmers
in the data used farm harvest for household consumption. However, as a propor-
tion of total number of items consumed by the household (household consumption
basket), the use of farm output for household consumption is fairly small. On av-
erage, over 30% of total items consumed by households is obtained from household
production.
These measures are aggregated at household level and thus may not illustrate
the extent to which households rely on farm harvest for household consumption.
To facilitate this, an item level analysis of the contribution of farm output to the
quantity each item consumed by the household is conducted. Of items for which
farm harvest is used, the average share of farm harvest of the quantity consumed
is 80%. This implies that for self-produced goods which are used for consumption,
the household relies mostly on its farm harvest; and less on other sources such as
market purchases or gift exchanges and barter. The dependence on farm harvest
for the consumption of these items may result from the presence of transactions
costs which break the substitutability of farm harvest of such items and similar
market goods. As a result, households tend to internalize the markets for such
items through the use of farm harvest.
The reliance on farm harvest for household consumption appears to be true for
certain items and not all items in the household consumption basket. This is in-
dicated by the fact that, across all the items consumed by households, an average
of 14% of the quantity consumed is obtained from farm harvest. Thus, on average
households in the data do not appear to be completely autarkic but possibly net-
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buyers. The extent to which households rely on markets for consumption may be
affected by transactions costs through the size of internalized markets indicated by
the number of items and quantity consumed by the household using farm harvest;
or through net returns on market exchange of farm output. We investigate these
issues in the chapter.
Indicators of Transactions Costs
As highlighted above, the presence of transactions costs is identified from house-
hold and community characteristics which indicate market accessibility and ease
of market participation. The average distance to markets is 4.855km; whereas
the average distance to a major town is 9.4km. Differences in distance to market
and major are expected to influence participation decisions through cost of par-
ticipation. It also observed that almost 30% of farmers sell farm output in village
markets which are expected to be in closer proximity to households compared to
other market outlets especially given that ownership of a means of transport (such
as a cart) is low among farmers in the data.
Other indicators of transactions costs such as markets and road conditions appear
to have improved for more than half of the farmers in the data. Similarly, agri-
cultural support services such as extension services and cooperatives appear to be
common in most communities. Other household characteristics such as member-
ship of IDDIR (funeral societies) which is expected to affect search costs through
access to information vary across households. On average, 25% of households are
members of such associations.
Differences in Crop Choices and Diversity of Crop Portfolio
We also examine the heterogeneity of transactions costs effects on market par-
ticipation across farmers based on differences in choice of crop and diversity of crop
portfolio. We investigate whether cash crop farmers relative to other farmers are
less likely to be constrained by the presence of transactions costs or not. Similarly
we consider the effect of differences in crop diversity on the extent to which trans-
actions costs constrain market participation. It is observed that on average 14%
of farmers in the data are coffee producers- a popular cash crop. This indicates
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the dominance of food and other non-cash crop production among farmers and
perhaps explain the low intensity of participation among sellers of farm output.
In terms of crop diversity, it also appears that farmers tend to diversify food crop
production more intensely that food and cash crop. The indexes of both measures
indicate that the latter is larger on average.
Differences between Sellers and Non-Sellers.
Before estimating our model of transactions cost effects on market participation,
we examine the characteristics of sellers and non-sellers and the extent to which
such differences illustrate transactions costs effects. For instance, differences in
household characteristics which indicate household’s search skills, experience, ac-
cess and ability to obtain information can influence marketing decisions through
farmers’ ability to relax constraints due to transactions costs. In addition to house-
hold factors, differences in the status of rural infrastructure/public goods such as
road conditions, distance to major town, proximity to markets; and agricultural
support services such as extension services and agricultural cooperatives are ex-
amined. Below is t-test on the significance of the differences in the means of
household and community characteristics of sellers and non-sellers. Since majority
of the farmers in the data (on average 85%) use farm harvest for at least one item
consumed, we do not conduct a test of differences in means across farmers based
on their use of farm output for household consumption.
The table shows that sellers and non-sellers significantly differ in terms of dis-
tance to market and major town which as highlighted above are main indicators
of transactions costs. The difference in distance to market appear to be partic-
ularly large- on average, the distance to market for sellers is 3.8km compared to
6.5km for non-sellers. Other differences which are likely to influence the extent
to which market participation is constrained include: differences in improvements
in roads and markets, and availability of cooperatives. These differences illustrate
that transactions costs to market participation indicated by these characteristics
are lower among sellers.
At household level, differences between sellers and non-sellers include scale of crop
diversity, number of plots and membership of IDDIRs. On average, sellers appear
to have more diverse crop portfolios, more plots and members of IDDIRs than
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Table 18: Test of Differences in Means of Sellers & Non-Sellers
Non-Seller Seller
Variable Mean Mean p-value
Hh. head’s age 53.064 53.456 0.585
Hh. head (male=1) 0.543 0.600 0.010
Hh. size 5.536 5.310 0.061
Number of plots 4.143 5.712 0.000
Tropical Livestock Units 2.214 2.341 0.505
IDDIR member (=1) 0.195 0.282 0.000
Food price Index (Deviation from avg.) 0.499 0.485 0.782
Agric. cooperative (=1) 0.619 0.685 0.002
Agric extension Service (=1) 0.862 0.847 0.349
Distance to mkt. 6.525 3.813 0.000
Distance to major town 10.557 8.712 0.000
Number of mkts in Community 2.022 1.893 0.133
better road (=1) 0.593 0.673 0.000
improved mkt. (=1) 0.413 0.541 0.000
cart owner (=1) 0.103 0.103 0.997
Coffee farmer (=1) 0.043 0.201 0.000
Crop diversity Index (Food & cash crops) 0.229 0.297 0.000
Crop diversity Index (Food Crops only) 0.284 0.347 0.000
non-sellers. However, differences in wealth (measured using livestock units) are
statistically insignificant.
Therefore, preliminary examination of the data seems to suggest that differences
in the scale of agricultural commercialization among farmers in Ethiopia may be
driven by differences in the extent to which market participation is costly. This
motivates the need to examine the extent to which transactions costs affect market
participation and the heterogeneity of such effects across farmers based on their
crop portfolio- choice of crop and diversity.
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3.4 Results
To interpret the results from the estimated double-hurdle model, the Average
Partial Effects (APEs) are used. The APEs are obtained from the partial effects
on participation and intensity of participation for each variable in the model is
obtained using techniques discussed in Burke (2009). The derivation of the partial
effects is provided in the Appendix. The tables with the estimated coefficients
(not the APEs) are presented in the Appendix.
We examine transactions costs effects on market participation by estimating two
specifications of our model: one for marketing of farm output and the other for
use of farm harvest for household consumption. This is followed by examining the
heterogeneity of transactions costs effects between cash crop and non-cash crop
producers; and by incorporating differences in crop diversity.
3.4.1 Transactions Cost Effects on Market Participation
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Table 20: Transactions Costs Effects on Market Participation: Average Partial Effects
Mktn. of Farm output Use of Farm output for Hh. Cons.
VARIABLES Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Hh. head’s age -9.63e-05 0.000435 0.000256 8.34e-05
(0.000667) (0.000405) (0.000435) (0.000186)
Hh. size -0.00832** -0.00567** -0.00157 -0.000490
(0.00419) (0.00263) (0.00265) (0.000918)
Number of plots 0.0497*** -0.0201*** 0.0273*** 0.00508***
(0.00526) (0.00351) (0.00386) (0.000836)
Tropical Livestock Units 0.00513* -0.00222 -0.000131 0.00135**
(0.00272) (0.00170) (0.00195) (0.000549)
Food price Index (Deviation from avg.) 0.0443 -0.306*** -0.315*** 0.0824***
(0.0782) (0.0646) (0.0608) (0.0215)
Distance to mkt. (in km) -0.0126*** -0.00546* -0.0122*** 0.00279***
(0.00234) (0.00283) (0.00102) (0.000907)
Distance to major town (in km) -0.00711*** -0.00389*** -0.000189 -0.000851**
(0.00170) (0.00151) (0.00112) (0.000420)
Number of mkts in Community -0.0321*** 0.00675 0.00269 -0.0118***
(0.00591) (0.00515) (0.00328) (0.00178)
Hh. head (male=1) 0.0255 0.0226* 0.0518*** -0.00333
(0.0197) (0.0131) (0.0150) (0.00515)
IDDIR member (=1) 0.0642** 0.0557*** -0.0143 -0.0161**
(0.0279) (0.0185) (0.0223) (0.00796)
Agric. cooperative (=1) 0.105*** -0.0378** 0.0362** 0.0387***
(0.0250) (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.00616)
Agric extension Service (=1) -0.0191 0.0267 -0.0595*** 0.0180***
(0.0339) (0.0207) (0.0193) (0.00525)
Village mkt seller (=1) 0.0632*** -0.0108*
(0.0217) (0.00607)
cart owner (=1) -0.0171 0.000806
(0.0240) (0.00908)
better road (=1) 0.0341** -0.0272***
(0.0143) (0.00690)
improved mkt. (=1) 0.0798*** -0.0244***
(0.0283) (0.00701)
Observations 2,051 2,051 2,051 2,051
chi2 217.8 217.8 264.6 264.6
Log likelihood -889.9 -889.9 1269 1269
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Marketing of Farm Output
We begin by examining transactions cost effects on farmers’ use of farm output
for market exchange.
As highlighted in the discussion about the identification of transactions costs,
distance to markets has been a popular indicator of transactions costs in the liter-
ature. The average partial effects reported above show that an increase in distance
to market is associated with a decrease in the probability of farmers participating
as sellers by 1.26%. The effect conditional on participation (i.e. among sellers of
farm output) is smaller but statistically significant- the intensity of participation
of sellers decreases by 0.546% on average.
Distance to major town also has similar effect on market participation of farmers.
All else equal, increase in distance to major town lowers the probability of partici-
pating as sellers by 0.711% on average. The effect on the intensity of participation
among sellers is smaller- a decrease of 0.389% in the proportion of farm output
sold is expected.
These results indicate that transactions costs due to distance to market (such
as transportation costs) appear to constrain market participation through farm-
ers’ discrete choice of participating or not. The effect of both measures of distance
to market is larger on farmers’ first stage market participation decision. Condi-
tional on participating, the effect of distance to market and major town are both
very small albeit statistically significant. This is further reflected in the intensity
of participation in village markets relative to other market outlets. On average,
farmers participating as sellers, sell 6.32% more of farm output in village markets
relative to other markets. Drawing from the work by Vakis et al. (2003) that
farmers’ choice of market can be used to identify the role of transactions costs, the
intensity of participation in village markets (which are in terms of distance closer
than say regional markets) might be influenced by the presence of transactions
costs.
While the effect of distance to market can be interpreted as the role of transporta-
tion, and other costs associated with participating in a given market, the effect of
distance to major town on marketing of farm output can be interpreted in several
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ways since it relates to the connectedness of the community (or its markets) to
other communities and markets. Major towns are by virtue of their population
are likely to have larger and more integrated markets. This implies access to wider
customer base and thus lower search costs for both selling farm output and pur-
chasing goods for household consumption. As a result, farmers in communities
closer to major towns are likely to benefit from lower transactions costs in access-
ing larger and more developed markets thereby increasing incentives to participate
more intensely. Previous studies such as Fafchamps (1992) have reported that due
to market segmentation, farmers’ face price risk which lowers incentives to produce
cash crops relative to food crops. These effects are more severe in communities
where price and yield are highly correlated. Thus, as markets become more inte-
grated, price risk and the correlation between price and yield is potentially lowered
thereby increasing farmers’ incentive to produce cash crops and increase their scale
of agricultural commercialization.
In addition to distance, the effect of the state of community and market infras-
tructure such as improvements in road and market conditions on marketing of
farm output (especially among sellers) have also been considered. These indica-
tors of transactions costs appear to have a larger effect on market participation
than distance to market. Farmers in communities with improved market condi-
tions are likely to sell 7.98% more of farm output relative to those in communities
without such improvements. Similarly, all else equal, an improvement in road
conditions is associated with an increase intensity of participation by 3.41% on
average. Improvements in roads and markets are likely to influence market par-
ticipation by lowering opportunity costs of the time spent selling farm output,
search costs, transportation costs etc. of sellers thereby increasing the intensity of
participation. These results also illustrate the importance of market infrastructure
(in addition to community infrastructure such as roads which is often considered
in the literature) on agricultural commercialization. The improvements in the in-
frastructure of markets which may occur in the form of the provision of stalls,
expansion of size of the market among others are likely to ease the participation
of farmers in selling farm output as shown in the results. The size of the gains
from these improvements measured in terms intensity of participation are large
especially when compared to the gains from improved road conditions.
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At household level, differences in production capacity and wealth proxied by num-
ber of plots and livestock units respectively; and membership of a local association
(IDDIR) also affect farmers’ discrete market participation decisions. Farmers with
more land area and livestock are on average more likely to participate as sellers.
This may result from the fact that constraints on market participation due to
transactions costs are less likely to be binding for farmers with more land or live-
stock endowments. With a large farming area, farmers can produce several crops
thereby reducing the impact of transactions costs at the household level since av-
erage transactions costs across all crops produced is likely to be lower. Farmers
with livestock on the other hand are less likely to be constrained by lower net-
returns from market change due to transactions costs since livestock can facilitate
consumption smoothing when faced with lower income from market exchange.
It is also observed that members of local associations are likely to participate as
sellers of farm output. Membership in local associations is likely to influence mar-
ket participation through access to information about prices and markets from co-
members of local associations. Several studies in the literature on social networks
have documented the effectiveness of these associations as channels for informa-
tion sharing. Another possible explanation for the effect of IDDIR membership
on marketing of farm output is financial obligations to the association. Members
obliged to make periodic contributions are likely to sell farm output in order to
fulfill their obligations and to avoid penalties. However, we do not investigate this
possibility further.
In the existence of jointness in household production and consumption decisions,
food prices and its volatility are likely to influence marketing of farm output deci-
sions. This issue has been considered by Fafchamps (1992). The results indicate
that deviation of food prices from average overtime have a significant effect on
the intensity of participation. Increase in food prices from the average overtime
decreases the proportion of farm output sold by upto 30%. Fafchamps (1992) in-
terpreted this effect as a signal to food scarcity due to rising food prices and hence
the need to internalize food markets through the use of farm harvest for household
consumption. This relationship between production and consumption decisions
which creates the possibility of internalizing markets through farm harvest per-
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haps explains the negative effect of household size on market participation. All
else equal, larger households (who are likely to have a larger food demand) are less
likely to sell farm output and among sellers, the volume of output sold decreases
as household size increase.
Use of Farm Harvest For Household Consumption
As with the analysis of transactions costs effects on the marketing of farm out-
put, we examine the effect of transactions on market participation through farmers’
use of farm harvest for household consumption.
The effect of distance to market on farmers’ discrete choice of using farm out-
put is counterintuitive- increase in distance to market, is expected to decrease
the probability of using farm harvest for household consumption by 1.22%. This
is perhaps because there is very little variation in farmers’ discrete choice of us-
ing farm harvest for household consumption due to its popularity among farmers.
Thus the focus of the analysis is on the effect of transactions costs on the volume
of household consumption obtained from own-farm harvest.
Distance to market increases the farmers’ use of farm harvest for household con-
sumption. However, in terms of magnitude, the effect is small- increase in distance
to market increases the proportion of household consumption obtained from farm
harvest by 0.279%. The larger effect among the indicators of transactions costs
is observed in improvements in roads and market conditions. Both improvements
are associated with a decrease of 2.72% and 2.44% respectively in the proportion
of household consumption obtained from farm harvest. These improvements are
likely to ease access to markets by lowering transactions costs thereby increasing
incentives to sell farm output and purchase market goods for household consump-
tion.
Similar to market exchange of farm output, changes in food prices also have a
significant effect on farmers’ use of farm output for household consumption. In-
crease in food prices relative to average price levels increases the proportion of
farm harvest as a composition of total household consumption by 8.24%. This
result is in line with the effect of food prices on market exchange discussed above
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and results from previous studies such as Goetz (1992b). All else equal, as food
prices increase, farmers’ ability to balance household food demand is constrained.
The presence of transactions costs to market participation is likely to reinforce this
effect further constraining households’ consumption decisions. As a result, farmers
have incentives to internalize food markets by increasing their inventory of farm
harvest for household consumption thereby reducing reliance on formal markets.
The magnitude of the effect compared to other covariates illustrates the role of
food prices in farmers’ market participation decisions and is possibly influenced
by the non-separability of household decisions.
3.4.2 Heterogeneity of Transactions Cost Effects
Below we examine the extent to which constraints to marketing of farm output
due to transactions costs differ across farmers based on differences in choice of crop
(cash versus non-cash crop) and diversity of crop portfolio. We focus on differences
in the effect of specific indicators of fixed and proportional transactions costs. For
fixed transactions costs, we consider distance to market and distance to major
town; and for proportional transactions costs, we consider improvements in road
and market conditions. In the interest of space, we present below the estimated
coefficients of the key variables only. The remaining variables as reported in the
previous specification are omitted from the table.
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Table 21: Heterogeneity of Transactions Cost Effects on Marketing of Farm Output For Cash & Non-Cash Crop Farmers and Differences
in Crop Diversity
Mktn. of Farm output Mktn. of Farm output Mktn. of Farm output Mktn. of Farm output
VARIABLES Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Distance to mkt. (in km) -0.0126*** -0.00546* -0.0112*** -0.00473 -0.0257*** -0.00481 -0.0119*** -0.00417
(0.00234) (0.00283) (0.00147) (0.00366) (0.00479) (0.00619) (0.00186) (0.00298)
Distance to major town (in km) -0.00711*** -0.00389*** -0.00567*** -0.00383*** -0.00721** -0.00755*** -0.00705*** -0.00360***
(0.00170) (0.00151) (0.00190) (0.00122) (0.00313) (0.00235) (0.00156) (0.00126)
Distance to mkt.* cash crop 0.0339 -0.00267
(0.0224) (0.00987)
Distance to Town* cash crop 0.0127 0.000431
(0.00916) (0.00329)
Distance to mkt.* crop diversity 0.0726*** 0.00550
(0.0224) (0.0212)
Distance to Town* crop Diversity 0.000858 0.0133
(0.0120) (0.0104)
better road (=1) 0.0331** 0.0464*** 0.0277* 0.0345
(0.0153) (0.0164) (0.0155) (0.0300)
improved mkt. (=1) 0.0776*** 0.0781*** 0.0703*** 0.158***
(0.0298) (0.0296) (0.0259) (0.0446)
better road* Cash Crop -0.0506** -0.0412
(0.0255) (0.0925)
improved mkt.* Cash Crop 0.000828 -0.254***
(0.0299) (0.0947)
Observations 2,051 2,051 2,051 2,051 2,051 2,051 2,051 2,051
chi2 233.5 233.5 223.1 223.1 234.5 234.5 222.2 222.2
Log likelihood -861.8 -861.8 -863.8 -863.8 -876.1 -876.1 -880.3 -880.3
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Other variables as reported in table (20) were also included in each specification.
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Cash Crop Vs. Non- Cash Crop Producer
The effect of distance to market on farmers’ discrete market participation de-
cision is not significant for cash crop producers. Non- cash crop farmers on the
other hand, are 1.13% less likely to participate as sellers than cash crop farmers
following an increase in distance to market. The effect of distance to major town
also has similar effect albeit smaller in magnitude. Thus transactions costs due to
distance to markets are more likely to constrain non-cash crop farmers than cash
crop farmers. In general, farm output of cash crops such as coffee is often used
for market exchange, thus producers of cash crops are more likely to participate
as sellers since the choice of producing cash crops is indicative of their commercial
orientation.
However, conditional on participating, the effect of distance to market does to
seem to significantly affect the intensity of participation between cash and non-
cash crop farmers. This does not seem to be the case with distance to major town
which again might be as a result of the fact that cash crops are often produced
for market exchange. Non-cash crop farmers are more likely to face binding con-
straints due to distance to a major town in both their discrete and continuous
market participation decisions relative to cash crop producers. These results illus-
trate the heterogeneity of transactions costs effects measured through distance to
market on cash and non-cash crop farmers’ decision to sell farm output and the
volume to sell. In addition, the two measures of distance to market also illustrate
differences in transactions costs effects on market participation- cash crop farmers
appear to be less likely to be constrained by distance to market (both community
market and larger markets of major towns) relative to non-cash crop farmers.
Non-cash crop farmers on the other hand appear to gain more from improvements
in road conditions and markets. These improvements have a large positive effect
on the participation of non-cash crop farmers. Better roads increase the intensity
of marketing farm output of non-cash crop farmers by 4.64% relative to cash crop
farmers. Improvements in market conditions on the other increase non-cash crop
farmers’ participation by 7.81% relative to cash crop farmers. These results are
in line with the results from the analysis in the preceding section in which it was
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observed that in addition to community infrastructure such as road conditions,
market infrastructure also has a large effect on market participation of farmers-
especially among non-cash crop farmers.
Therefore, it appears the presence of transactions costs to market participation
is more likely to constrain non-cash crop farmers marketing of farm output. It is
observed that distance to market lowers their participation whereas improvements
in roads and market conditions increase the intensity of their participation rela-
tive to cash crop farmers. These differences possibly result from the magnitude of
the difference between shadow and market prices due to transactions costs. This
difference is expected to increase with farmers’ ability to use output for household
consumption.
Similarly, lower transactions costs such as improvements in road conditions and
market access are expected to lower the gap between shadow and market prices
(especially for food crops) thereby increasing incentives for market participation.
For these reasons, cash crop farmers are expected to be less constrained by dis-
tance to market whereas non-cash crop farmers are likely to sell more farm output
following transactions costs-reducing improvements in community infrastructure.
Since cash crop output is often produced for market exchange, the presence of
transactions costs is less likely to constrain market participation since incentives
for alternative uses of farm output such as household consumption are lower. In
the case of farm output of food crops, the possibility of using farm output for
household consumption rather than market exchange exists. As a result of this,
the size of the wedge between shadow and market prices of cash crops is likely to
be smaller compared to non-cash crops since the substitutability of farm harvest
of food crops and similar market goods is likely to decrease faster than the substi-
tutability of farm harvest of cash crops with similar market goods. For instance,
coffee as a cash crop is perhaps easily substitutable with similar coffee purchased
from the market in addition to the fact as a composition of household consumption
basket, it is likely to occupy a smaller proportion relative to other food items like
cereals. Thus coffee farmers are less likely to be constrained by transactions costs
in selling coffee since the incentives (in utility terms) for using coffee produced for
household consumption are smaller. On the other hand, producers of cereals are
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likely to have strong incentives to consume household harvest of where transactions
costs are high and cereals are staple foods.
Differences in Diversity of Crop Portfolio.
The extent to which transactions costs constrain market participation of farm-
ers also appears to be sensitive to the diversity of farmers’ crop portfolio. Using an
index of crop diversity constructed from the number of food and cash crops farmers
produce, we examine the differences in transactions costs effects on marketing of
farm output. As opposed to using a simple definition of number of crops, we use
a weighted definition of food and cash crops.
The average partial effects above indicate that the effect of distance to market
on farmers’ discrete choice to sell farm output is sensitive to diversity of crop port-
folio. The more diverse a crop portfolio is, the less likely market participation is
constrained by distance to market. The effect of road conditions on market partic-
ipation does not appear to significantly differ across farmers based on differences
in diversity of crop portfolio. However, farmers with more diverse crop portfolios
are expected to participate less intensely following improvements in market condi-
tions. The heterogeneity of transactions costs effects on market participation due
to differences in diversity of crop choices appears to be more noticeable in the case
of distance to market.
The role of crop diversity in relaxing constraints on market participation due
to transactions costs (especially distance to market) is likely to occur through
farmers’ reliance on markets to balance household food demand especially where
household decisions are non-separable. Through the production of multiple food
crops, farmers can internalize food markets thereby lowering the impact of trans-
actions costs on their ability to finance consumption decisions. Thus farmers’ with
more diversified crop portfolios such as a farmers of food and cash crops are less
likely to be constrained by transactions costs and thus participate as sellers. How-
ever, given that our definition of crop diversity index allocates weights to both food
and cash crops, another more direct effect of diversification on transactions costs is
possible. By producing several crops, farmers are able to reduce average marketing
costs of farm output and hence ease market participation. For instance, farmers
producing cash crops in addition to food crops are less likely to be constrained by
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transactions costs in selling cash crop output. Using the results from the previous
section, it is observed that distance to market constrains non-cash crop farmers’
discrete choice of selling farm output but not cash crop farmers. Therefore, it is
possible for a farmer with a diversified crop portfolio to relax constraints on her
decision to sell farm output of food crops when she produces and sells cash crop
output. This spill-over effect of marketing farm output of cash crops is likely to in-
fluence differences in the effect of transactions costs on market participation across
farmers. This is very likely in developing countries diversifying crop production
such as the addition of cash crops to farmers’ crop portfolio is often done only af-
ter sufficient amount of food crops have been produced as reported by Fafchamps
(1992). This is particularly the case where formal insurance markets are missing
and farmers are exposed to risk of crop loss due to rain variation, pests etc. Under
these conditions and the presence of transactions costs, farmers have incentives to
produce several crops to minimize risk and ensure food security. Thus, an increase
in the diversity of crop portfolio is likely to be associated with the addition of cash
crops which is also likely to be associated with commercialized farming and hence
lower probability of being constrained by transactions costs.
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3.5 Robustness Tests
A major constrain in using Cragg’s Double Hurdle model is challenge of incorpo-
rating unobserved heterogeneity into the model. Unobserved differences between
farmers are likely to influence transactions costs effects on marketing of farm out-
put. Drawing from the contributions in the literature, we deal with this issue
by augmenting Cragg’s Double Hurdle model with Correlated Random Effects.
This is implemented by adding time-averages of household characteristics into the
model. Various specifications of this augmented model have been tried to test the
robustness of the results. Details about the implementation of the procedure are
provided in the appendix.
The key results are largely consistent with the results obtained in the basic Cragg’s
model- See Tables (24-26).
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3.6 Conclusion
Several papers have documented transactions costs effects on market participa-
tion of small-scale farmers in developing countries. These studies have identified
transactions costs from the state of community infrastructure relating to market
accessibility-distance, roads, support services etc.; and household characteristics
relating to search and bargaining skills, ability to process information etc. Results
from these studies have shown that transactions costs constrain market partici-
pation by driving a wedge between household shadow and market prices thereby
lowering incentives to participate as sellers of farm output or buyers of goods for
household consumption.
For subsistence farmers, constraints on market participation (especially in sell-
ing farm output) results in jointness of production and consumption decisions
since lower returns from agricultural activities due to transactions costs in mar-
ket exchange of farm output decreases households’ ability to finance consumption
decisions. Responses to these constraints which have been considered in the liter-
ature include: non-participation and low intensity conditional on participating in
markets to sell farm output; and internalizing food markets by using farm harvest
for household consumption. These analyses have often been done separately. We
contribute to the literature by examining transactions costs effects on farmers’
marketing of farm output and use of farm harvest for household consumption.
Rather than focusing on marketing of farm output of a single crop as done in sev-
eral studies, we construct an index of market participation by first obtaining the
proportion of output sold of individual crops produced in a given farming period,
and then aggregating it to household level across all crops produced by a given
farmer. Similarly, we define the size of internalized food markets using the contri-
bution of farm harvest to the quantity consumed of a given item relative to other
sources such as quantity of purchased goods. This is done for all items consumed
by a household in a given period and aggregated to household level. With a rich
multi-crop definition of market participation, we also examine the heterogeneity of
transactions costs effects on market participation between cash crop and non-cash
crop farmers and based on differences in diversity of crop portfolio.
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We use data from three rounds of the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS)
to construct a balanced panel of households surveyed between 1999 and 2009. We
define market participation and use of farm output for household consumption
as a discrete choice of participation or non-participation; and a continuous choice
of intensity of participation. We fit Cragg’s double hurdle model augmented to
control for unobserved heterogeneity using Correlated Random Effects (CRE).
We find statistical evidence that distance to market and major town lowers both
farmers’ probability of participating as sellers and conditional on participation the
volume of farm output sold. Distance to market is assumed to reflect the size of
explicit marketing costs such as transportations costs; and implicit costs such as
opportunity costs of time spent selling farm output. Distance to major town on
the other hand, is assumed to indicate the extent of market integration and access
to larger markets with bigger cliente`le. Improvements in road conditions and mar-
kets appear to have a larger effect on farmers’ intensity of participation. Sellers
of farm output in communities with such improvements and hence lower transac-
tions costs appear to participate more intensely on average. It is also observed
that in addition to community infrastructure such as road conditions, improve-
ments in market infrastructure also have a significant effect (and comparatively
larger than the effect of improvements in roads) on the intensity of market par-
ticipation. These results illustrate the effect of costly exchange as constraints on
farmers’ marketing of farm output- especially non-cash crop farmers and farmers
with less diverse crop portfolio whose discrete choice to participate appears to be
constrained by distance to market.
The use of farm harvest for household consumption also appears to be influenced
by transactions costs. Similarly to marketing of farm output, the effect of dis-
tance to market is much smaller than expected. However, improvements in road
conditions and markets significantly lower the use of farm harvest for household
consumption perhaps due to increase in incentives to sell farm output or lower
costs of participating in markets as buyers of goods for household consumption.
Apart from transactions costs indicators, food prices also appear to have a sig-
nificant effect on farmers’ market participation decisions. Increase in food prices
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lower the intensity of farmers’ participation as sellers of farm output and increase
the size of internalized food markets. This is in line with results from previous
studies that food price volatility is often interpreted as a signal to food scarcity in
response to which farmers increase their inventory of food stock and thus decrease
the volume of marketed surplus.
Policy interventions targeting increased agricultural commercialization which ig-
nore the presence of transactions costs and its effects on farmers’ allocation of farm
output decisions is likely to be less effective. As highlighted in previous studies,
policy actions such as improving road networks and market infrastructure which
lower participation costs and increase market integration are likely to significantly
increase farmers market participation. These interventions can increase the relia-
bility on markets to meet household food demand and facilitate exchange of farm
harvest thereby increasing participation of farmers and buyers of goods for house-
hold consumption and sellers of farm output.
In summary, the results indicate that transactions costs such as distance to market
and improvements in roads and markets affect both farmers’ marketing of farm
output and use of farm output for household consumption. The effect on the for-
mer has not been examined extensively in the literature. Costly exchange of farm
output due to transactions costs creates disincentives for farmers to sell farm out-
put and increases gains from internalized food markets. The results also indicate
the jointness of household production and consumption decisions observed through
the effect of food prices on market participation decisions.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Description of variables
Table 22: Description of Variables
Variable Description
Mkt. Participation (seller=1) A binary variable indicating a farmers’ market participation as a seller
hh. sales index The intensity of market participation measured through a sales index.
use farm harvest (=1) A binary variable indicating farmers’ use of farm harvest for hh. consumption
Prop. of Self-produced Consumed Items The number of consumed items produced by the household as a proportion of total items
consumed
Prop. of Qty. obtained from harvest (all items) The quantity of consumed items produced by the household as a proportion of total
quantity consumed averaged for all items consumed by the household.
Prop. of Qty. obtained from harvest The quantity of consumed items produced by the household as a proportion of total
quantity consumed averaged only for items produced and consumed by the household.
Hh. head’s age Age of household head
Hh. head (male=1) Male headed household
Hh. size Household size
Number of plots Number of plots used by household
Tropical Livestock Units A measure of household wealth constructed by allocating weights to various livestock owned
by the household- cattle, horses, ox, etc. See Dercon (????)
IDDIR member (=1) A binary variable indicating membership of a funeral society
Food price Index (Deviation from avg.) Food Price Index provided in ERHS
Agric. cooperative (=1) A binary variable indicating availability of agricultural cooperative in the community.
Agric extension Service (=1) A binary variable indicating availability of agricultural extension service in the community.
Distance to mkt. (in km) Distance to market in kilometers
Distance to major town (in km) Distance to major town in kilometers- A measure of market/community integration
Number of mkts in Community Number of markets within the community.
better road (=1) Improvement in access to other towns due to better road network
improved mkt. (=1) Improvement in access to markets
Choice of mkt. (village mkt=1) A binary variable for sellers of farm output in village market.
cart owner (=1) A binary variable for households owning a cart- access to means of transport
Crop diversity Index (Food & cash crops) An index of crop diversity measuring using the number of food & cash crops produced
Crop diversity Index (Food Crops only) An index of crop diversity measuring using the number of food crops produced
Cash Crop farmer (=1) A binary variable for cash crop producers such as coffee
3.7.2 Average Partial Effects for Cragg’s Double Model.
The Partial effect of a continuous variable x on farmers’ discrete marketing
decision is computed as follows following Burke (2009):
∂P (y > 0|x)
∂x
= φ (xβ) • β (49)
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For a binary variable x, the partial effect on participation is computed as:
P (y > 0|x) |x=1 − P (y > 0|x) |x=0 = Φ (xβ) |x=1 − Φ (xβ) |x=0 (50)
Similarly, the partial effects on intensity of participation for continuous and
binary versions of a variable x is computed as:
∂E (s|x, y > 0)
∂x
= β {1− λ (xβ/σ) [(xβ/σ) + λ (xβ/σ)]} (51)
E (s|x, y > 0) |x=1−E (s|x, y > 0) |x=0 = [(xβ) + σλ (xβ/σ)] |x=1−[(xβ) + σλ (xβ/σ)] |x=0
(52)
Where xβ is a vector of explanatory variables and their corresponding param-
eters to be estimated; λ (xβ/σ) = φ (xβ/σ) /Φ (xβ/σ) is the Inverse Mills Ratio
(IMR) and σ-sigma is obtained from maximizing the log-likelihood function de-
fined in the econometric model.
3.7.3 Dealing With Unobserved Heterogeneity
To account for unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of market partici-
pation decisions, the error terms in the structural equations in (38) and (39) are
defined following Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2009) and Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2011)
in their work on the effect of use subsidized fertilizer on demand for commercial
fertilizer in Malawi.
ıt = cı1 + ϕıt1 (53)
εıt = cı2 + ϕıt2 (54)
where cı1and cı2 represents time-constant unobserved farmer heterogeneity such
as differences in farming ability, risk attitude etc.; and ϕıt1 andϕıt2 represents pe-
riodic unobserved shocks to farmers marketing decisions such as health shocks,
changes in household head resulting in changes in marketing ability etc. Inde-
pendence between the factors which affect farmers’ marketing decisions and these
unobservable factors (cı1, cı2) and (ϕıt1, ϕıt2) is required to obtain consistent esti-
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mates.
To relax the assumption of independence between the covariates and unobserved
time-invariant household characteristics which affect marketing decisions: (cı1, cı2),
we follow Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2011) in using the Correlated Random Effects
(CRE) framework also called the Mundlak-Chamberlain Device (due to Mundlak
(1978) and Chamberlain (1984)). Under this framework, time-constant values of
time-varying household characteristics such as means or initial values of such co-
variates are used “as with fixed effects while avoiding the problem of incidental
parameters in nonlinear models” (Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2011) p.32). The CRE
framework as discussed in Wooldridge (2010) and implemented by Ricker-Gilbert
and Jayne (2009) and Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2011) , involves the following definition
of the unobserved household heterogeneity in both hurdles:
cıs = Ψs + βX¯ıs + kıs kıs | Xıs ∼ Normal
(
0, σ2k
)
s = 1, 2 (55)
where X¯ıs represents the time-averaged household covariates andβs are parameters
associated with it. In the context of this chapter, X¯ıs contains household-means
of continuous variables and initial values of discrete variables for each household
in the sample across all years.
3.7.4 Estimated Parameters from Cragg’s Double Hurdle Model + Cor-
related Random Effects.
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Table 24: Transactions Cost Effects: Cragg’s Double Hurdle Model
Mktn. of Farm output Use of Farm output for Hh. Cons.
VARIABLES Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Hh. head (male=1) 0.0549 0.0406* 0.228*** -0.00615
(0.0661) (0.0242) (0.0780) (0.0105)
Hh. head’s age -0.000603 0.000808 0.000993 0.000120
(0.00200) (0.000751) (0.00258) (0.000308)
Hh. size -0.0164 -0.00362 -0.0145 -0.000903
(0.0220) (0.00886) (0.0289) (0.00394)
Number of plots 0.0885*** -0.0400*** 0.0444* -0.00637**
(0.0197) (0.00696) (0.0249) (0.00278)
Tropical Livestock Units 0.00619 -0.00716* -0.0128 -0.00143
(0.0107) (0.00410) (0.0115) (0.00156)
IDDIR member (=1) 0.198** 0.110*** -0.0938 -0.0275*
(0.0842) (0.0326) (0.109) (0.0144)
Food price Index (Deviation from avg.) 0.233 -0.561*** -1.501*** 0.170***
(0.285) (0.119) (0.370) (0.0503)
Agric. cooperative (=1) 0.302*** -0.0698* 0.156* 0.0808***
(0.0742) (0.0365) (0.0920) (0.0139)
Distance to mkt. (in km) -0.0360*** -0.0101* -0.0607*** 0.00608***
(0.00582) (0.00602) (0.00573) (0.00183)
Distance to major town (in km) -0.0194*** -0.00710*** 0.00123 -0.000956
(0.00524) (0.00216) (0.00602) (0.000799)
better road (=1) 0.0604* -0.0563***
(0.0310) (0.0120)
improved mkt. (=1) 0.149*** -0.0516***
(0.0560) (0.0189)
Agric extension Service (=1) -0.0844 0.0466 -0.361*** 0.0274**
(0.0987) (0.0410) (0.121) (0.0131)
Number of mkts in Community -0.0959*** 0.0128 0.0120 -0.0222***
(0.0181) (0.00823) (0.0218) (0.00431)
Choice of mkt. (village mkt=1) 0.108*** -0.0287**
(0.0307) (0.0132)
cart owner (=1) -0.0329 0.00176
(0.0431) (0.0159)
Constant -0.0906 0.242** 0.0391 0.143***
(0.241) (0.0960) (0.270) (0.0390)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Correlated Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,051 2,051 2,051 2,051
chi2 218.2 218.2 265.0 265.0
ll -879.1 -879.1 1317 1317
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 25: Heterogeneity of Transactions Cost Effects: Cash Crop vs. Non-Cash Crop Farmers
Distance to Markets Improved Roads & mkts.
VARIABLES Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Hh. head (male=1) 0.0455 0.0384 0.0418 0.0369
(0.0667) (0.0243) (0.0667) (0.0241)
Hh. head’s age -0.000736 0.000805 -0.000663 0.000841
(0.00203) (0.000750) (0.00203) (0.000748)
Hh. size -0.00796 -0.00336 -0.00763 -0.00353
(0.0220) (0.00881) (0.0219) (0.00888)
cash crop farmer(=1) 0.180 0.0498 0.739*** 0.106*
(0.268) (0.0586) (0.130) (0.0572)
Number of plots 0.0792*** -0.0409*** 0.0814*** -0.0393***
(0.0199) (0.00716) (0.0200) (0.00710)
Tropical Livestock Units 0.00380 -0.00760* 0.00389 -0.00734*
(0.0108) (0.00416) (0.0107) (0.00407)
IDDIR member (=1) 0.107 0.100*** 0.0934 0.104***
(0.0870) (0.0336) (0.0865) (0.0337)
Food price Index (Deviation from avg.) 0.241 -0.549*** 0.145 -0.553***
(0.289) (0.121) (0.287) (0.122)
Agric. cooperative (=1) 0.228*** -0.0779** 0.252*** -0.0845**
(0.0805) (0.0375) (0.0761) (0.0371)
Distance to mkt. (in km) -0.0323*** -0.00871 -0.0322*** -0.00863
(0.00567) (0.00626) (0.00554) (0.00598)
Distance to major town (in km) -0.0181*** -0.00695*** -0.0156*** -0.00698***
(0.00540) (0.00232) (0.00525) (0.00216)
Distance to mkt.* Cash crop 0.0996 -0.00430
(0.0616) (0.0124)
Distance to major town* Cash crop 0.0483* 0.000697
(0.0251) (0.00598)
better road (=1) 0.0575* 0.0826**
(0.0309) (0.0375)
improved mkt. (=1) 0.144*** 0.144**
(0.0552) (0.0564)
Agric extension Service (=1) 0.0281 0.0541 -0.0318 0.0595
(0.101) (0.0442) (0.0992) (0.0406)
Number of mkts in Community -0.103*** 0.0104 -0.101*** 0.0107
(0.0184) (0.00843) (0.0182) (0.00833)
Choice of mkt. (village mkt=1) 0.105*** 0.106***
(0.0307) (0.0305)
cart owner (=1) -0.0359 -0.0380
(0.0433) (0.0431)
better road* Cash Crop -0.0968*
(0.0571)
improved mkt* Cash Crop 0.00903
(0.0502)
Constant -0.218 0.235** -0.237 0.219**
(0.240) (0.0958) (0.238) (0.101)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Correlated Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,051 2,051 2,051 2,051
chi2 231.3 231.3 222.9 222.9
ll -849.5 -849.5 -852.1 -852.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 26: Heterogeneity of Transactions Cost Effects: Diversity of Crop Portfolio
Distance to Markets Improved Roads & mkts.
VARIABLES Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Hh. head (male=1) 0.0499 0.0390 0.0478 0.0313
(0.0660) (0.0241) (0.0661) (0.0242)
Hh. head’s age -0.000868 0.000632 -0.000728 0.000721
(0.00198) (0.000738) (0.00199) (0.000721)
Hh. size -0.0159 -0.00352 -0.0151 -0.00468
(0.0222) (0.00874) (0.0219) (0.00874)
Crop Diversity Index -0.464 0.0996 0.278 0.576***
(0.473) (0.171) (0.297) (0.186)
Number of plots 0.0867*** -0.0450*** 0.0843*** -0.0431***
(0.0205) (0.00713) (0.0202) (0.00719)
Tropical Livestock Units 0.00638 -0.00785* 0.00633 -0.00694*
(0.0108) (0.00410) (0.0108) (0.00406)
IDDIR member (=1) 0.195** 0.0891*** 0.181** 0.0927***
(0.0870) (0.0319) (0.0861) (0.0318)
Food price Index (Deviation from avg.) 0.272 -0.467*** 0.261 -0.604***
(0.293) (0.124) (0.289) (0.134)
Agric. cooperative (=1) 0.299*** -0.0774** 0.294*** -0.0668*
(0.0764) (0.0367) (0.0750) (0.0358)
Distance to mkt. (in km) -0.0740*** -0.00808 -0.0346*** -0.00754
(0.0148) (0.0107) (0.00593) (0.00591)
Distance to major town (in km) -0.0211** -0.0137*** -0.0194*** -0.00673***
(0.0102) (0.00460) (0.00524) (0.00217)
Distance to mkt.* Cash Diversity 0.207*** 0.00718
(0.0638) (0.0320)
Distance to major town* Cash Diversity 0.00686 0.0234
(0.0371) (0.0170)
better road (=1) 0.0467 0.0607
(0.0303) (0.0655)
improved mkt. (=1) 0.133** 0.286***
(0.0532) (0.0838)
Agric extension Service (=1) -0.0517 0.0551 -0.0847 0.0430
(0.0991) (0.0412) (0.0987) (0.0417)
Number of mkts in Community -0.0976*** 0.0103 -0.0964*** 0.0132
(0.0185) (0.00810) (0.0181) (0.00830)
Choice of mkt. (village mkt=1) 0.115*** 0.107***
(0.0303) (0.0307)
cart owner (=1) -0.0347 -0.0367
(0.0426) (0.0424)
better road* Crop Diversity -0.0763
(0.187)
improved mkt* Crop Diversity -0.441**
(0.178)
Constant 0.0788 0.308*** -0.0946 0.123
(0.270) (0.105) (0.241) (0.115)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Correlated Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,051 2,051 2,051 2,051
chi2 236.0 236.0 222.8 222.8
N clust 696 696 696 696
ll -866.6 -866.6 -870.2 -870.2
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4 Persistence of Links in Risk-Sharing Networks: Strategic
Consideration versus Social Factors.
Abstract
In this chapter we examine the persistence of links within risk-sharing networks of house-
holds in rural Ethiopia. Using two rounds of data collected over a five year period, we identify
persistent links as individuals listed in both periods by households as their source of support
in times of need. We investigate the extent to which the persistence of links in these net-
works are driven by strategic or social factors. Under strategic considerations, households
are assumed to choose risk-sharing partners to maximize gains from insurance. On the other
hand, risk-sharing arrangements between households (especially with family members and
close neighbors) may persist overtime due to social factors such as altruism. We consider
these explanations in the chapter using attributes of links in repeatedly observed risk-sharing
networks in Ethiopia. We find that link attributes such as kinship relations, proximity (both
in terms of neighborhood and farming area), connectedness of links and endowments (such
as land) significantly influence the persistence of links in risk-sharing networks. Further
examination of the persistence of specific links indicate that the effects of these factors differ
in magnitude and statistical significance across links with family members and neighbors;
as well as based on type of relationship- money-lending and labor sharing links.
Keywords: risk-sharing networks, informal-insurance, persistent links, utility maximiza-
tion, social factors, Ethiopia.
JEL Classification: D10 O12 Q12
139
4.1 Introduction
The objective of the chapter is to examine the persistence of risk-sharing ar-
rangements between households in rural Ethiopia. Using data on households’ net-
work of individuals they rely on for support in times of need, we examine the extent
to which the persistence of these relationships overtime is strategically driven to
maximize gains from insurance or influenced by social factors such as altruism.
We use two rounds of data on individuals a given household relies on for support
collected five years apart to identify persistent relationships or links as individuals
listed in both periods. Through the attributes of these links (such as differences
in endowment, proximity, existence of kinship ties, type of support provided) we
investigate the extent to which persistence of risk-sharing links over the five years
is influenced by attributes associated with strategic consideration or social fac-
tors which oblige households to mutually support each other. We hypothesize
that under strategic considerations, households are assumed to choose risk-sharing
partners to maximize gains from insurance. Therefore, attributes of links such
as wealth, proximity, type of support etc. are important to the household in
maintaining risk-sharing arrangements overtime. On the other hand, risk-sharing
arrangements between households may persist overtime due to social factors such
as altruism where households share kinship or neighborhood. We test this hypoth-
esis using a binary definition of link persistence, to fit a logit model on link level
data.
With link level data, risk-sharing networks are defined at household level rather
than risk-sharing groups as done in several previous studies. As a result, the
heterogeneity of systems of mutual support across households can be captured.
Furthermore, by this definition, links which form risk sharing networks are het-
erogeneous not just in terms of endowments/wealth; but also differences in other
attributes across links such as type of mutual support in addition to risk-sharing,
social and spatial distances, history of relationship etc. Two unique advantages of
this data structure which facilitate our analysis are: the availability of two rounds
of data on households’ risk-sharing networks; and the availability of various at-
tributes of the links which form these networks. With two rounds of data, it is
easier to identify links which persist and also to obtain causal effects of attributes
140
which influence persistence by using previous link characteristics since they are
exogenous to link persistence. With various attributes of links we can consider
several definitions of social and strategic factors and also capture the heterogene-
ity typical in endogenous networks which are absent in exogenous risk-sharing
arrangements. Jointly, these features enable us to examine the underlying factors
which influence the persistence of links within risk-sharing networks through their
characteristics. Furthermore, using information about the type of supported pro-
vided by each link within the network, we can examine the persistence of specific
links such as kinships, neighbors, labor-sharing and financial links. This is moti-
vated by the need to account for possible differences in the nature of households’
objectives across links in forming risk-sharing arrangements.
The chapter draws from various contributions in the literature on informal insur-
ance arrangements. Risk-sharing through mutual support and pooling of resources
is a common practice in developing countries where households are exposed to
various forms of risks due to household (idiosyncratic) and community (covariate)
shocks. These shocks which differ in terms coverage, frequency and persistence
range from climatic and health conditions, loss of property and livestock, price
shocks among others33. The effects of these shocks include lower consumption
and income/asset levels in the short and medium-term. Long term effects include
poverty-traps affecting quality of nutrition and health outcomes; and also efficiency
losses due to low investments in agricultural production, education among others
(Dercon (2005)). In addition to the effects of shocks, the state of credit, asset and
insurance markets in these communities also affect households’ ability to mitigate
the effects of shocks ex-ante and ex-post. The presence of credit constraints or
poorly developed asset markets or missing formal insurance contracts, affects the
effectiveness of risk management and coping strategies developed by households to
self-insure. Under these conditions, the accumulation and depletion of assets, use
of savings or borrowing, diversification of economic activities such as crop choices
and labor allocation may still be inadequate in cushioning the effects of shocks.
33For instance, between 1999 and 2004, 52% of surveyed households in rural Ethiopia reported to have ex-
perienced drought; 38% reported crop pest or diseases; and 35% reported death of a household member- Pan
(2009).
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Apart from self-insurance, another strand of the literature considers informal insur-
ance arrangements between households. Under missing insurance markets, house-
holds can be insured against shocks through risk-sharing agreements with other
households in semi-formal groups or through networks. In risk-sharing groups,
informal insurance contracts are designed to share risk through the pooling of
resources of participating households whose membership maybe strategically re-
stricted to maximize utility in the form of insurance. A more informal risk-sharing
arrangement occurs through networks created by inter-household relationships.
Through these networks, social factors such as altruism may implicitly embed sys-
tems of mutual support between households within a given community resulting in
risk-sharing. Specific forms of these ’contracts’ take various forms across several
communities such as state contingent transfers, quasi-credit, labor-sharing and
other forms of gift exchanges between households sharing kinship, ethnicity/tribe,
religious groups, neighborhood, organizational identities or other exogenously iden-
tified groups.
This chapter also draws from the contributions of recent papers which have shifted
focus from risk-sharing arrangements through exogenous groups to social networks.
In developing countries, inter-household interactions among several uses, serve as
channels for information sharing and source of mutual support. Through repeated
interactions between households due to kinship or neighborhood and shared activ-
ities, households share information about various activities and build relationships
on which they can rely on for support in times of need. Our focus is on the latter
use of these networks formed among households. As systems of mutual support,
insurance through these relationships occurs through transfers or other forms of
support offered to households facing shocks with the hope that the help will be
reciprocated when the need arises. Empirically, examining the extent to which
risk-sharing occurs through social networks is challenging. Self-selection by house-
holds into networks and possibilities of measurement error in obtaining the full
network of households introduces endogeniety concerns. In large communities, a
census of households’ full network might be both expensive and challenging. In
some studies, a sample of the network is obtained by truncating the network size
which results in measurement error due to unobserved social space. As a result
of these concerns, endogenous risk-sharing networks have not until recently been
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examined extensively.
Despite these concerns, endogenous risk-sharing arrangements offer an opportu-
nity to investigate interesting aspects of informal insurance contracts since they
are defined at household level. Across households, these arrangements are likely to
differ in structure at a given period of time and in the underlying mechanism which
drives the evolution overtime. In particular, the composition of risk-sharing net-
works may be strategically chosen by households to maximize gains from insurance
or socially influenced by altruism towards relatives and close neighbors. Although
in some instances, reasonable hypotheses can be formulated about the underlying
mechanism which drives the existence of certain risk-sharing arrangements. For
instance, risk-sharing through family/kinship networks are more likely to be based
on altruism whereas risk-sharing through semi-formal local associations such as
funeral societies in Ethiopia are likely to be based on utility maximization. How-
ever, in general, risk-sharing arrangements especially where they are endogenously
formed with family members, neighbors, co-members in local associations, etc. are
more complex and hence difficult to examine the underlying motivation for their
existence. It is perhaps because of this (and data constraints) that several papers
on endogenous risk-sharing networks focus on obtaining evidence of insurance.
We contribute to this gap in the literature by using self-reported systems of mutual
support between households to construct risk-sharing networks rather than using
exogenously identified groups as widely used in previous studies. The links within
these networks are reported by households as individuals on whom they rely on
for support in times of need. We examine the extent to which the persistence of
these links is explained by utility maximization and/or social factors.
We find that link attributes such as kinship relations, spatial distance (especially
next-door neighbors), connectedness of links and endowments (such as land) sig-
nificantly influence the persistence of links in risk-sharing networks. The effects
of kinship, proximity and connectedness are robust to the truncation of network
size, interdependence in the persistence of links at household level and unobserved
household heterogeneity. In the context of informal insurance arrangements, the
effect of attributes such as endowments, proximity and shared activities may be
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linked to strategic considerations to maximize gains from insurance through com-
mitment and information asymmetry as constraints to efficient risk-sharing. On
the other hand, the effect of kinship is can be interpreted as the role of social factors
such as altruism in the formation of risk-sharing agreements. Given that the under-
lying mechanism which derives the formation of risk-sharing arrangements is likely
to differ across links, we examine the factors which derive the persistence of specific
links such as kinship/family links, links with neighbors, money-lending/financial
links and labor-sharing links. We find that the persistence of links with family
members is more associated with social factors such as the existence of a link
with the household head’s father; whereas the persistence of links with non-family
neighbors is sensitive to connectedness of the link and shared activities. Similar
differences are also observed in the persistence of financial and labor sharing links.
The persistence of the latter is influenced by receipt of previous help in addition to
connectedness and proximity. The persistence of labor-sharing links on the other
hand appears to be sensitive to connectedness and proximity.
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4.2 Literature Review
Households in developing countries use various strategies in dealing with shocks
they face. Risk of facing these shocks and their possible effect on household wel-
fare create the need to devise various strategies at household level and beyond.
These strategies both at household level (self-insurance) and between households
(through risk-sharing groups and networks), their use (ex-ante and ex-post) and
effectiveness in mitigating the effects of shocks have been the subject of various
studies.
4.2.1 Dealing with Risk and The Need for Insurance
Strategies used ex-post (or devised ex-ante) to deal with risk in environments
where shocks of various forms are frequent and possibly persistent are an important
part of rural household behavior. With incomplete or missing credit and insurance
markets and insufficient public safety nets, households’ ability to mitigate shocks
and achieve consumption smoothing is further constrained. Alternative mecha-
nisms used to cope with risk vary across space and over time yielding a huge body
of research-both theoretical and empirical. These studies have focused on identi-
fying strategies used by households to deal with risk; and examining the extent to
which such strategies are effective.
In the developing world, various forms of risk-coping strategies are used by house-
holds to self-insure against shocks. The effectiveness of these strategies in facil-
itating household consumption smoothing in the occurrence of a shock has been
the subject of several studies. Deaton Angus (1991) and Deaton (1992) examined
households’ savings and accumulation of assets in environments with incomplete
credit markets and households are risk averse and impatient. Similar studies which
followed built on this work by using various definitions of assets such as livestock
accumulation by households in rural communities of developing countries- See
Fafchamps et al. (1998) and (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) for empirical exam-
ples). In addition to self-insurance through asset accumulation and depletion,
income smoothing strategies through the diversification of economics activities
to preserve mean-income; or choosing low-risk-low-return activities to minimize
income risk have also been studied. Empirical example include abor allocation
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) , Alderman and Paxson (1994), Reardon (1997),
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Kochar (1995, 1999); Moser (1998),Beegle et al. (2003)); diversification of crop
choices (Townsend (1995) and Dercon (1996)); low-risk low return crop choices
(Morduch (1990)), low return off-farm activities (Dercon and Krishnan (1996))
among others.
Beyond the household and self-insurance strategies, the extent to which risk of
exposure to shocks is mitigated through interactions between households been
studied. Building on the work by Manski (1993), the role of household networks
built through inter-household interactions influence economic outcomes of house-
holds have been studied by several papers. Through these networks, channels
for information sharing, easing liquidity constraints, risk sharing among others;
emerge. The importance of these relationships is indicated by the sensitivity
of various household outcomes to household networks. For instance, by relax-
ing credit constraints through informal loans, or facilitating informal insurance
through risk-sharing, or sharing experiences to relax information asymmetry con-
straints on technology adoption; the effects of shocks and income levels are likely
to be affected.
The effectiveness of these strategies in enabling households mitigate the impact
of shocks on household welfare is limited. Empirical evidence of households’ in-
ability to fully insure themselves against risk has been reported in several papers-
Townsend (1995) for Indian villages; Dercon (1996)- Tanzania; Deaton (1997);
Porter (2012b) using the ERHS among other studies. Dercon (2000) and Dercon
(2005) discussed factors which constraint the use of assets and income smoothing
strategies in developing countries. Asset markets are often underdeveloped limit-
ing both access and use of assets to mitigate shocks. These conditions result in
covariance between household asset values (especially livestock which is commonly
used) and income; introduce risk in asset return and purchasing power of assets
especially in communities where assets are a common buffer to shocks- negative
shock lowers asset prices due to increased supply by sellers as more households sell
their assets to ensure consumption smoothing; and positive shock increases asset
prices due to increased demand by buyers as more households invest in accumu-
lating assets. Despite these concerns, some studies such as Dercon (2000) have
reported empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of the use of some assets
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such as cattle. However, these assets are very expensive for average households in
developing countries. Dercon (2000) also discussed the effect of entry constraints
in the form of capital and skills required to diversify economic activities as a means
of preserving average household income levels in dealing with income risk.
The state of credit and insurance markets in developing countries which by the
standards in developed countries are incomplete and poorly developed [See Besley
(1994) for a review] also affects households’ ability to mitigate the impact of shocks.
Under these market conditions, households are unable to achieve consumption
smoothing through borrowing or formal insurance when faced with or (in antic-
ipation of) a shock. These effects are even more pronounced for the rural poor
Dercon (2005) (chap. 1). Furthermore, other market conditions such as labor
and product markets (which are often thin and less integrated) affect households’
ability to cope with risk by diversifying household labor supply or sell household
made products intended for income smoothing (Dercon (2005)-chap. 1). These
conditions added to variation in rainfall create volatility in crop income through
price risk thereby lowering gains from specialization relative to diversifying crop
production.
To complement these strategies and enable households better mitigate the effects
of shocks, various policy interventions have been formulated targeting vulnera-
ble households in poor communities. Recent examples include rain-index based
insurance- [Barnett et al. (2008) among others]. However, since these mechanisms
are designed for specific shocks (such as aggregate rainfall shocks), residual risk
which is uninsured-referred to as basis risk in the literature; may affect its ef-
fectiveness (Dercon et al. (2014)). Other forms of interventions include transfers
through government and non-governmental organizations through food for work
programs etc. (Dercon and Krishnan (2003)).
In summary, costly self-insurance and public safety nets beyond the budgets of
many governments, risk is an inherent part of rural household behavior affecting
income and consumption smoothening. In these risky environments with missing
and incomplete markets, an understanding of the strategies developed by house-
holds to mitigate risk naturally becomes an interesting and active area of research.
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Results from these studies are crucial for the development of social protection
policies (see Larson et al. (2004) for a review of policies for agricultural markets)
which strengthen existing institutions rather than crowd out their effectiveness
(especially informal institutions- Attanasio and Rıos-Rull (2000)). Given the re-
sults from studies on self-insurance and constraints surrounding its use, alternative
strategies have dominated what followed in the literature on households’ response
to risk. Several papers considered informally devised strategies and the extent to
which they are effective in insuring households against risk. These studies have
been centered on:
• Confirming whether informal insurance through risk-sharing enable house-
holds deal with risk- completely or partially?
• Examining the mechanism through which such arrangements affect house-
hold’s ability to deal with risk- transfers, informal credit etc.
Below is a selected review of the related literature.
4.2.2 Informal Insurance Through Risk Sharing
In developing countries, informal systems of mutual support are common among
households. Households within a given community help each other in times of
need through inter-household transfers, informal loans (quasi-credit), labor shar-
ing, share-cropping, gift exchanges among several others. These arrangements
maybe implicit among neighboring households, extended families, ethnicities and
tribes established on grounds of altruism and reciprocity to facilitate insurance en-
forced as moral requirement34. Risk-sharing may also occur through semi-formally
structured associations such as between members of local associations to maximize
utility in the form of insurance enforced through set rules. Despite the differences
in the underlying mechanisms of various risk-sharing arrangements (see Genicot
and Ray (2003)), the ultimate objective is to facilitate cross-sectional consumption
smoothing over time (Dercon (2000)). Through risk sharing, households faced with
a shock are able to cushion its effects leaving consumption unaffected by changes
34See (James (1976) for an earlier work on moral considerations in poor communities
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in household income. Furthermore, in developing countries where credit and in-
surance markets are incomplete or missing, these arrangements can be viewed as
informal mechanisms to internalize insurance markets35.
Having established the motivation for risk-sharing, empirical studies have exam-
ined the structure and effectiveness of informal insurance arrangements especially
in developing countries. In his seminal work, Townsend (1994) illustrated that
through risk sharing, households with identical preferences and facing uncertainty
in the form of income shocks maximize expected utility subject to aggregate re-
source constraints. Through a benevolent social planner (such as a village or fam-
ily head) Pareto weights are allocated to households participating in risk-sharing
arrangements and state-contingent transfers are chosen to maximize household
utility subject to aggregate resource constraints. A first best outcome from this
arrangement is achieved when households are fully insured against idiosyncratic
shocks. This implies that the marginal utility of consumption of households is
independent of idiosyncratic (but not covariate) shocks since household consump-
tion is independent of household income. Where risk-sharing is assumed to occur
at village level (i.e. all households within the village support each other), full
insurance implies that household consumption is only sensitive to the size of in-
come/resources aggregated at village level -the full risk sharing hypothesis . Given
that transfers are specified to be chosen by the social planner, details of the risk-
sharing arrangement such as the number of support/transfers offered to a given
household are ignored. The primary focus of the hypothesis is on the extent to
which households’ are fully insured against idiosyncratic shocks.
To empirically examined the full risk sharing hypothesis, Townsend (1994) argued
that under complete insurance, once aggregate income (or more broadly, aggregate
resources) is controlled for, changes in household income should not significantly
affect household consumption36. Put differently, growth in household consumption
should be independent of idiosyncratic shocks to household income under full risk
35Although much of the literature on informal insurance considers inter-household risk sharing, few others
have also considered within household risk sharing- Dercon and Krishnan (2000) examined risk sharing between
husbands and wives in Southern Ethiopia.
36A modified version of this test is provided in Deaton (1997). He argued that under complete insurance, growth
rate of consumption is the same for all households thus cross-sectional variances must be zero.
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sharing. This is tested by regressing household consumption on aggregate income
(or consumption), household income and indicators of idiosyncratic shocks. In
terms of defining risk sharing groups, Townsend (1994) and several other studies
that followed, examined the extent of risk sharing at village level (commonly re-
ferred to as village economies). By this definition, it is implied that risk sharing
occurs between all households in the same village and thus idiosyncratic shocks are
fully insured. Townsend (1994)- Indian villages; Townsend (1995)- Thia Villages;
Udry (1994) informal credit between households in Northern Nigeria. Dercon and
Krishnan (2000) among several others [See Dercon (2005) for a recent review].37
The motivation for defining risk sharing groups at village level is motivated on
theoretical grounds. Given that aggregate resources are used to finance trans-
fers to mitigate shocks, larger groups (all else equal) are by definition expected
to better insure risk. This is substantiated by the belief that within villages, in-
teractions between neighboring households facilitate reciprocal exchanges of gifts
especially in times of need thereby serving as informal insurance arrangements.
(Dercon (2005)- chap.2). The results from several studies on full risk sharing indi-
cate that while informal insurance is effective in mitigating idiosyncratic shocks,
it is incomplete thereby providing statistical evidence against the full-risk sharing
hypothesis-Townsend (1994); Deaton (1997); Ligon et al. (2002).
Statistical evidence against the full-risk sharing hypothesis at village-level raised
further interest in understanding the extent to which informal insurance is effec-
tive. In light of this, factors responsible for deviation from first best outcome of
complete insurance have attracted significant attention the literature. In partic-
ular, costs associated with monitoring and enforcement of agreements have been
cited as reasons for incomplete insurance. Given that risk sharing arrangements
in developing countries are often implicit (without formal contracts or legal in-
stitutions to enforce agreements), constraints due to information asymmetry and
commitment are likely to influence equilibrium outcomes. In village risk sharing
groups, monitoring and enforcement costs are potentially high due to the number
of households involved. This may result in opportunistic behavior such as moral
37Studies using US data include Mace (1991)- Consumer expenditure; and Cochrane (1991)-income Dynamics.
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hazard creating excessive risk taking. Under these conditions, the possibility of
full insurance (first best outcome) through these arrangements is constrained by
the trade-off between risk sharing and moral hazard. Thus, incomplete insurance
(as reported in several studies) becomes second best. These constraints also raise
concerns about the stability of risk sharing groups. Under weak enforcement mech-
anisms, large risk sharing groups may break into smaller coalitions affecting the
effectiveness of informal insurance.
These concerns have been formally incorporated into risk sharing models as con-
straints on efficient risk sharing. On limited commitment, (Ligon et al. (2000,
2002)) among several others that followed] reported a better fit of risk sharing
data on a limited commitment model of informal insurance. Typically, these stud-
ies use game theoretic approaches in which gains from participation in repeated
agreements to share risk are compared with gains from autarkic behavior- the
sub-game perfect equilibrium (Attanasio and Rıos-Rull (2000)). More formally,
this adds a participation constraint to ensure agreements are self-enforceable (plus
the resource constraint) to the maximization problem. Another strand of the lit-
erature also considers the extent to which imperfect information constraints full
insurance- Ligon et al. (1998) among others. Similarly, concerns about information
asymmetries are incorporated by adding an incentive compatibility constraint to
imply that participants must find it beneficial to be truthful to the risk sharing
model.
Drawing from these contributions, later studies examined the extent of risk-sharing
between groups of households within villages (rather than at village level) with con-
cerns about information asymmetry and limited commitment in mind. Given the
implicit and informal nature risk-sharing arrangements as substitutes to formal
insurance, it is reasonable to expect mutual support to be more effective between
some households within a given village. These groups are likely to be smaller and
can be exogenously identified on the basis of households sharing common social
traits- kinship, ethnicity/tribe, religion or co-members of semi-formal organiza-
tions. Restrictions on memberships and/or implicit social norms (such as altru-
ism, reciprocity and guilt/shame) are assumed to enforce agreements and punish
deviations from agreements of mutual support within these groups. Similarly, in-
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formation asymmetries about the occurrence of shocks are less likely constraint
insurance through risk sharing groups. Through repeated interactions due to kin-
ship, shared neighborhood and shared activities overtime, households are better
able to observe risk-sharing partners thereby lowering possibilities of information
asymmetry. However, constraints due to the imperfect information about house-
hold income and enforceability of agreements may have significant bearing on the
efficiency of informal insurance.
• Family/kinship ties (Kinnan and Townsend (2012)), tribal/ethnic identities
[Grimard (1997); Munshi (2011) and Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016)], neighborhoods-
Murgai et al. (2002); Goldstein (2000).
• Udry (1994)- informal credit in the form of state contingent transfers among
households in Nigeria; Fafchamps and Lund (1997)- informal loan exchanges
and transfers among households in Ethiopia; Grimard (1997)- tribal identities
in Ivory Coast;
The results obtained from these studies illustrate that while not all idiosyncratic
shocks are fully insured, informally devised insurance mechanisms improve house-
hold welfare by cushioning the effects of shocks- partial risk sharing . The frequency
of shocks of various forms in these environments added to constraints due to en-
forceability of agreements makes informal insurance insufficient.
4.2.3 Risk-Sharing Networks
An empirical concern in studying informal insurance through risk-sharing ar-
rangements is the need to use appropriate identification and definition of the man-
ner through which risks is shared. Exogenously identified groups as discussed
above have been commonly used in the previous studies. However, recent studies
in the literature have considered endogenous risk sharing arrangements. This re-
quires an understanding of household interaction beyond a single exogenous group
but rather a composition of family, neighborhood and co-member relationships
among others. This growing body of research has been characterized by several
studies which have attempted to incorporate game theoretic approaches into the
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social networks literature to examine issues such as network formation, dynamics
and structure- see Jackson et al. (2008). These contributions have been crucial in
the growth of the literature on risk-sharing through household networks.
Apart from risk-sharing groups, households can also rely on the set of individuals
they interact with- their social network. Through these interactions, insurance is
achieved as implicit agreements of mutual support between households. This defi-
nition of risk-sharing differs from exogenous risk-sharing groups since it is defined
at household level as a network of links representing the various individuals a given
household supports and/or relies on for support. As a result, the complex nature of
risk-sharing arrangements between households and its heterogeneity across house-
holds can be captured.
In addition, through the dynamics in the structure of household networks which
can be obtained in repeatedly observed networks can be used to examine the ef-
fectiveness of informal insurance through households’ ability to mitigate shocks.
Changes in network features such as composition and attributes of links can also
be used to examine various aspects of risk-sharing arrangements. By observing the
composition of a given households’ social network at link level, reasonable expla-
nations for the existence of risk-sharing links can be obtained. Similarly, through
the features of these links and their changes overtime, reasonable hypotheses can
be formulated about possible constraints to risk-sharing such as the possibility
of limited commitment by non-family members; or information asymmetry about
efforts of distant and new links38.
However, access to data on social networks with information about links which
facilitate insurance and other challenges such as the endogeniety of networks have
limited research on these issues. To examine the effectiveness of insurance pro-
vided through social networks, knowledge of the structure of the entire network is
required. This is often a major constraint since the costs associated with conduct-
ing a census of household networks in a given community is often high. In several
studies, a sample of the network is obtained by asking households to list a cer-
38A set of studies building on the work of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) have examined the dynamics of social
networks through the changes in links and structures of networks overtime. The concept of pair-wise stability
where households decisions to make and break links follows utility maximization is common in this literature.
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tain number or type of individuals they are linked to. Empirically, this introduces
measurement error due to the truncation of network size which biases results on
the effects of social networks on economic outcomes. Krishnan and Shaorshadze
(2015) compared a village census of social networks with the survey data used
in this chapter. They reported two possible sources of measurement error in the
surveys: under-reporting of links, and difference between directed and undirected
network of relatives in the survey. Therefore the challenge in using survey data
to back out the effect of social networks on economic outcomes is complicated by
the fact that the measurement error in such data may not be random as found by
Krishnan and Shaorshadze (2015). Further examination of this error by comparing
census and survey data also showed that links with relatives are significantly more
likely to be reported in the survey (i.e. less likely to be censored). To deal with
this issue, Advani et al. (2014) propose that information obtained in the survey
can be used to predict network structure of households which is then used to back
out its effects on household outcomes.
With these limitations in mind, we use data on households’ risk-sharing networks
in rural Ethiopia provided by the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS) to
examine the persistence of links within these networks. As risk-sharing links, we
examine the extent to which link persistence is influenced by strategic considera-
tion to maximize gains from insurance or social factors such as altruism. In two
rounds of the survey collected in 2004 and 2009, households were asked to list and
provide the characteristics and type of relationship they have with five individuals
they rely on for support. Responses to these questions in both rounds constitute
our definition of risk-sharing networks at link-level as oppose to exogenous groups
within communities. In light of the concerns highlighted above (especially in terms
of the truncation of the network size), we consider these links as an approximation
of the household’s core network which facilitates risk-sharing. Another advantage
of our definition of risk-sharing arrangements is its ability to capture the different
relationships through which risk is shared in communities of developing countries-
family ties, friends and neighbors, co-members of local associations etc. By con-
structing a panel of households interviewed in both rounds, we identify persistent
links as individuals listed as risk-sharing partners in both years. Using this defi-
nition, we examine the factors that drive link persistence using attributes of links
154
in 2004 and in 2009. The results from the former are interpreted as causal ef-
fects whereas the effects from the latter are interpreted as mere correlations due
to endogeniety concerns. The analysis of these results is done through the lens of
strategic consideration such as maximizing gains from insurance or social factors
such as altruism.
As mentioned earlier, econometric concerns such as endogeniety exist in the use of
self-reported social networks. In addition, given that the full network structure is
not observable, the truncation of the network size has empirical implications. We
draw from recent contributions in the literature in dealing with these concerns.
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4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Data & Conceptual Framework
The Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (ERHS) is longitudinal household dataset
which is representative of rural Ethiopia. Data collection started in 1989 with fol-
low up rounds in 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2004 and 2009 summing up to 7 rounds.
Over the years, the coverage of the survey has been expanded from an initial num-
ber of 6 administrative units to 15 across 4 of Ethiopia’s 11 regions surveying 1,477
households. See Dercon (2004b) for a detailed discussion of the dataset.
The surveyed households were asked about a wide range of questions including
their agricultural activities, consumption and interactions with other households
in their communities. We use the two most recent rounds of the dataset (2004 and
2009) in which households were asked their networks. Using this data:
• We combine link level data of households’ risk-sharing networks for households
surveyed in both periods.
• Persistent links are identified as links reported in both periods.
• At link level, we estimate the factors which influence link persistence using
attributes of links in 2004.
• We interpret these effects along the lines of strategic consideration to maxi-
mize gains from insurance or social factors such as altruism.
Below a description of risk-sharing networks as obtained in the data and a com-
parison of attributes of persistent and non-persistent links is presented.
Household Risk-Sharing Networks
We begin by examining the characteristics of household networks among farm-
ers in Rural Ethiopia. This section builds on the work by Dercon et al. (2005) and
Hoddinott et al. (2009) by extending the analysis to include an additional round
of the survey collected in 2009.
Information about risk-sharing arrangements between households is obtained from
household heads’ responses to the questions about “...[at most] 5 most important
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people you can rely on in time of need for support both within village or elsewhere”.
The attributes of these individuals such as their endowments/assets, location, re-
lationship with household head; and type of relationship(s) such as money lending,
labor-sharing, sharecropping; and shared activities such as co-membership in local
associations are provided by the household head responding to the questions. All
the information relating to the risk-sharing agreement between a household and a
given link is provided by the household head being interviewed. This includes the
number of links reported by a household and the attributes of each link. We inter-
pret individuals listed by households in both rounds as links within risk-sharing
networks. It is assumed that insurance contracts through these arrangements take
the form of state contingent transfers to insure households against idiosyncratic
shocks. Enforcement of agreements is assumed to be facilitated by social norms
and quid-pro-quo which is typical in informal systems of mutual support.
We combine network information at link level for households interviewed in both
rounds to identify persistent links. From the recent round of data collected in 2009,
persistent links are defined as individuals listed by a given household in both 2009
and 2004. We examine the factors which influence link persistence through differ-
ences in the characteristics of persistent and non-persistent links as a preliminary
step. More on this is provided in the section on the empirical technique.
A couple of striking features about these inter-household relationships can be iden-
tified from the data as presented in the summary statistics below. A description of
variables is provided in the appendix in table (35). Although the broad architec-
ture of these networks may not have changed significantly between 2004 and 2009
across households as shown in the table, the composition of the networks in terms
of the links listed by households are more likely to change overtime. The extent
to which these changes are strategically made to maximize gains from insurance
or driven by social factors is the main objective of the chapter. In what follows,
we discuss the attributes of the links within these networks as summarized by the
statistics below with this objective in mind.
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Table 27: Summary Statistics of Links in Risk-sharing Networks
2004 2009
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Network size 4.0 1.384 4.60 0.994
maintained link (=1)∗ 0.307 0.461 0.29 0.454
proportion of stable links 0.29 0.254
Measure of Link Visibility∗∗ 0.06 0.308 0.409 1.15
Number of Oxes 1.441 3.161 1.286 1.927
Number of other People 4.317 9.149 5.824 11.70
Age 42.287 13.856 42.721 13.679
Near plots 0.275 0.447 0.289 0.453
HHs with more land 0.402 0.49 0.385 0.487
HHs with less land 0.344 0.475 0.40 0.488
HHs with the same land 0.252 0.432 0.224 0.417
Number of adult males 1.905 2.002 1.785 1.561
Neighboring members 0.594 0.491 0.670 0.470
Member in Same village 0.277 0.447 0.242 0.428
Member in Different village 0.125 0.331 0.088 0.284
Members with Kinship ties 0.655 0.476 0.694 0.461
Neighbors with Kinship ties 0.55 0.498 0.618 0.486
Members in Same IDDIRR 0.572 0.495 0.575 0.494
Members in Same Mahber 0.213 0.409 0.188 0.391
Members in Same Iqqub 0.07 0.255 0.06 0.238
Share Cropping Relations 0.054 0.227 0.094 0.293
Oxen sharing Relations 0.23 0.421 0.265 0.441
Loan Exchange Relation 0.492 0.5 0.387 0.487
Labor Sharing Relation 0.436 0.496 0.449 0.497
Link supports HH. 0.858 0.349 0.851 0.356
Link supported by HH 0.911 0.284 0.898 0.303
Link Helped by HH 0.796 0.403 0.811 0.392
Head’s Father relies on Link 0.391 0.488 0.552 0.497
N 4,780 5,631
∗In 2004= links repeated in 2009; in 2009= links mentioned in 2004
∗∗Calculated as the number of times a link is mentioned by others within the Community
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Overall, more links were reported by households in 2009 than in 2004. A total
of 4,780 links were reported in 2004 by 1,204 households compared to 5,631 links
reported by the same households in 2009. This observation can be interpreted
in various ways such as indication of increased integration among households in
rural Ethiopia in 2009 relative to 2009; increase need for informal insurance ar-
rangements due to missing insurance markets, the occurrence and/or persistence
of more idiosyncratic shocks among others. Other possible explanations beyond
the scope of this chapter include macroeconomic or other policy changes (such as
agricultural support services) creating increase collaboration between households
and expansion of social networks. Comparing links listed by households surveyed
in both 2004 and 2009, persistent links represent an average of 29% of all links
listed in 2009. The same result is obtained using historical network data in 2004.
Despite the differences in the number of links reported in both rounds- on average
30% of links listed in 2004 were re-listed in 2009. At household level, this implies
approximately 2 individuals in a given network of 5 risk-sharing partners were
maintained over the five-year period.
In addition to this measure of link persistence, the data also indicates that some
of these relationships span across generations-almost 40% of links listed in 2004;
and 55% of links in 2009 had/have relationships with the household head’s father.
It can also be observed from the summary of the data that links within these net-
works are heterogeneous along several dimensions. The characteristics of links in
these networks such as age, number of oxes, number of adult males, land endow-
ments and connectedness with other households; the relationship among house-
holds both social such as family members and neighbors; and type of mutual
support such as money lending, labor sharing etc. vary across links and by exten-
sion across households. Through these differences in the attributes of links, we can
examine the factors which influence link persistence overtime and interpret these
effects through strategic and/or social factors.
Although risk-sharing arrangements (at least in the context of the chapter) are
implicit, evidence of insurance through these networks can be identified from at-
tributes of links within the network such as reciprocity, proximity, relative differ-
ences in endowments etc. It can be observed from the data that support provided
through these networks is highly reciprocal. On average, more than 80% of links
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listed in both years provide support to households and are supported by house-
holds listing them as risk-sharing partners. Similarly, almost 80% of links are also
reported to have received support from the household in the past. Reciprocity
is important in these arrangements since in the absence of legal institutions, en-
forcement of risk-sharing agreements is commonly achieved through quid-pro-quo.
Other features such as proximity and differences in endowment such as land are ob-
served. The majority of risk-sharing partners are neighboring household members-
representing almost 60% of the total links listed in both rounds. This is followed
by other neighboring households within the same village constituting over 20%
of links. Apart from spatial proximity, social distance in terms kinship is also
common among households sharing risk. Family members represent more than
65% of links in both rounds. Other indicators of proximity such as near plots are
also are also captured. Proximity as captured by these attributes is related to the
provision of insurance through constraints such as commitment and information
asymmetry. Where risk-sharing partners are distant and not socially obliged (as
the case might be with non-family members) enforcement of risk-sharing arrange-
ments might be constrained. The relative difference in endowments such as land
among households is expected to influence the formation of risk-sharing arrange-
ments. For instance, to maximize gains from insurance, households are likely to
rely on households with more land since they are likely to have more influence in
society (since land is centrally allocated in Ethiopia) and better insurers. However,
the difference in the proportion of links with more land and those with less land
than a given household is small. This is perhaps because, where risk is shared with
family members and neighbors as shown above, considerations about differences
in endowments are likely to be of second order importance.
Other relationships between households (such as labor and oxen sharing, money-
lending and sharing cropping relationships; and shared activities such as member-
ships in local associations) are also likely to reinforce risk-sharing. Labor shar-
ing and money-lending relationships appear to be fairly common among house-
holds thereby insuring households against shocks on labor supply and income loss.
Through shared memberships, trust can be built and information asymmetry about
efforts and shocks can be relaxed thereby making informal insurance more effec-
tive.
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In general, although network size is truncated at five members per household, the
average size in the data is four members. Therefore, even though concerns about
the effect of the truncation of network size in examining the effectiveness of infor-
mal insurance exist, an average of four members (below the upper limit) provides
statistical support that a network size of five might be a reasonable approxima-
tion. As an additional control, the number of other people within the household’s
network is also captured in both rounds. This number varies greatly across house-
holds and may serve as alternative measure of household connectedness and also
for use as additional information in dealing with the truncation of risk sharing
network.
These features (longevity, diversity and proximity of the links) are broadly in
line with the theoretical predictions that for social networks to be effective tools
for informal insurance, they must ensure trust and lower enforcement and moni-
toring costs. Other features of these links such as shared activities ranging from
money lending, to labor sharing; share cropping and oxen sharing arrangements;
and also shared membership in other informal organizations such as Iddirr (fu-
neral associations), Iqqub (borrowing and lending societies) and mahabir (social
groups) will also contribute towards strengthening these relationships as systems
of mutual support.
In summary, through interactions between neighboring households and/or fam-
ily members, households are able to devise informal insurance contracts through
mutual support based on the principle of reciprocity. We consider the nature of
these arrangements in household networks where links are defined as other house-
holds/individuals on whom a given household relies on for support. The reciprocal
nature of these relationships also contributes to our identification- the individu-
als a household is connected to may not necessarily be those they share risk with.
However, by only focusing on the people they rely on for support and who also rely
on them for support (even where the agreements are only implicit), a reasonable
approximation of a household’s risk sharing network is obtained. Helped received
through these links are also largely obtained from neighbors and relatives. These
features illustrate the fact that networks in these environments are quite hetero-
geneous across several dimensions which are ignored in studies where risk-sharing
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arrangements are defined as membership in informal organizations or links with
neighbors.
Persistent vs. Non-Persistent Links
As a preliminary step to understanding the dynamics in risk sharing networks,
we examine differences between persistent and non-persistent links by means of a
t-test on the differences in averages. The objective at this stage is to illustrate
differences in the attributes of persistent and non-persistent links. As highlighted
above, persistent links represent links maintained over a five-year period (i.e. listed
in both 2004 and 2009). Non-persistent links on the other hand are links that did
not reappear in 2009 from 2004. As an additional step, we also examine differences
in the attributes of persistent links and new links listed in 2009 to examine the
extent to which differences in persistence of links is influenced by differences in
link attributes which are related to strategic consideration or social factors. The
results from the t-tests are presented in table (28) below.
The p-values indicate that persistent links appear to be statistically different from
non-persistent links across several attributes as indicated by the significance of the
differences in averages of several attributes. Significant differences in attributes are
observed between maintained links from 2004 to 2009 and new links in 2009. For
some of the features of the links, the average differences are small (albeit sta-
tistically significant). However, the differences in the averages of other features
are relatively large. For instance, maintained links are on average older, more
visible and often have nearer plots than new links. Similar pattern is also ob-
served in household visibility/connectedness and endowments where maintained
links have on average more land, more adult males and more oxen and also appear
to be more connected with other households. These differences are also observed
between maintained and new links in terms of the type of relationship that ex-
ist between households especially money lending and labor sharing arrangements;
shared membership in local associations; and social proximity- kinship and neigh-
borhood.
On the basis of the observations from the data discussed above, the chapter
attempts to examine the extent to which maintained links in risk sharing networks
are influenced by strategic considerations to maximize utility from insurance or
162
Table 28: T-Test of Differences in Attributes of Persistence & Non-persistent Links in 2004 &
2009.
2004 data 2009 Data
Variable Persistent
Link in09
Non-
Persistent
Link
p-value Persistent
Link in04
New
Link
p-value
Measure of Link Visibility∗ 0.087 0.048 0.000*** 0.502 0.370 0.000***
Age 41.905 42.456 0.203 45.028 41.77 0.000***
Near plots 0.327 0.252 0.000*** 0.355 0.262 0.000***
HHs with more land 0.408 0.402 0.719 0.439 0.364 0.000***
HHs with less land 0.324 0.353 0.053* 0.333 0.413 0.000***
HHs with the same land 0.268 0.245 0.088* 0.228 0.223 0.636
Number of Oxes 1.399 1.460 0.537 1.445 1.221 0.000***
Num of adult males 1.813 1.946 0.034** 1.944 1.720 0.000***
Members with Larger hh. size 0.449 0.432 0.299 0.504 0.449 0.000***
Neighboring members 0.664 0.568 0.000*** 0.722 0.649 0.000***
Members in Same village 0.251 0.288 0.007*** 0.203 0.258 0.000***
Member in Different village 0.086 0.143 0.000*** 0.075 0.093 0.032**
Members with Kinship ties 0.701 0.634 0.000*** 0.724 0.682 0.002***
Neighbors with Kinship ties 0.627 0.516 0.000*** 0.658 0.601 0.000***
Members in Same IDDIRR 0.602 0.559 0.005*** 0.628 0.554 0.000***
Members in Same Mahber 0.215 0.212 0.828 0.212 0.178 0.003***
Members in Same Iqqub 0.083 0.064 0.016** 0.072 0.056 0.021**
Share Cropping Relations 0.054 0.055 0.958 0.115 0.086 0.001***
Oxen sharing Relations 0.237 0.227 0.441 0.295 0.252 0.001***
Loan Exchange Relation 0.505 0.486 0.208 0.423 0.373 0.001***
Labor Sharing Relation 0.474 0.419 0.000*** 0.502 0.427 0.000***
Member supports HH. 0.879 0.849 0.005*** 0.867 0.844 0.027**
Member supported by HH 0.927 0.905 0.013** 0.914 0.891 0.009***
Member Helped by HH 0.823 0.784 0.002*** 0.829 0.803 0.024**
Head’s Father relies on Link 0.383 0.394 0.490 0.557 0.551 0.675
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
∗Calculated as the number of times a link is mentioned by others within the Community
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social factors such as altruism.
4.3.2 Theoretical Model
Conceptual Framework
Our context and data bears some resemblance with what is presented in Genicot
and Ray (2003). We assume that there are N households in a given community. In
the absence of formal insurance and exposure to various forms of shocks (rain vari-
ation, health related shocks, rising food prices etc.), households have incentives to
internalize missing insurance markets through their relationships and interactions
with other households. The formation of these arrangements may be sensitive of
households’ need for insurance or social factors such as altruism. The differences in
the underlying objective of risk-sharing may be reflected in the changes in struc-
ture and composition of such arrangements overtime. Genicot and Ray (2003)
discussed certain conditions typical in these environments, which affect the for-
mation and changes in risk-sharing groups/networks. Large groups and networks
are particularly susceptible to breaking into smaller coalitions overtime thereby
affecting the level of insurance provided. Households facing binding constraints
in the use of self-insurance strategies against shocks either due to existing market
conditions or the prevalence and persistence of shocks, mutual support between
households within a community are common options to pool resources with the
objective of facilitating insurance. This process involves choosing links (size of
group) and transfer schemes (contingent on a given state of nature) to maximize
expected utility. The nature of this utility has been examined through: strategic
considerations such as the need for insurance; or social factors such as altruism.
We examine this distinction through changes in network composition (such as at-
tributes of persistent and severed ties).
To begin, we assume the following about risk-sharing networks in the context of
this chapter:
• Links in risk-sharing networks represent individuals/households on whom a
given household relies on for support in times of need such as when faced
with a shock. We assume that these shocks are largely idiosyncratic in nature
such as labor shortage, income loss/credit constraints, food shortage, livestock
loss etc. It is also assumed that the links within risk-sharing networks are
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independent in a given network since they are not directly linked; but they
overlap across households in a given community since two households might
share a common risk-sharing partner(s). As a result, a given link is viewed
as a coalition formed between two households such that the network is a
collection of coalitions formed by the household to share risk.
• To facilitate insurance through social networks, households make two deci-
sions:
– forming links with other households- this involves determining the links
within a household’s larger network to share risk with in a given period
of time and the evolution of such relationships overtime- changes in the
composition of the risk-sharing arrangement overtime.
– Designing the transfer schemes (contingent on given states of nature)
which facilitate insurance.
• These decisions- especially the transfer scheme; is likely to differ across links
within a network with heterogeneous links- family members, friends and
neighbors, etc. This might be as a result of the fact that the underlying
objective for the formation of risk-sharing might differ across links in a net-
work. We consider two of such objectives as discussed in the literature- to
maximize gains from insurance and social factors.
With these in mind, we examine the factors which influence persistent links in risk-
sharing networks overtime and the extent to which these factors can be interpreted
as social and/or strategic factors which drive the formation of these informal ar-
rangements. What follows builds on the work by Agbaglah (2014), Genicot and
Ray (2003) and Fitzsimons et al. (2015).
Risk-Sharing Networks
Following Agbaglah (2014) , let households’ social network (the individuals it
is linked to) by gı for all ı of such households in the community. From these
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relationships, households form risk-sharing network Ig which overlap across house-
holds. It is further assumed that in any given period of time, with a probability
p (θ), households face a given state of nature θ ∈ Θ. For simplicity, we assume
that θ ∈ Θ = {h, `} and p (θ) = (ρ, (1− ρ)) respectively. In each state, an income
distribution y (θ) = (yı (θ))ı∈N is realized with y
ı (h) > yı (`) ∀ı ∈ N . The enforce-
ment of agreements to share risk is implicit. Since institutions such as courts may
not be available or accessible in rural communities, enforcement of risk-sharing is
often facilitated by societal norms which ensure that households facing negative
shocks receive transfers; and those deviating from agreements are punished. To
account for the possibility of overlapping relationships within a households’ net-
work (and hence risk-sharing parters), there are s possible links within the network
Ig-s ∈ Ig39. Thus in any given period of time, household ı makes net-transfers zısh
when θ = h; and zıs` when θ = ` within s for ı ∈ s with transfers received entering
as positive values and transfers made entering as negative values. Thus in any
given time period, household consumption and transfers are represented by the
following equations respectively:
cı = (ρyıh + (1− ρ) yı`) + (zıh + zı`)
zı =
∑
ı∈s,s∈Ig
(zısh + z
ı
s`)
On the basis of this setup, households derive utility from consumption and also
from the composition of their network (such as altruist tendencies towards rela-
tives, spill-over effects in the form of market information, farming practices, etc.).
For this reason household utility comprises of utility from consumption u (c); and
gains from the composition of the household network- f (dı (g)) . We maintain the
assumptions made by Agbaglah (2014) about the u and f : u (.) is smooth, strictly
concave and increasing; whereas f is smooth and increasing. dı (g) represents the
total number of links in i’s network. Note that households in autarky only derive
utility from consumption since f (0) = 0.
The focus of the chapter is to examine the attributes of links which influence
39In our setting, s can be thought as a link between household ı and another
household - where ı reports that it shares risk with . All such links that ı has
out of her network form the risk-sharing network Ig.
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the persistence of risk-sharing arrangements between households to understand
the underlying objective of forming risk-sharing networks through changes in the
composition of the network overtime. Therefore, we assume that the decision by
households ı and  linked through s to severe or maintain risk-sharing ties over-
time can be strategically done to maximize gains from insurance or influenced by
social factors such as altruism. Let deviation from a set D ⊆ N be defined as
when ı deviates from all  ∈ D where set D is included in the union of ı’s links-
Sı. Following a deviation, the deviant ı receives a punishment (the severity of
which differs both across links and networks and may occur in the form of loss of
relationship, trust etc) and is left with a residual network gR ( g. The difference
between gR and g (in terms of size and composition) is sensitive to the severity
of the punishment imposed by the societal norms. In terms of consumption, the
deviating household gets cıD and c
ı
R after punishment.
More formally, in the absence of any deviation between periods, households receive
utility of the following form with an additional assumption about the functional
form of the utility function. We assume that it follows a CRRA with δ ∈ [0, 1] as
the discount factor. The typical assumption in the literature is that the discount
factor is close to unity- high degree of persistence contributes to the effectiveness
of risk-sharing arrangements. Furthermore, in the context of this paper, this as-
sumption is motivated by the fact that the choice of maintaining the composition
of a network or make adjustments is an intertemporal arbitrage decision which is
likely to be affected households’ valuation of future utility.40
Uı (c
ı, g) +
δ
1− δ (ρUı (c
ı
h, g) + (1− ρ)Uı (cı`, g)) (56)
In the case of a deviation, the deviant receives the following discounted utility:
Uı (c
ı
D, g) +
δ
1− δ (ρUı (c
ı
Rh, gR) + (1− ρ)Uı (cıR`, gR)) (57)
Thus the incentive compatibility constraint for networks be immune to deviation
and hence maintain their composition (i.e. links forming these networks persisting
overtime) takes the following form:
40 Agbaglah (2014) relaxes this assumption to examine the sensitivity of stability of informal insurance insti-
tutions to different degrees of patience.
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Uı (c
ı, g)+
δ
1− δ (ρUı (c
ı
h, g) + (1− ρ)Uı (cı`, g)) ≥ Uı (cıD, g)+
δ
1− δ (ρUı (c
ı
Rh, gR) + (1− ρ)Uı (cıR`, gR))
(58)
∀ı ∈ N ; D ( Sı; gR ⊂ g.
With this structure and following Agbaglah (2014), changes in network links can
be defined as follows. Suppose θ0 ∈ Θ is the current state of the world; and
β ≡ (θ0, ı, D, gR) and F as the collection of all such tuples. Then Ig is stable if
and only if, for all β ∈ F :
uı (c
ı
D (θ0))−uı (cı (θ0)) <
δ
1− δ
{∑
θ
p (θ) [uı (c
ı (θ))− uı (cıR (θ))]
}
+
δ
1− δ {f (dı (g))− f (dı (gR))}
(59)
The equation above indicates the two effects of severing ties or breaking away
from risk-sharing agreements- the effect on households’ ability to ensure smooth
consumption when faced with a shock; and the effect on indirect gains from main-
taining relations such as altruist gains in preserving relations.
In the context of this chapter, strategic consideration is indicated by the first com-
ponent of the RHS of equation (59): i.e. δ
1−δ {
∑
θ p (θ) [uı (c
ı (θ))− uı (cıR (θ))]};
whereas social factors are indicated by the second component of the RHS of equa-
tion (59): δ
1−δ {f (dı (g))− f (dı (gR))}. With further simplification of the states
of the world into two, the first component can be re-written as follows:
δ
1− δ {[ρuı (c
ı
h) + (1− ρ)uı (cı`)]− [ρuı (cıRh) + (1− ρ)uı (cıR`)]}
i.e. the discounted difference in utility between the two states of the world follow-
ing changes in network structure. Genicot and Ray (2003) refers to the difference
in the marginal utilities of the two states of the world as the need for insurance.
This difference measures the uncertainty associated with facing risk and hence the
need to pool resources. This can be formalized as thus:
u′(c`,)−u′(ch, )
u′(ch)
> 1−α
δρ(1−ρn−1) .
The second component indicates gains other than insurance derived from keeping
links overtime. This is particularly important in a risk-sharing network (as op-
pose to group) where membership is not identified based on common social traits.
Rather, these arrangements are often implicit and exist between households who
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may be related differently- relatives, neighbors, friends etc. As such, changes in
the composition of the network overtime may be sensitive to these differences in
relations which may be influenced by social factors- family members may be so-
cially obliged to support each other. Adhering to these social conventions may
generate some form of utility captured in the second term of the equation above.
In summary, the persistence of links in risk-sharing networks overtime maybe
strategically influenced by household’s need for insurance or other gains such as
fulfillment of social obligations due to altruism. We consider these two factors in
the chapter.
4.3.3 Econometric Model
Equation (59) shows that changes in links of risk-sharing arrangements overtime
maybe influenced by two factors: strategic consideration and social factors. Our
objective is to examine the extent to which persistent links in risk-sharing networks
are explained by these factors. Using two rounds of data on households’ networks
spaced five years apart, we identify links which are maintained in both rounds and
estimate the factors which influence the persistence of links. In doing this, we
define persistent links using a binary variable which is expressed as a function of
link attributes such as assets, land endowments, history and type of relationship
among other features; and estimated using a logit model as illustrated in the equa-
tion below: We analyze the effect of these attributes on link persistence through
the lens of strategic consideration and social factors as identified in equation (59).
Bı = α0 + dα1 + xıα2 + εı (60)
Where Bı is a binary variable indicating that a link  listed by household ı in
2004 is also listed in 2009- ie. persistent link=1 and 0 otherwise; d is a vector of
link characteristics; xıis a vector of household-specific network characteristics and
αs are parameters to be estimated.
Link Level Analysis of Persistence
Given that there are two rounds of data, we can examine the persistence of links
using attributes of links as reported in 2004 at link level. Therefore, we consider the
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estimating equation (60) using round 1 (collected in 2004) network information on
persistent and non-persistent links. In using this data, link persistence is expressed
as a function of 2004 features of links which can be assumed to exogenous. As a
result, a causal interpretation on the effect of link attributes on persistence can be
made. Intuitively, the use of this approach is set on the premise that households’
decision to maintain a link in 2009 or not is influenced by the attributes of the
link in the previous period. We estimate two specifications of equation (60) at link
level:
• Using attributes of links to examine link persistence without household fixed
effects.
• Unobserved household heterogeneity may affect households’ choice of risk-
sharing partners and by extension the persistence of links overtime. To min-
imize this effect, we incorporate household fixed effects for households with
multiple links at the expense of a decrease in the number of observations.
Household Level Analysis of the Persistence of Links
The persistence of links within a given risk-sharing network may be interdepen-
dent. This implies that a household’s decision to maintain a given link between the
two periods may be affected by the status of other links. This cannot be captured
in the analysis of persistence of links at link level with standard errors clustered at
household level. This approach is in line with our definition of links in theoretical
model as a relationship between two households one of whom provides the informa-
tion about the risk-sharing agreement. However, at household level, the decision
to maintain a given link may be influenced by the status of other links within the
risk-sharing network establishing inter-dependence in the persistence of links over-
time. This is likely to occur in an instance where a household chooses to maintain
a link because of changes in the arrangement or existence of another link. Due to
these concerns, equation (60) is also estimated at household level rather than at
link level. This is done by using the number of persistent links as a proportion of
network size in 2009 which is examined using network features in 2004 since they
are exogenous. This is also done using network information from 2009, but as be-
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fore, we interpret these results as correlations due to concerns about endogeniety.
In essence, we collapse the network information from link level to household level
where attributes of links including persistence are expressed as averages at house-
hold level and estimate equation (60) using OLS. Since the dependent variable is
bounded between zero and one- where zero implies no links listed in 2004 were
re-listed in 2009; and one implies all links listed in 2009 where listed in 2004; we
also use a Tobit model with upper and lower bounds. The results indicate that
attributes such as kinship and proximity significantly affect the persistence of links.
Testable Hypothesis:
We use this model to examine the extent to which persistent links are driven by
maximizing gains from insurance or social factors. As highlighted in the previous
section, the need for insurance and social factors such as altruism as factors which
influence risk-sharing arrangements can be identified through the effect of link
attributes (such as wealth, history and type of relationship, family/kinship ties
etc.) on link persistence overtime. More formally, we test the following hypothesis:
• Do links in risk-sharing networks persist overtime because they strengthen
insurance for households or because they exist between households who are
socially inclined to share risk?
In the first part of the hypothesis, we focus on attributes of links which are related
to maximizing gains from informal insurance such as differences in endowments.
A significant effect of these factors on link persistence is interpreted as households
being strategic in their decisions relating to changes in their risk-sharing networks
overtime. The second part of the hypothesis focuses on the role of social factors
such as kinship and neighborhood etc. in the persistence of risk-sharing links. We
interpret the effects of these factors as the role of altruism and other socially driven
factors on the existence of informal insurance arrangements. The table below
provides a list of link attributes through which we identify strategic consideration
and social factors as considered in examining the persistence of links.
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Table 29: Indicators of Strategic Consideration and Social Factors using Link Attributes
Link Characteristics Explanation
Household wealth: Land Endowment and
number of oxes.
Differences in land endowments are likely to indicate differences in wealth
and influence within the society. Thus maintaining links with more land
may be strategically motivated.
Measure of Link Visibility Links that are popular as indicated by the number of households that cite
them are likely to be wealthy or influencing making them socially connected.
Maintaining such links overtime is likely to result in gains in insurance.
Number of adult males Links with more adult males are likely to be more effective in insuring
households against shocks on labor supply.
Near plots. & Shared activities Households can better monitor the activities of links with whom they share
faming area and share activities such as memberships in local associations.
This is expected to establish trust and lower possibilities of information
asymmetry about effort. The possibility that these households are likely to
be neighbors and family members of the household cannot be ruled out.
Kinship/Family relation & Neighboring
Households
Households may be altruistic towards neighbors and family members and
hence be socially obliged to support them in times of need.
Shared relationships The existence of shared relationships such as labor sharing, oxen-sharing,
money-lending, share-cropping etc. among risk-sharing partners is likely to
provide insurance against shocks affecting labor supply, income, oxes and
farm output. Households are likely to maintain links with these
arrangements to ensure they are insured.
Previous exchange of support Links supported by a given household maybe maintained overtime since
risk-sharing through these networks is assumed to be enforced by
quid-pro-quo. Similarly, households due to social obligations and reciprocity
are likely to maintain links from whom they received support in the past.
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Endogeniety Issues
A major limitation in our definition of risk sharing networks is the truncation
of the network size and the role of unobserved heterogeneity in the formation of
household networks. Maertens and Barrett (2013) argued that truncation of net-
work size may bias estimates of the effect of social networks on economic outcomes.
This is likely to be case for households with more links than they are allowed to
report. It is reasonable to assume that full networks are only observed for house-
holds listing less than the upper limit. In addition, they also argued that this
technique of identifying social networks is likely to provide ’strong’ (as oppose
to ’weak’) links (also referred to as the the ’core’ social network in other stud-
ies) and prone to unobserved household heterogeneity which affect the likelihood
of including or forgetting to include a given link. These issues have significant
implication especially in studies on the diffusion and dissemination of information
within communities. However, the focus of the chapter is not on the effect of social
networks on household outcomes or the effectiveness of informal insurance through
risk-sharing networks. The objective of the chapter is to examine the persistence
of links between households within these networks and the extent to which they
are driven by strategic or social factors. It is reasonable to expect that households
are likely to pool resources and share risk with the ’strong’ links within its network
as oppose to its full network. Furthermore, in eliciting risk-sharing arrangements
between households, respondents were asked to list the five most important
individuals on whom they can rely for support in times of need. This implies
that the network being observed is likely to be the households’ core network which
serves risk-sharing purposes. These links are expected to be a sub-set of house-
holds’ larger network of households. Theoretically, this is justified by the fact
that a trade-off exists between group size and risk taking, thus we believe five is
a reasonable approximation41. The summary statistics indicated that the average
risk-sharing group has four links which implies that the average household in the
sample has less than five members, hence five being a reasonable approximation.
In light of these limitations in the network information, we analyze our results
with these concerns in mind and interpret the reported links as a representation
41Jackson et al. (2012) restricted number of friends of surveyed households to five in their study of informal
favor exchanges between households in 75 rural villages in Southern India.
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of the households’ core risk-sharing network. Thus, these links are interpreted as
an approximation of the household’s network. By defining the unit of analysis at
link level within a household’s network (rather than the full network), we identify
persistent links since this is the main focus of the chapter. By means of a binary
variable, we differentiate persistent and non-persistent links which are expressed as
a function of link attributes in 2004 to obtain interpretation of the factors driving
link persistence.
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4.4 Results
Using the two rounds of data on households’ risk-sharing group, we identify
persistent links as links listed in both rounds. At link level, we also estimate per-
sistence using the characteristics of persistent and non-persistent individual links
with and without household fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity
across households. We extent this analysis into sub-samples of links which facili-
tate specific forms of support between households- such as labor-sharing, money-
lending, kinship and neighborhood links. The marginal effects are presented below.
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Table 30: Average Marginal Effects from Logit Estimation of Link Persistence
Basic Household F.E
Variable dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err
Network size 0.0184** (0.0074) - -
Number of other People 0.0014** (0.0007) - -
Measure of Link Visibility∗ 0.08*** (0.0201) 0.0682*** (0.0265)
Age -0.0003 (0.0005) -0.0004 (0.0008)
Near plots 0.0475*** (0.0158) 0.081*** (0.0246)
Land Endowment:
Less Land=1 -0.0285* (0.0172) -0.0267 (0.0263)
About the Same=1 0.0106 (0.0187) -0.006 (0.0259)
Number of Oxen -0.0013 (0.0019) -0.0018 (0.0066)
Number of adult males -0.0028 (0.004) 0.0071 (0.0065)
Neighbors
Same village (=1) -0.0558*** (0.0169) -0.1107*** (0.0349)
Different village/town(=1) -0.117*** (0.0229) -0.1899*** (0.0572)
Kinship Link (=1) 0.0862*** (0.016) 0.0899*** (0.0263)
Members in Same IDDIRR 0.001 (0.0166) 0.001 (0.0303)
Members in Same Mahber -0.0316* (0.0189) -0.0285 (0.0378)
Members in Same Iqqub 0.054** (0.0276) 0.0005 (0.0574)
Share Cropping Relations -0.0205 (0.0307) 0.0296 (0.0598)
Oxen sharing Relations -0.0168 (0.0188) 0.0133 (0.0385)
Loan Exchange Relation 0.0062 (0.016) 0.0703 (0.0482)
Labor Sharing Relation 0.0179 (0.0164) 0.0605 (0.0409)
Wage Work Relation -0.0216 (0.0324) -0.1087 (0.0824)
Crop buying Relation 0.0704* (0.0403) 0.0381 (0.0744)
Other relationship 0.0206 (0.028) -0.0452 (0.0903)
Link supports HH. 0.0225 (0.0249) 0.1345*** (0.0483)
Link supported by HH 0.0184 (0.0292) -0.0586 (0.0753)
Link Helped by HH 0.0278 (0.0224) 0.0089 (0.0457)
Head’s Father relies on Link -0.039** (0.0157) -0.0069 (0.0397)
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,780 3,353
R-Squared 0.0264 0.040
Note: The base category for differences in land is more land; The Base category for neighbors it is next door neighbor.
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At household level, network information is constructed by aggregating the char-
acteristics of the individual links within the network and used to examine the fac-
tors which influence the proportion of persistent links for each household in the
data. This is motivated by the possibility of interdependence in the persistence
of links within a given network. Results from the estimation of the persistence of
links in risk-sharing networks at household level are presented below.
Table 31: Persistence of Links at Household Level (OLS & Tobit)
OLS Tobit
VARIABLES Prop.Persistent
Links
Std. Err Prop.Persistent
Links
Std. Err
Network size 0.0450*** (0.00500) 0.0607*** (0.00755)
Number of other People 0.00126* (0.000713) 0.00164* (0.000843)
Measure of Link Visibility 0.0957*** (0.0333) 0.145*** (0.0436)
Avg. Age Links -0.000576 (0.000690) -0.00124 (0.00102)
Prop. with Near plots 0.0157 (0.0217) 0.0199 (0.0306)
Prop. with less land -0.0214 (0.0218) -0.0287 (0.0308)
Prop. with same land 0.00450 (0.0219) 0.00874 (0.0316)
Number of oxes 0.000194 (0.000515) 0.000179 (0.000821)
Number of adult males -0.00703 (0.00509) -0.0135* (0.00771)
Prop. in Same village 0.0449** (0.0181) 0.0662*** (0.0255)
Prop. of relatives 0.0963*** (0.0191) 0.140*** (0.0276)
Prop. in same IDDIRR 0.00742 (0.0188) 0.0128 (0.0261)
Prop. in same Mahber -0.0293 (0.0212) -0.0409 (0.0294)
Prop. in same Iqqub 0.0528* (0.0304) 0.0702* (0.0409)
Prop. with share cropping R’ship -0.0535* (0.0293) -0.0661 (0.0430)
Prop. with oxen sharing R’ship -0.0267 (0.0203) -0.0357 (0.0280)
Prop. with money lending r’ship -0.0102 (0.0160) -0.0205 (0.0223)
Prop. with labor sharing r’ship -0.00119 (0.0171) 0.00244 (0.0234)
Prop. with wage work r’ship -0.0100 (0.0294) -0.00771 (0.0418)
Prop. with crop buying r’ship 0.111** (0.0444) 0.142** (0.0580)
Prop. with other r’ship 0.00283 (0.0277) -0.0134 (0.0391)
Prop. of links that helped hh -0.0458* (0.0268) -0.0749** (0.0374)
Prop. of links relying on hh. 0.0289 (0.0261) 0.0424 (0.0387)
Prop. of links helped by hh. 0.0520** (0.0221) 0.0708** (0.0326)
Prop. of links on which father relied -0.0508*** (0.0157) -0.0657*** (0.0220)
Constant 0.0519 (0.0484) -0.0617 (0.0719)
Observations 1,204 1,204
R-squared 0.116 0.109
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Social Factors
Social factors such as kinship ties significantly affect the probability that a
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given link is maintained overtime. The average marginal effects using link level
data indicate that links with family members are on average 8.6% more likely to
be maintained than non-family members. In the specification with household fixed
effects, a similar effect is observed albeit slightly larger (8.99%). Compared to the
effects of other link attributes, the estimated effect of kinship ties is fairly large.
At network level, increase in the number of links with family members as a pro-
portion of network size is positively associated with the number of persistent links
as a proportion of network size in both the OLS and Tobit estimated models. All
else equal, increase in the number of links with relatives is expected to increase
the proportion of persistent links by 9.63% on average.
Given that these arrangements are often implicit and informally structured, it
is not surprising that the persistence of links within risk-sharing networks is sig-
nificantly associated with the existence of kinship between households. Several
previous studies including Kinnan and Townsend (2012) have illustrated the role
of kinship in facilitating the formation of informal insurance arrangements. It is
thus not surprising that links with relatives are more likely to be maintained over-
time. In these communities, extended family members provide support to each
other in times of need. These arrangements often implicit and enforced through
moral obligations and commitment to preserving family ties enable households
mitigate the effects of shocks through state-contingent transfers. Jointly, these
factors enforce risk-sharing arrangements between family members making such
links persistence overtime. On the other hand, households are less likely to be so-
cially obliged to form risk-sharing arrangements with non-family members. Where
these arrangements exist, their persistence is likely to be constrained by enforce-
ment and monitoring costs associated with such links to ensure help is reciprocated
when needed.
Strategic Consideration
To examine the extent to which strategic considerations to maximize gains from
insurance affect the persistence of links, we consider link features such as land en-
dowment and connectedness of links. In terms of differences in land endowments
between the household and its links, links with less land compared to the house-
hold are less likely to be maintained relative to links with more land than the
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household. The effect is negative with an estimated average marginal effect of
approximately 3% decrease in the probability of persistence in both specifications
using link level data. However in the specification with household fixed effects, the
effect is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, differences in land endow-
ment of links with about the same land with the household and links with more
land than the household do not significantly affect persistence. The same effect
is observed in the household level analysis- households with more links with less
land on average have fewer persistent links. Therefore in general, in terms of land
endowments, links with less land than the household relying on her for support
are less likely to be maintained overtime. Although land is centrally allocated in
Ethiopia, households’ land endowment is assumed to be an indicator of influence in
society in addition to its typical role as an indicator of household wealth. Thus, all
else equal, households with more land are expected to be more reliable in provid-
ing support when in need thereby increasing incentives to maintain them overtime.
The effect of a link’s connectedness or ’visibility’ on persistence can also be exam-
ined through the context of strategic consideration. We approximate the connect-
edness of a link using the number of other individuals apart from the household
but within the sample who mention the link as part of their risk-sharing network.
It is assumed that through this measure, more connected or prominent individ-
uals within the community will be cited more often by other households. It is
observed that the marginal effect of increased connectedness on the probability of
link persistence is estimated to an increase of 8%. Adding household fixed effects,
the marginal effect decreases slightly to 6.8% but remains statistically significant.
At household level, networks with more connected links have a higher proportion
of persistence. Using the OLS estimated model, increase in the connectedness of
links with a given network, is expected to increase the proportion of persistent
links by 9.57% on average.
The effect of link connectedness on informal insurance can be analyzed through
spill-over gains from friends of friends’. By sharing risk with individuals who are
well-known or better connected within the society, households are likely to be bet-
ter supported directly or indirectly through the network and/or influence of such
individuals. In anticipation of these gains, households have incentives to maintain
highly connected individuals within their network to maximize gains from insur-
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ance.
Differences in distance to link or proximity also affect persistence overtime. We ex-
amine the role of spatial distance through different categories of neighbors: (next-
door) neighboring households, co-villagers and links in neighboring villages/towns.
Relative to links with next-door neighbors, co-villagers and links in neighboring
villages are significantly less likely to be maintained overtime. The probability
of preserving a link with a co-villager is on average 5.6% less likely when com-
pared to a link with a next-door neighbor. Similarly, links between households
in neighboring villages are on average 11.7% less likely to be preserved than links
between next-door neighbors. The effects are even larger when household fixed
effects are considered. The average marginal effects increase in magnitude to
11.1% and 18.99% respectively. Similar results are also observed in another mea-
sure of proximity-nearness of plots. On average, links between households with
neighboring farming areas are on average 4.8% more likely to be maintained over-
time. Using the aggregated network information at household level to control for
inter-dependence in the persistence of links shows similar results. In the OLS spec-
ification, it is observed that an increase in the number of links within the village
increases the proportion of persistent links in the network by 4.5% on average.
Similar results are observed in the tobit model.
The effect of proximity of links on informal insurance can be examined in two folds.
On one hand, nearer links (especially under this informal setting) are likely to be
family members and thus are maintained overtime for altruistic reasons. On the
other hand, risk-sharing with nearer links is less likely to be constrained by infor-
mation asymmetry about efforts and income. As a result, maintaining links with
neighboring households relative to other co-villagers and links in neighboring com-
munities maximizes gains from insurance. We examine this distinction between
neighbor and family members in the next section on persistence of specific links.
These results provide further empirical evidence that village risk-sharing arrange-
ments as previously studied in the literature may not provide full insurance (See
Townsend (1994)). To facilitate efficient risk-sharing, households are likely to form
these arrangements at lower levels within the village-through groups and networks.
The effect of other link attributes such as shared membership in local associations
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and other forms of support or relationship between households on link persistence
are mixed. In both the link and household level analysis, it is observed that shared
membership in borrowing and lending societies (Iqqub) and funeral societies (ID-
DIRR) are associated with increased likelihood of persistence although the effect
of the latter is small and statistically insignificant. On the other hand, links in
the same social group (Mahber) with the household are less likely to be preserved
overtime. However, this effect is only significant in the link level analysis with-
out household fixed effects. The persistence of links from Iqqubs and IDDIRRs
is perhaps driven by the increased interaction between households through these
groups formed to provide insurance against risk due to income loss and funeral
costs respectively. Through meetings and other group activities, the bond be-
tween members increases yielding spill-over gains in the form of mutual support
and trust which translates into risk-sharing beyond the group- at a more inter-
household level. As a result of these gains, households may find it strategically
beneficial to preserve such links overtime.
In general, while indicators of strategic considerations appear to significantly affect
the persistence of links in risk-sharing networks, the role of social factors cannot be
ruled out. The magnitude of the effect of kinship relative to other factors on link
persistence illustrates the extent to which social factors drives the formation of
risk-sharing arrangements. However, other attributes of links such as their wealth
and influence, proximity and connectedness also affect the dynamics of these in-
formal arrangements.
4.4.1 Heterogeneity in the Persistence of Links
The previous section, does not take into account the possibility of heterogene-
ity in the underlying mechanism which drives the formation of risk-sharing ar-
rangements across links. To achieve insurance through risk-sharing, households
can strategically choose risk-sharing partners and/or altruistically rely on family
members within their networks. The extent to which these mechanisms are ob-
served in risk-sharing arrangements is likely to differ across links in endogenously
defined risk-sharing networks. In general, it is reasonable to expect that these links
facilitate the exchange of various kinds of support between households which are in
principle insurance mechnisms. Given that we defined a household’s risk-sharing
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network as a collection of coalitions formed with individual households, it is rea-
sonable to expect that the mechanism which drive the formation of risk-sharing is
heterogeneous across links which represent the coalitions. These differences may
not be easily identified in the model specified above. In light of these concerns, we
examine the persistence of specific links such as:
• Family/kinship links;
• Links with neighbors;
• Labor sharing relationships;
• Financial/money-lending relationships.
by estimating equation (60) for each category of links. A similar approach (at least
conceptually) is implemented by Jackson et al. (2012) in examining various forms
of favor exchanges between households in rural India.
Testable Hypothesis
• We expect that the persistence of links with family members is more likely
to be influenced by social factors. We compare this with the persistence
of links with neighbors which is expected to be more sensitive to strategic
considerations.
• Similarly, the persistence of links for labor sharing is likely to be influenced by
strategic considerations such as proximity whereas the persistence of financial
links is more likely to be sensitive to strategic considerations such as wealth
and trust.
• In general, links with family members and neighbors are likely to be more
sensitive to social factors whereas links which facilitate labor sharing or money
lending are likely to be more associated with strengthening insurance.
The average marginal effects are presented below:
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Table 32: Average Marginal Effects: Persistence of Sub-sample of Links (Kinship & Links with Neighbors)
Kinship Links Links With Neighbors
Basic Fixed Effects Basic Fixed Effects
Variable dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err
Network size 0.014 (0.009) 0.031** (0.014)
Number of other People 0 (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001)
Measure of Link Visibility∗ 0.074** (0.031) 0.043 (0.041) 0.077*** (0.025) 0.107** (0.044)
Age 0 (0.001) 0 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002)
Near plots 0.042** (0.02) 0.066** (0.031) 0.08*** (0.023) 0.114** (0.051)
Land Endowment:
Less Land=1 -0.035 (0.022) -0.059* (0.035) -0.007 (0.028) -0.016 (0.052)
About the Same=1 0.006 (0.024) -0.011 (0.033) 0.018 (0.028) -0.017 (0.053)
Number of Oxen 0.001 (0.004) -0.002 (0.009) -0.002 (0.003) 0.007 (0.017)
Number of adult males -0.001 (0.005) 0.003 (0.008) -0.006 (0.006) 0.019 (0.016)
Neighbors
Same village (=1) -0.054** (0.022) -0.093** (0.043)
Different village/town(=1) -0.135*** (0.027) -0.181*** (0.07)
Members in Same IDDIRR -0.007 (0.022) 0.003 (0.04) 0.029 (0.025) 0.07 (0.066)
Members in Same Mahber -0.021 (0.024) -0.031 (0.046) -0.059** (0.03) -0.082 (0.105)
Members in Same Iqqub 0.06* (0.034) 0.005 (0.087) 0.023 (0.044) -0.034 (0.116)
Share Cropping Relations -0.032 (0.023) 0.024 (0.048) 0.024 (0.03) -0.034 (0.102)
Oxen sharing Relations 0.015 (0.02) 0.088 (0.057) -0.011 (0.025) -0.033 (0.13)
Loan Exchange Relation 0 (0.021) 0.101* (0.053) 0.051** (0.024) 0.002 (0.104)
Labor Sharing Relation 0.009 (0.037) 0.042 (0.078) -0.101* (0.054) 0.126 (0.17)
Wage Work Relation -0.05 (0.041) -0.138 (0.123) 0.037 (0.049) -0.248 (0.183)
Crop buying Relation 0.02 (0.049) -0.064 (0.109) 0.163*** (0.056) 0.076 (0.152)
Other relationship -0.036 (0.039) -0.075 (0.115) 0.114*** (0.036) -0.411 (0.26)
Link supports HH. 0.01 (0.033) 0.159** (0.069) 0.033 (0.036) 0.161 (0.101)
Link supported by HH 0.027 (0.041) -0.079 (0.1) 0.002 (0.038) -0.036 (0.175)
Link Helped by HH 0.042 (0.027) 0.074 (0.065) 0.014 (0.036) -0.15 (0.099)
Head’s Father relies on Link -0.022 (0.019) -0.039 (0.053) -0.09*** (0.028) 0.044 (0.102)
Number of observations 3,1319 1,984 1,641 881
R-Squared 0.020 0.0457 0.0499 0.0440
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Kinship Links
A key result from the analysis of link persistence using both household and
link level network data is that links with family members or kinsmen are highly
persistent relative to links with non-family members. However, with network infor-
mation on the various attributes of links available at link level, the heterogeneity
of persistence across a sub-sample of links (such as family members) can be ex-
amined. We investigate why kinship links are highly persistent through the effect
of other attributes of kinship links on their persistence. The estimated marginal
effects indicate that the effect of land, ox and labor endowments on the persistence
of links with family members is not statistically significant. Although these factors
have been found to affect other links perhaps due to their effect on maximizing
gains from insurance, their effect on the persistence of family links is statistically
insignificant. However, proximity of family links (both in terms of neighborhood
and farming area) significantly increases their persistence as observed in both spec-
ifications with and without household fixed effects. In particular, links with family
members in the same village and in other villages/towns are less likely to persist
than links with next-door neighboring family members by 9.3% and 18.1% respec-
tively. Similar albeit smaller effects are observed in the basic specification without
household fixed effects-5.4% and 13.5% respectively. Also, shared farming area
with a family member on whom a given household relies on for support increases
the probability of persistence by 6.6% (or 4.2% in the benchmark specification)
on average. Other effects such as the connectedness of the link are also associ-
ated with increasing the probability of persistence of links with family members
by 7.4%. However, this effect is only statistically significant in the absence of
household fixed effects.
Therefore, while links with family members are likely to persist overtime due to
altruism (since household characteristics such as endowments of land, ox and labor
are statistically insignificant), the proximity of these links (in terms of neighbor-
hood and farming area) are also positively associated with being preserved over-
time. Thus among risk-sharing arrangements with family members, those nearer
to the household are likely to be more persistent. The effect of proximity is likely
to occur due to the fact these arrangements often exist in closely knitted societies
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where extended families form villages and thus rely on each other for support. The
result that households are likely to rely on individuals they share kinship ties with
and that such relationships are highly persistent overtime is in line with the pre-
vious studies that these implicit systems of support are often established among
family members since they are often socially obliged to support each other in times
of need.
These results also illustrate the effect of diversity in the composition of risk-sharing
networks and the overlapping characteristics of links within these networks. By
jointly considering these factors, the underlying mechanisms which drive the per-
sistence of risk-sharing arrangements overtime can be understood. Although the
ultimate objective of risk-sharing is to achieve insurance, to the individual house-
holds, the role of each link towards this goal might differ based on relationship,
wealth, proximity among other factors. These factors are often ignored in studies
on informal insurance through risk-sharing groups. As a result, the use of endoge-
nous risk-sharing networks provides a significant contribution in this regard- in
terms of data and modeling.
Links with Neighbors
Due to the overlapping nature of link attributes in the data, and to avoid repeat-
ing the the analysis in the previous sub-section in which we examined the persis-
tence of family links, we differentiate neighbors between family and non-family to
be able to examine the differences in the persistence of links with family members
and neighbors. In this sub-section we examine risk-sharing among neighbors by fo-
cusing on the persistence of links with non-family neighbors. This sub-set of links
also represents a substantial proportion of risk-sharing partners in rural Ethiopia.
Despite the absence of kinship relations between such neighbors, repeated interac-
tions between these often facilitates mutual support in times of need. The gains
from proximity whether in terms of access to insurance or relaxing constraints due
to monitoring and enforcement of agreements are expected to be higher among
neighboring non-family households who choose to share risk. For these links, it is
observed that connectedness of a link and shared relationships significantly affect
their persistence. For instance, all else equal, increase in connectedness of a link is
expected to increase the persistence of links with non-family neighbors by 7.7% on
185
average (and up to 10.7% with household fixed effects). Similarly, the existence of
money-lending, crop-buying and other relationships are associated with increased
probability of persistence by 5.1%, 16.3% and 11.4% respectively. As can be seen
the largest effect is observed in links with crop-buying relationships. Surprisingly,
the existence of labor sharing relationship has an opposite effect. However, these
effects are statistically insignificant in the specification with household fixed effects.
Similarly, differences in endowments of land, ox and labor are all statistically in-
significant in the persistence of links with neighbors in both specifications. Thus it
appears, differences in endowments of land and labor or wealth measured through
number of ox do not seem to influence the persistence of links with neighbors.
These relationships indicate the extent to which scale of interactions between
neighbors affects households’ reliance on their neighbors for support in times of
need. An increase in inter-household interactions is likely to strengthen bonds of
friendship and trust resulting in mutual support between households (irrespective
of differences in endowments). The effectiveness of informal insurance through
these relationships may be facilitated by lower monitoring and enforcement costs
making concerns about information asymmetry less likely to constrain risk-sharing.
Although households may feel obliged by social norms to support neighbors, the
persistence of these arrangements is likely to be sensitive to households’ ability to
monitor the efforts and activities of its neighbors and enforceability of quid-pro-
quo for efficient risk-sharing. For instance, where links with money-lending and
crop-buying relationships exist between neighbors, their persistence is likely to be
associated with the trust-worthiness (especially with the repayment of loans) of the
borrowing and/or buying household which are built through repeated interactions.
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Table 33: Average Marginal Effects: Persistence of Sub-sample of Links (Labor-Sharing & Financial Links)
Labor Sharing Links Money Lending/Financial Links
Basic Fixed Effects Basic Fixed Effects
Variable dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err
Network size 0.007 (0.013) 0.038*** (0.013)
Number of other People 0.001 (0.001) 0.002* (0.001)
Measure of Link Visibility∗ 0.087*** (0.033) 0.075 (0.046) 0.1*** (0.03) 0.094** (0.041)
Age -0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Near plots 0.049** (0.024) 0.105*** (0.036) 0.043** (0.022) 0.056* (0.034)
Land Endowment:
Less Land=1 -0.007 (0.027) -0.015 (0.039) -0.009 (0.023) 0.022 (0.033)
About the Same=1 0.005 (0.03) -0.016 (0.039) 0.035 (0.026) 0.055 (0.035)
Number of Oxen -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.009) 0 (0.002) 0.005 (0.007)
Number of adult males -0.01 (0.007) -0.004 (0.011) -0.019*** (0.006) -0.003 (0.009)
Neighbors
Same village (=1) -0.088*** (0.026) -0.215*** (0.056) -0.062*** (0.023) -0.102* (0.053)
Different village/town(=1) -0.06 (0.05) -0.188* (0.11) -0.113*** (0.032) -0.251*** (0.091)
Kinship Link (=1) 0.059** (0.024) 0.083** (0.042) 0.12*** (0.023) 0.088** (0.039)
Members in Same IDDIRR 0.031 (0.028) 0.033 (0.051) -0.028 (0.023) -0.025 (0.04)
Members in Same Mahber -0.017 (0.026) 0.031 (0.056) -0.01 (0.024) -0.018 (0.05)
Members in Same Iqqub 0.061* (0.035) -0.038 (0.095) 0.049 (0.036) -0.022 (0.081)
Share Cropping Relations -0.014 (0.037) 0 (0.08) 0.049 (0.048) 0.076 (0.075)
Oxen sharing Relations -0.052** (0.024) 0.003 (0.055) -0.051** (0.024) -0.07 (0.052)
Labor Sharing Relation 0.032 (0.022) 0.072 (0.058)
Loan Exchange Relation 0.022 (0.024) 0.106 (0.07)
Wage Work Relation 0.006 (0.051) -0.132 (0.14) 0.014 (0.057) 0.017 (0.132)
Crop buying Relation 0.063 (0.055) 0.036 (0.111) 0.126** (0.05) 0.139 (0.128)
Other relationship -0.033 (0.049) -0.302 (0.186) -0.013 (0.075) -0.032 (0.326)
Link supports HH. 0.021 (0.041) -0.024 (0.099) 0.035 (0.041) 0.041 (0.091)
Link supported by HH 0.125*** (0.045) 0.161 (0.144) -0.021 (0.047) 0.004 (0.126)
Link Helped by HH 0.004 (0.039) -0.075 (0.091) 0.054 (0.034) 0.059 (0.089)
Head’s Father relies on Link -0.062*** (0.024) 0.044 (0.062) -0.069*** (0.022) -0.009 (0.056)
Number of observations 2,087 1,442 2,354 1,602
R-Squared 0.0279 0.0577 0.0453 0.0414
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Labor Sharing Links
Since farming is the major economic activity of these households, the pres-
ence of labor sharing relationships can help mitigate shocks to labor supply due
to illness or death of family members, among other sources of labor shortage.
The persistence of links which facilitate labor sharing has been examined through
various attributes of links. It is observed that the persistence of labor sharing re-
lationships is largely driven by proximity and kinship ties. Links with near plots,
neighboring households and co-members of local association are all individually
associated with increase probability of maintaining links with labor sharing rela-
tionship. On average, labor sharing relationships are 5.9% more likely to persist
among links with kinship ties and 4.9% more likely to persistent when established
with links whose plots are near the household’s. With household fixed effects, the
estimated marginal effects are larger and still statistically significant- 8.3% and
10.5% respectively. The connectedness of these links also increases the probability
of persistence by 8.7% on average.
Also, differences in the proximity of links within networks across households signif-
icantly affect the persistence of links which facilitate labor-sharing between house-
holds. Relative to neighboring households, labor-sharing with co-villagers and links
in nearby villages/towns are 21.5% and 18.8% less likely to maintained overtime.
However, the effect of the latter is statistically insignificant in the specification
without household fixed effects. Also co-members of local associations such as
savings associations (Iqqub) are 6.1% more likely to be maintained.
The role of proximity on the persistence of links with labor sharing relationships is
perhaps driven by efficiency reasons. For labor sharing links to be effective, they
need to be established with reliable individuals such as family members and within
reach such as neighboring households; especially where the risk of labor shortage
cannot be anticipated with reasonable certainty. As a result, to maximize gains
from labor sharing arrangements as insurance mechanisms, the proximity of links
in terms of plots, household and shared activity is likely to play an important role.
Money Lending/Financial Links
In the absence of formal credit markets, money lending relationships enable
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households to mitigate income shocks by providing quasi-credit. It is observed
that the persistence of these financial links are driven by kinship, connectedness,
proximity, and existence of a crop buying/selling relationship. Among family mem-
bers, money lending relationships are on average 12% more likely to be maintained
overtime- a smaller effect of 8.8% is observed with household fixed effects. Given
that kinship is closely linked with proximity, it is also observed that relative to
money-lending relationships with next-door neighbors, such links with other house-
holds within the same village and in neighboring villages/towns are significantly
less likely to be maintained by 6.2% and 11.3% respectively. The effects are much
larger in the specification with household fixed effects estimated at 10.2% and
25.1% respectively. Another indicator of proximity- near farming plots is also pos-
itively associated with increased persistence of money lending links.
Another feature of links which strengthens the persistence of links with money-
lending relationship is the presence of a crop buying/selling relationship. On av-
erage, the presence of such relationship increases the probability of maintaining
links with money lending relationship by 12.6% all else equal.
These factors can be interpreted as the role of reliability and accessibility in the ef-
fectiveness of financial links. As highlighted before, links with family members are
particularly reliable in providing quasi-credit. This has been documented in previ-
ous studies such as Udry (1994). The effectiveness of kinship networks in providing
credit is perhaps due to altruism implicit in such relationships. Similarly, the ef-
fect of proximity and crop buying/selling relationships indicates the role repeated
interactions between households in these informal arrangements. This strength-
ens trust, indicates financial ability and reliability of financial links in providing
support when needed. Thus, to maximize gains from insurance through money
lending relationships, households maintain links with neighboring households and
those who have previously purchased or sold crop output, or family members who
facilitate quasi-credit.
Therefore in summary, the results presented in this section illustrate the hetero-
geneity in the persistence of specific links within risk-sharing networks. Through
these analyses it is observed that kinship links play a particularly important role
in risk-sharing. This is perhaps because these informal insurance arrangements
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are largely built on altruism typical in relationships between family members and
close neighbors. Another interesting result is the fact that differences in endow-
ment such as land and ox are typically insignificant (on statistical grounds) once
we consider sub-sets of links within risk-sharing arrangements do not appear to
influence the persistence of links. This may be attributed to the possibility that
the implied arrangement (in the case of labor-sharing and money-lending) or type
of relationship (in the case of links with family members and neighbors) are given
first order importance in the persistence of links as oppose to differences in en-
dowments. Furthermore, it is equally possible that these insurance schemes may
occur in the form of moral support rather than state-contingent transfers. As such,
relative differences in endowments may have a lesser effect than anticipated.
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4.5 Robustness Test
In this section, we examine the robustness of the results presented above to the
truncation of the network size. Since households were asked to list at most five
individuals they rely on for support, our estimation of the factors which influence
the persistence of links is likely to be biased for households with more than five
individuals. For households listing less than five individuals, it is reasonable to
assume that the full risk-sharing network of these households is captured. We ex-
amine whether the results are sensitive to these differences in network size due to
truncation by estimating two separate specifications of link persistence with and
without household fixed effects. In the first specification, we examine the persis-
tence of links for households with less than five links- i.e. with full risk-sharing
network. In the second specification, we examine the persistence of links for house-
holds listing up to five risk-sharing links.
As can be seen below, some of the effects are consistent across both specifications
(except for the specification for households with less than five members estimated
with household fixed effects perhaps due to loss of observations to degrees of free-
dom resulting in a much smaller sample size). In particular, indicators of social
factors such as proximity of a link (both in terms of neighborhood or farming
area) and existence of kinship ties influence link persistence. Other factors such as
the connectedness of a link (which is associated with strategic consideration) also
increase the probability of a link being persist in both specifications.
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Table 34: Robustness of Persistence of Links to Differences in Network Size due to Truncation
Less than 5 Members 5 Members
Basic Fixed Effects Basic Fixed Effects
Variable dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err
Network size -0.001 (0.015) 0***
Number of other People 0.002 (0.003) 0.001* (0.001)
Measure of Link Visibility∗ 0.113** (0.054) 0.064 (0.088) 0.072*** (0.021) 0.065** (0.026)
Age -0.001 (0.001) 0 (0.002) 0 (0.001) 0 (0.001)
Near plots 0.017 (0.032) 0.107* (0.063) 0.061*** (0.018) 0.069*** (0.025)
Land Endowment:
Less Land=1 -0.043 (0.032) -0.028 (0.068) -0.021 (0.02) -0.021 (0.026)
About the Same=1 0.027 (0.033) 0.001 (0.061) 0.005 (0.022) -0.003 (0.026)
Number of Oxen 0 (0.004) 0.035 (0.024) -0.002 (0.002) -0.005 (0.007)
Number of adult males 0.003 (0.006) 0.011 (0.012) -0.005 (0.005) 0.006 (0.007)
Neighbors
Same village (=1) -0.038 (0.033) -0.092 (0.09) -0.061*** (0.02) -0.095*** (0.037)
Different village/town(=1) -0.109*** (0.039) -0.001 (0.107) -0.12*** (0.028) -0.222*** (0.067)
Kinship Link (=1) 0.111*** (0.032) 0.063 (0.062) 0.079*** (0.019) 0.086*** (0.028)
Members in Same IDDIRR -0.041 (0.031) 0.025 (0.083) 0.016 (0.02) 0.002 (0.029)
Members in Same Mahber 0.003 (0.035) 0.081 (0.102) -0.04* (0.022) -0.043 (0.038)
Members in Same Iqqub 0.028 (0.043) 0.04 (0.13) 0.063* (0.033) -0.018 (0.058)
Share Cropping Relations -0.071 (0.058) 0.033 (0.154) -0.01 (0.036) 0.048 (0.06)
Oxen sharing Relations -0.033 (0.035) -0.039 (0.094) -0.013 (0.022) 0.026 (0.038)
Loan Exchange Relation -0.007 (0.029) -0.069 (0.124) 0.016 (0.019) 0.088* (0.049)
Labor Sharing Relation 0.024 (0.029) 0.032 (0.113) 0.013 (0.019) 0.059 (0.04)
Wage Work Relation 0.015 (0.043) -0.176 (0.183) -0.039 (0.042) -0.077 (0.085)
Crop buying Relation 0.054 (0.054) -0.067 (0.208) 0.077 (0.054) 0.054 (0.073)
Other relationship -0.033 (0.06) -0.111 (0.185) 0.035 (0.032) -0.016 (0.093)
Link supports HH. 0.04 (0.049) 0.054 (0.141) 0.018 (0.029) 0.129*** (0.049)
Link supported by HH 0.06 (0.055) -0.188 (0.173) 0.002 (0.036) 0.015 (0.077)
Link Helped by HH -0.014 (0.043) 0.266** (0.133) 0.043* (0.026) -0.035 (0.046)
Head’s Father relies on Link 0.026 (0.028) -0.079 (0.098) -0.061*** (0.018) 0.013 (0.039)
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 1,153 568 3,622 2,780
R-Squared 0.0358 0.0651 0.0271 0.0445
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4.6 Conclusion
Risk is inherent in the livelihood of rural households in developing countries.
Exposure to adverse climate and health conditions, loss of property and livestock,
food price shocks among others affect household welfare. In the absence of formal
insurance and credit markets in these communities, farmers can internalize such
markets through risk-sharing. This involves the pooling of resources of family
members or relatives, friends, or members of semi-formal associations to explicitly
share risk (such as funeral societies in Ethiopia) or implicitly provide mutual sup-
port (as in family networks). Despite the differences in the underlying mechanism,
these arrangements share a common objective of providing insurance. Enforcement
of agreements to share risk is often achieved through various mechanisms such as
quid-pro-quo, social norms or group rules. Empirical studies on the effectiveness
of these arrangements report evidence of partial insurance against idiosyncratic
shocks but not full insurance.
We contribute to this literature by examining the underlying mechanism which
drives the persistence of informal insurance arrangements facilitated by mutual
support relationships between households. Using information about household
networks, we consider two popular explanations for the existence of links within
risk-sharing networks: strategic considerations to maximize gains from insurance;
and social factors such as altruism. We examine the role of these factors on the
dynamics of risk-sharing networks through the persistence of links and the extent
to which the changes in network composition overtime are influenced by utility
maximizing behavior or social factors.
We use two rounds of data on various attributes of links in risk-sharing networks
of households in rural Ethiopia collected over a five year interval (2004 and 2009).
We use this information to identify persistent links as links which are maintained
in both rounds by a given household. Through the various attributes of the links
in these networks, we investigate the factors which influence persistence of links
overtime at household and at link level. The objective of the former is to cap-
ture the possibility that the persistence of links may be interdependent within a
given network- i.e. a given household’s decision to maintain a certain link may be
influenced by the persistence of another link. On the other hand, to capture the
heterogeneity in the attributes of links within the network, we examine persistence
at link level with clustered standard errors at the household level. Using the same
approach, we also test our hypothesis on specific sub-sets of links such as kinships,
neighbors, labor-sharing and money lending relationships to account for possible
heterogeneity in the persistence of various links within the network.
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We find that link attributes such as kinship relations, proximity (especially next-
door neighbors), connectedness of links and endowments (such as land) signifi-
cantly influence the persistence of links in risk-sharing networks. In the context of
informal insurance arrangements, these results are in line with both strategic con-
siderations to maximize gains from insurance and social factors such as altruism.
The effect of kinship, proximity and connectedness are robust to the truncation
of network size, interdependence in the persistence of links at household level and
unobserved household heterogeneity. By forming agreements of mutual support
with neighbors, relatives, and others with whom households share activities with,
monitoring and enforcements costs in risk sharing agreements are lowered thereby
making informal insurance more effective. Furthermore, by sharing risk with fam-
ily members, constraints due to commitment are less likely to be binding since
enforcement can be achieved through altruism and other social norms. Similarly,
the proximity of links is also likely to lower incentives to shirk and/or misreport
earnings since households can effortlessly monitor activities of other households.
We also observe that the underlying mechanisms which drive the persistence of
risk-sharing relationships are sensitive to the heterogeneity of links in terms of
shared activity and relationship (such as kinship, neighborhood or type of sup-
port). While links with family members are likely to persist overtime due to
altruism (since household characteristics such as endowments of land, oxes and la-
bor are statistically insignificant), the proximity of these links (in terms of neigh-
borhood and farming area) are also positively associated with being preserved
overtime. Comparatively, the persistence of links with neighbors is influenced by
connectedness and shared activities. These attributes can be interpreted as in-
dicators of strategic considerations as discussed above suggesting that links with
non-family neighbors are often formed with the goal of maximizing gains from
insurance. Similar differences are also observed between labor-sharing and money
lending/financial links.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Description of Variables
Table 35: Description of Variables
Variable Description
Network size The number of individuals listed by household head. Truncated at 5.
maintained link in 2009 (=1) Binary variable indicating whether a link listed in 2009 was also listed in 2004.
proportion of stable links At household level, proportion of links listed in 2009 which were listed in 2004.
Measure of Link Visibility Calculated as the number of times a link is mentioned by others within the Community.
Number of Oxes Number of oxes owned by link.
Number of other People Number of other individuals household can rely on for support as reported by household
head.
Age Age of link.
Near plots Binary variable indicating household and link have plots near each other.
HHs with more land Binary variable indicating link has more land than the household
HHs with less land Binary variable indicating link has less land than the household
HHs with the same land Binary variable indicating link has about the same land than the household
Number of adult males Number of adult males in link’s household
Neighboring members Link is a next-door neighbor of the household.
Member in Same village Link is a co-village neighbor of the household.
Member in Different village Link is a neighbor from a different village/town.
Members with Kinship ties Link shares kinship ties with the household head.
Neighbors with Kinship ties Link shares both kinship ties and neighborhood with the household head.
Members in Same IDDIRR Link is a co-member in a funeral society (IDDIRR)
Members in Same Mahber Link is a co-member in a social group (Mahber)
Members in Same Iqqub Link is a co-member in a borrowing and lending society (Iqqub)
Share Cropping Relations Household has a share-cropping relationship with household head.
Oxen sharing Relations Household has an oxen-sharing relationship with link.
Loan Exchange Relation Household has a loan-exchange relationship with link.
Labor Sharing Relation Household has a labor-sharing relationship with link.
Link supports HH. Link supports the household in times of need.
Link supported by HH The household supports the link in times of need.
Link Helped by HH The link received help from the household in the past.
Head’s Father relies on Link Household head’s father relied on link for support in times of need.
195
5 Conclusion
Several studies have considered various aspects of subsistence farmers who form
a substantial share of the population of rural communities in developing coun-
tries. Understanding the behavior of farming households as both producers and
consumers through observed choices has been a complex task. It is widely docu-
mented that the economic environment in these communities has a significant effect
on the nature of the relationship between production and consumption decisions
of farmers. For instance, the state markets faced by farmers such as the pres-
ence of transactions costs to market participation; or incomplete markets such as
missing credit or insurance markets; imposes constraints on household decisions.
Since farmers are involved in both production and consumption decisions, they
have incentives to respond to the constraints on consumption decisions through
production choices and/or informal strategies to replace formal markets. As a
result of this relationship, separately examining the extent to which observed pro-
duction and consumption decisions are profit and utility maximizing respectively
may not be an appropriate technique to understanding household behavior since it
ignores the joint determination of household decisions. Similarly, under such mar-
ket conditions, strategies devised by households to ’create’ missing markets have
important bearing on the understanding of household behavior and the develop-
ment of appropriate policy to improve the welfare of farming households. These
features which are typical of subsistence farmers in developing countries have been
the motivation for several studies on the various aspects of household decisions
and interactions between households; vis-a-vis market conditions.
The chapters in this thesis consider the decisions of farming households relat-
ing to crop choices, marketing of farm output and risk-sharing arrangements. We
investigate the extent to which these decisions are influenced by the state of mar-
kets faced by farmers. In particular, we examine the extent to which constraints
on consumption decisions can be relaxed through production decisions such as the
production of food crops and allocation of farm output for household consump-
tion rather than market exchange. We examine this relationship in the first two
empirical chapters of the thesis using data on crop choices and allocation of farm
output respectively. In the final chapter, we consider risk-sharing through mutual
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support between households as informal insurance arrangements under missing in-
surance markets. We focus on the persistence of these relationships overtime and
the extent to which they are driven by strategic factors to maximize gains from
insurance or social factors such as altruism.
The results from the various analysis indicate that farmers’ choice of crops are
sensitive to both indicators of household food demand, risk preferences and indi-
cators of transactions costs to market participation such as distance to market and
improvement in community and market infrastructure. These results highlight the
importance of market integration and improvements in market and community
infrastructure (which lower transactions costs) for subsistence farmers. Similar ef-
fects are also observed in the allocation of farm harvest between market exchange
and household consumption. These effects are interpreted as farmers’ efforts to
internalize food markets through crop choices and use of farm harvest for house-
hold consumption under binding constraints on household food consumption such
as the presence of transactions costs or missing insurance markets. Under these
conditions, farmers derive higher utility from balancing household food consump-
tion through farm output rather than market purchases. As a result, jointness in
household decisions occurs since farmers produce food crops to reduce reliance on
food markets in satisfying household consumption.
In terms of informal insurance arrangements through mutual support between
households, we found that link attributes such as kinship relations, proximity (both
in terms of neighborhood and farming area), connectedness of links and endow-
ments (such as land) significantly influence the persistence of links in risk-sharing
networks. Further examination of the persistence of specific links indicate that
the effects of these factors differ in magnitude and statistical significance across
links with family members and neighbors; as well as based on type of relationship-
money-lending and labor sharing links. These results highlight the importance of
inter-household interactions between family members and close neighbors in in-
suring households against shocks especially where formal insurance contracts are
absent. For these households, the existence and persistence of these relationships
is likely to enhance their ability to mitigate shocks of various forms thereby im-
proving welfare.
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In summary, these results highlight the complex nature of the relationship between
production and consumption decisions of subsistence farmers. Under the market
conditions faced by farmers, the possibility of satisfying household consumption
through household production occurs both directly (through the use of farm har-
vest for household consumption) and indirectly (through the use of returns from
market exchange of farm output to finance household consumption). In addition,
the presence of non-market strategies developed through the interactions between
households contributes in relaxing constraints due to missing markets. For these
households whose main economic activity is rain-fed farming, uncertainty about
rains introduces risk of yield and income loss. However, the ability to share risk
by pooling resources among several other informal strategies constitute reasonable
substitutes to formal markets.
These results reiterate the importance of understanding the extent to which the
decisions of farming households are jointly determined and its sensitivity to ex-
isting market conditions. Furthermore, household responses to missing markets
or markets for which they face binding participation constraints have significant
bearing on both techniques used to examine the behavior of these households
and in the design and implementation of appropriate policy. It is imperative for
government and other partner institutions such as NGOs to understand the impli-
cation of policy interventions such as increase of prices of farm output, provision
of subsidies or index insurance without considering the nature of the relationship
between production and consumption decisions of a given household, or the exis-
tence of informal arrangements to substitute missing markets. As a result of these
interventions, negative consequences such as crowding out of gains from effective
and existing informal institutions, uneven distribution or reallocation of welfare
across farmers, weak response to policy intervention among others. On the other
hand, where the development of policy takes into consideration the existence of
non-market arrangements and the interdependence of household production and
consumption decisions, interventions can be designed to complement these exist-
ing arrangements such that farmers’ welfare can be improved. This can occur by
strengthening the existing informal institutions and improving market conditions
to ease the jointness in household decisions thereby enhancing the commercializa-
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tion of agriculture for the benefit of farmers, their communities and the economy.
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